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Brazil is currently immersed in the project of building a new common market, 
known as MERCOSUR, with its neighbors Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay.   It has 
largely been assumed that this project will produce economic growth and therefore be 
beneficial for the environment.  However, this assumption has recently come into 
question, as a result of Brazilian and Argentinean efforts to regulate the environmental 
and health risks associated with retreaded tire imports.  Despite the protests of 
environmentalists, MERCOSUR and WTO tribunals have now issued three separate 
decisions finding that these measures violate international trade rules. This dissertation 
examines whether these decisions were correctly decided in light of the relevant scholarly 
literature on the relationship between trade liberalization and environmental protection, 
and on regulatory competition theory. I argue that the test applied by WTO and 
 
 viii
MERCOSUR panels in trade and environment disputes gives insufficient weight to the 
lessons learned from this literature, and that future panels should adopt a new approach 
that explicitly draws on these lessons.  I then attempt to apply this new approach to the 
retreaded tire dispute, based on my own examination of the relevant economic and 
scientific data, and individual interviews I conducted with representatives of the Brazilian 
government, the Brazilian tire industry, and MERCOSUR.   
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The MERCOSUR and WTO Retreaded Tires Dispute: 







Brazil is currently immersed in the project of helping to build a new common 
market, known as MERCOSUR, with its neighboring countries Argentina, Uruguay and 
Paraguay. Participation in this project has led to a widespread focus on the need to 
eliminate barriers to regional trade, including regional differences in environmental 
regulation.  Increased regional trade is widely seen as complementary to environmental 
protection, based on the assumption that trade will increase the resources available to 
protect the environment, and that regulatory “harmonization” will ensure more effective 
environmental protection.1 
 
These assumptions have recently come into question in the context of Brazilian 
efforts to regulate the environmental and health risks associated with retreaded tires.  
These tires are made from tires that have already been used and are no longer usable, but 
are then subjected to a reconditioning process that extends their usable life.2  The use of 
                                                 
1 For a discussion of the view that trade is beneficial for the environment, see e.g. JAGDISH BHAGWATI, 
FREE TRADE TODAY (2002). 
2 The reconditioning process involves stripping the worn tread from a used tire’s skeleton (casing) and 
replacing it with new material in the form of a new tread and, sometimes, new material also covering parts 
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retreaded tires has significant economic benefits, and has become the object of extensive 
international trade.  Over time, however, it has become apparent that retreaded tires are 
associated with significant health and environmental risks.  In response, both Argentina 
and Brazil banned the importation of retreaded tires.  Despite the protests of 
environmentalists, MERCOSUR tribunals have now issued two separate decisions 
finding that these import bans violate MERCOSUR rules.  In a third case filed by the 
European Union (EU), a World Trade Organization (WTO) panel has ruled that Brazil’s 
ban on retreaded tire imports also violates WTO rules. 
 
This dissertation examines the question of whether these decisions were correctly 
decided in light of the relevant scholarly literature.  I look first at the literature on the 
relationship between trade liberalization and environmental protection, and the  
arguments raised by critics such as Herman Daly, who asserts that “[e]nvironmental 
degradation is an iatrogenic disease induced by the economic physicians (pro-growth 
advocates) who attempt to treat the sickness with unlimited wants by prescribing 
unlimited production.”3  In addition, I examine the literature on regulatory competition 
theory, based on the work of Charles Tiebout,4 which asserts that regulatory 
                                                                                                                                                 
or all of the sidewalls. Under international standards, passenger car tires may be retread only once.   See 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Regulation No. 1-9 (1998), p. 6.2. 
3 HERMAN DALY, BEYOND GROWTH (1996) (arguing that “[w]e do not cure a treatment-induced disease by 
increasing the treatment dosage.”); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK 9 (2006) (arguing 
that the way globalization has been managed leads to the advancement of “material values over other 
values, such as a concern for the environment or for life itself.”). 
4 Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, LXIV THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
416 (1956) (presenting a solution for the level of expenditures for local public goods which reflects the 
preferences of the population more adequately than they can be reflected at the national level). 
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harmonization may actually reduce the level of environmental protection, and that 
environmental regulation is likely to be most effective when jurisdictions are allowed to 
adopt competing regulatory approaches.   
 
I argue that international trade tribunals need to pay greater attention to the 
potential environmental harm that can result from trade, and to the significant welfare 
gains that can be derived from allowing a proliferation of different environmental 
standards to be adopted by different governmental authorities. Rather than reflexively 
assuming that increased trade and harmonization will further environmental protection, 
tribunals should focus on more detailed analysis of the specific economic, scientific, and 
political factors involved.  I then proceed to conduct my own analysis of these factors.  
My analysis of the economic and environmental impact of the retreaded tire trade is 
based on various independent studies conducted by Brazilian and European governmental 
authorities.  My analysis of the politics of the Brazilian measure is based on a series of 
interviews that I was able to conduct with high-level representatives of the Brazilian 
government, the Brazilian tire industry, and MERCOSUR.   
 
Chapters I and II discuss the policy debate relating to the relationship between 
trade liberalization and environmental protection, and the legal framework that has 
emerged for resolving this conflict in the WTO and MERCOSUR.  The discussion in 
Chapter I relies on  the four categories of environment and trade disputes identified by 
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Edith Brown Weiss and John Jackson:5 national measures to protect the domestic 
environment; unilateral national measures to protect the environment outside national 
jurisdiction; measures authorized by international environmental agreements; and 
measures regulating processes, as opposed to products. I then review the specific treaty 
provisions and case law that has emerged with respect to these cases in both the WTO 
and MERCOSUR.  These two chapters show that there are similarities and differences 
between the WTO and MERCOSUR approach to trade-environment. The WTO and 
MERCOSUR frameworks both recognize that the goal of economic development must be 
achieved together with competing goals such as the protection of the environment. In 
addition, the WTO and MERCOSUR both provide exceptions to the general goal of trade 
liberalization in order to protect the environment. Moreover, like the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding, MERCOSUR dispute settlement also permits disputes to be 
settled by ad hoc trade panels, subject to review by a permanent Appellate Body.   There 
are, on the other hand, important differences between the WTO and MERCOSUR 
approaches to trade-environment. In the WTO, measures must be “necessary” to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health, or “relating to” exhaustible natural resources. In 
addition, these measures need to be applied in a manner that is not “unjustifiable or 
arbitrary discrimination” or a “disguised restriction on international trade.” The 
MERCOSUR exception applies to measures “destined to” protect life and health of 
persons, animals and plants, and has no provision with regard to the way in which the 
                                                 
5 Edith Brown Weiss & John H. Jackson, The Framework for Environment and Trade Disputes, in 
RECONCILING ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE 27-28 (Edith Brown Weiss & John H. Jackson eds., 2001). 
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measure must be applied. In addition, MERCOSUR case law is much less developed than 
that of the WTO.  Finally, unlike the WTO, MERCOSUR has produced a number of legal 
instruments that deal directly with environmental policy. 
 
Chapters III and IV deal with the specific decisions issued in the WTO and 
MERCOSUR in the retreaded tire dispute.  It explains the standards and reasoning 
applied by the tribunals in these cases, and the regulatory changes produced in Brazil by 
these decisions. There are similarities between the WTO and MERCOSUR decisions. 
Both failed to take into account the actual economic impact of the import bans; the 
political situation that led to the adoption of the bans; and the potentially negative 
consequences that these decisions might have on support for MERCOSUR and WTO in 
these countries. On the other hand, it could be concluded that the WTO approach pays 
closer attention to environmental concerns than that of MERCOSUR, because the WTO 
decision found that the Brazilian import ban could be justified as a measure “necessary” 
to protect human, animal or plant life or health. However, the WTO panel did not uphold 
the import bans, because of the fact that the Brazilian courts continue to allow imports of 
used tires. The panel found that this fact rendered the application of the measure an 
arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination and a disguised restriction on international 
trade. 
 
Chapter IV then reviews the economic and legal literature on regulatory 
competition as an alternative to regulatory harmonization. I begin with Charles Tiebout’s 
 
 6
seminal work on inter-jurisdictional competition, and the conflicting responses articulated 
by other economists. I then look at the way in which the debate over regulatory 
competition theory has been incorporated into U.S. legal scholarship concerning 
“environmental federalism.”6  I conclude by explaining the extent to which this debate is 
relevant to the WTO and MERCOSUR, and the specific lessons that WTO and 
MERCOSUR tribunals should learn from this literature. 
 
Chapter VI applies the lessons identified in Chapter V to the tire dispute. Using 
economic studies, I show that the impact of the Brazilian import ban on trade was 
relatively small.  Using environmental and scientific studies, I show that that the 
environmental risks associated with imports of retreaded tires were certain and 
significant. Based on Brazilian governmental studies and on my interviews with 
representatives of the Brazilian government, I show that less-restrictive alternatives 
would be less effective in regulating these risks. Based on the results of my interviews 
with representatives of the Brazilian government, the Brazilian tire industry, and 
MERCOSUR, I show that the ban was not aimed at protecting the domestic retreaded tire 
industry and that the WTO and MERCOSUR decisions have undermined political 
support for international institutions that badly need such support. I argue that this 
analysis suggests that the WTO and MERCOSUR decisions may have been wrongly 
                                                 
6 See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341, 
2343 (1996) (criticizing the various approaches that federal environmental laws have taken to address the 
problem of interstate externalities). 
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decided, and that these tribunals should adopt a different approach in future disputes 





Chapter I. The WTO Trade and Environment Linkage Debate 
 
In this chapter, I explore the fundamental elements of the trade-environment 
debate, and the four principal types of conflicts that have arisen in this area.  I then 
discuss the GATT and WTO treaty provisions and jurisprudence related to this debate.7  
 
A.  The Policy Debate 
 
In an influential article, Professor Jagdish Bhagwati argues that free trade requires 
harmonization of domestic institutions, policies (including environmental policies), and 
practices.8 His analysis centers on the factors behind the demands for reduced diversity 
among trading nations.9 Economics arguments, next to philosophical, structural and 
political arguments produce and demand harmonization among trading nations.10 The 
                                                 
7 The amount of scholarly writings is massive. For some leading examples, see John H. Jackson, World 
Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict? 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1227 (1992); 
DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND THE FUTURE (1994); Thomas 
Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The Continuing Search for 
Reconciliation, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 268 (1997); Robert E. Hudec, GATT Legal Restraints on the Use of 
Trade Measures against Foreign Environmental Practices, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION 95 
(Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert Hudec eds., 1996); Patricia Isela Hansen, Transparency, Standards of Review, 
and the Use of Trade Measures to Protect the Global Environment, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 1017, 1048 (1999) 
[hereinafter Transparency]. For a study on the actual role of trade leverage in promoting environmental 
cooperation in practice, see DUNCAN BRACK, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL 
xvii (1996) (contradicting the conventional wisdom that environmental trade leverage is either unnecessary 
or ineffective). For a more policy-oriented approach of the many debates within the trade and environment 
conflict, see Gregory Shaffer, The World Trade Organization under Challenge: Democracy and the Law 
and Politics of the WTO’s Treatment of Trade and Environment Matters, 22 HARV. ENVT’L. L. REV. 1 
(2001). 
8 See Jagdish Bhagwati, The Demands to Reduce Domestic Diversity among Trading Nations, in FAIR 
TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE? 9 (Jagdish N. Bhagwati & Robert E. 





economic arguments in favor of harmonization arise from the concern that mutually 
gainful trade between voluntarily trading nations may not survive if there is diversity in 
domestic policies among the trading nations.11 Economists fear that the effects of trade 
policies can be nullified or impaired by domestic actions (the idea of equivalence).12 
Economists have also raised the concern that, “whereas the conventional economic view 
is that free trade between nations is to their mutual advantage, amounting to a positive-
sum game, this belief need not be so when these nations have different domestic 
institutions and policies behind their borders.”13 
 
 Accordingly, trade and environmental disputes are nothing more than a country’s 
imposition of environmental regulation that nullifies or impairs trade with other nations. 
In the clash between trade and environmental interests, countries may come to the 
conclusion that no trade is good trade, thus deciding that trade liberalization is bad. On 
the other hand, countries may find middle ground in sustainable development, where they 
may pursue the goal of economic development with an eye on environmental 
                                                 
11 Id. at 23. 
12 With regard to the fear that the effects of trade policies can be nullified or impaired by domestic actions, 
Professor Bhagwati notes that there are instances where trade concessions can cause a systemic problem to 
countries not ready to make commitments of market access. Inside and outside the GATT/WTO system, 
this concern has appeared in at least four different situations: state trading, trade with the former centrally 
planned economies, trade with the developing countries, and trade with Japan. These four situations 
indicate that markets need to function adequately, or the free trade system will be nullified or impaired. 
Id.at 23-24. 
13 The fear is that lack of harmonization will not create a favorable distribution of the gains from trade. See 
Jagdish Bhagwati, The Demands to Reduce Domestic Diversity Among Trading Nations, in FAIR TRADE 




conservation.14 Esty advances the argument that “trade is pro-environment,”15 where both 
trade liberalization and environmental protection are directed toward the efficient use of 
natural resources. Under this rationale, trade generates wealth that will be employed to 
address environmental problems.16 In other words, trade liberalization will work for the 
environment provided that market forces are properly channeled. However, many 
environmentalists are skeptical about these supposed benefits in practice, for fear that the 
invisible hand of the market is guided by profit rather than environmental concern.17 
 
 According to Professor Esty, the implementation of the polluter-pays principle is 
central to reconciling trade and environmental policy goals,18 where those who caused the 
damage internalize the environmental harm. The key issue, however, is whether the 
prices assigned by businesses and the public in general include the often-unaccounted 
burdens imposed on third parties through environmental spillovers. Market forces may 
not protect the environment if pollution effects and natural resources are improperly 
priced or given no value at all.19 In other words, because so many resources are 
improperly priced, market forces cannot presently be relied upon to allocate scarce 
natural resources efficiently or to guarantee that polluters will face real incentives to 
minimize their emissions.20 From Professor Esty’s standpoint, the use of trade penalties 
                                                 
14 ESTY, GREENING THE GATT, supra note 7, at 61. 
15 Id. at 63. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 64. 
18 Id. at 65. 
19 ESTY, GREENING THE GATT, supra note 7, at 66. 
20 Id. at 67. 
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to enforce environmental agreements or to promote environmental goals constitutes 
second-best policy mechanisms. 21 
 
Moreover, Professor Esty identifies seven origins of the trade-environment 
conflict:22 rising environmental interest, dispute over the ends and means of 
environmentalism, ecological interdependence, economic interdependence, evolving 
threats to freer trade, and two triggering events: NAFTA and the Tuna-Dolphin case. 
Rising environmental interests have been characterized by the call for sustainable 
development, that is, the need to pursue economic growth while not disregarding 
environmental protection,23 and by the widespread recognition that the Earth has a 
limited capacity to absorb pollution.24 The dispute over the ends and means of 
environmentalism identifies the inadequacy of command and control tools and the need 
for reorientation of environmental regulation toward incentive-based programs and the 
use of market forces to support environmental protection.25 Ecological interdependence 
addresses the inability of the world community to systematically respond to matters such 
as the spillover effects of pollution.26 Esty argues it has become more apparent that 
coordinated environmental programs are required to address global problems.27 
According the Esty, the trade and environment conflict can also be attributable to the 
                                                 
21 Id. at 69. 
22 Id. at 10-36. 
23 Id. at 10. 
24 ESTY, GREENING THE GATT, supra note 7, at 11. 
25 Id. at 16. 
26 Id. at 18. 
27 Id. at 19. 
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growing economic interdependence of the world’s major economies.28 In other words, 
trade and environmental policymaking have become interconnected in the sense that 
countries with less stringent environmental standards are perceived as ideal locations to 
externalize pollution costs and as an alternative to gaining competitive advantages over 
the rest of the players in the market.29  
 
In addition, Esty argues that there are at least two evolving threats to freer trade 
that contribute to the trade-environment debate: a changing international scene and the 
shift in the axis of international tension.30 The end of the Cold War and the consequent 
dominance of the market-based capitalism changed the international trade scene.31 As a 
consequence, new strategic issues were raised, including environmental concerns. Esty 
also identifies a shift from the East-West (communism versus capitalism) conflict to 
North-South (developed versus developing nations); whereas the North perceives 
Southern countries as not wishing to slow down growth through non-environmentally 
friendly ways, the South views Northern countries’ demands for environmentally-
sensitive policies with suspicion.32 
 
Finally, Esty outlines two triggering events changed the trade-environment 
debate: NAFTA and the GATT Tuna-Dolphin dispute. During the negotiation stage of 
                                                 
28 See id. at 20. 
29 ESTY, GREENING THE GATT, supra note 7, at 20-21. 
30 Id. at 25-26. 
31 Id. 
32 See id. 
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the NAFTA, the environmental community in North America demanded a green trade 
agreement for the region, which afterwards became the North American Agreement on 
Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC).33 Before NAFTA, environmentalists paid little 
attention to trade issues.34 The GATT Tuna-Dolphin decision, which found the United 
States in violation of the GATT 1947 for imposing a ban on tuna importation from 
Mexico because it used fishing practices that harmed and killed dolphins, demonstrated 
that GATT’s efforts to address mixed questions of trade and environmental policy were 
highly problematic.35 
 
Others have argued that the origins of the trade and environment conflict are a 
clash of cultures between environmentalists and free traders.36 Environmentalists are 
process-oriented and they perceive themselves to be pursuing moral imperatives that 
cannot be easily traded off in economic terms.37 Free traders, on the other hand, are 
outcome-oriented, utilitarian, and focused on increasing economic welfare by lowering 
                                                 
33 On the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, see Patricia Isela Hansen, The 
Interplay Between Trade and Environment Within the NAFTA Framework, in ENVIRONMENT, HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 339 (Francesco Francioni ed., 2001); Paul Stanton Kibel, The Paper 
Tiger Awakens: North American Environmental Law After the Cozumel Reef Case, 39 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 395 (2001); Beatriz Bugeda, Is NAFTA Up to Its Green Expectations? Effective Law 
Enforcement under the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 
1591 (1999); Fabio Morosini, Repensando Estratégias de Regulação Ambiental: Lições a partir da 
Experiência da União Européia e do NAFTA [Rethinking Regulatory Strategies for the Environment: 
Lessons from the European Union and NAFTA], 38 REVISTA DE DIREITO AMBIENTAL [ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW REVIEW] 66 (2005). 
34 See ESTY, GREENING THE GATT, supra note 7, at 27. 
35 Id. at 31. 




trade barriers.38 While environmentalists believe that the use of trade penalties to enforce 
environmental standards is justified, free traders sustain that excessive deference to 
environmental regulations or standards may result in trade distortion not justified by 
environmental results.39  
 
B.  GATT/WTO Jurisprudence 
 
Professors Edith Brown Weiss and John H. Jackson lay out the main types of 
disputes involving conflicts between environment and trade.40 The four kinds of disputes 
involve national measures to protect the domestic environment; unilateral national 
measures to protect the environment outside national jurisdiction; measures called for by 
                                                 
38 Id. 
39 ESTY, GREENING THE GATT, supra note 7, at 38. 
40 See Weiss & Jackson, supra note 8 at 27-28. For a somewhat different conceptualization of the 
environment and trade conflict, see Joost Pauwelyn, Recent Books on Trade and Environment: GATT 
Phantoms Still Haunt the WTO, 15 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 575 (2004). Pauwelyn 
divides the tension between trade and environment in the following manner: “First, treaties liberalizing 
trade can harm the environment. In this sense, trade and environment may conflict in at least four ways: 
(i) more trade and economic activity may result in more environmental degradation; 
(ii) the competition brought about by free trade may put pressure on governments to lower 
environmental standards (the so called ‘race to the bottom’); 
(iii) trade agreements may prevent governments from enacting certain environmental regulations; 
and 
(iv) trade law may prohibit the use of trade sanctions or preferences, be it as sticks or carrots to 
ensure the signing up to, or compliance with (international) environmental standards. 
Second, trade restrictions or distortions can harm the environment. In this sense, trade liberalization and 
environmental protection go hand in hand in at least three ways: 
(i) trade liberalization should lead to higher levels of development and make available resources 
for environmental protection (the Environmental Kuznets Curve); 
(ii) trade-distorting subsidies and other support for over-production (activities generally disliked 
by trade law), be it in the fisheries or agricultural sectors, can deplete environmental 
resources; and 
(iii) trade restrictions on the provision of cross-border services or technology to recycle or 
otherwise limit environmental harm can delay or prevent the efficient protection of the 
environment.” Id. at 578. 
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international (multilateral) environmental agreements; and measures that regulate the 
process used to make an imported product, as opposed to the characteristics of the 
imported product itself. I review representative cases of the GATT/WTO jurisprudence in 
order to show the development of the treatment of environmental and public health 
claims brought before the GATT/WTO. Although this review shows an increasing 
acceptance of environmental interests in trade disputes, the WTO is still reluctant to 
accept legitimate environmental defenses as exceptions to free trade between its member 
countries. 
 
1) National Measures to Protect the Domestic Environment 
 
Under this category of trade and environmental conflict, states adopt 
environmental laws or regulations and foreign parties challenge these measures in light of 
their inconsistency with the text of GATT 1994 or the Agreements on Technical Barriers 
to Trade (TBT) and on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS). 
The rationale for such types of measures normally is that “the product is restricted for 
sale domestically, and imports should not be able to threaten human health and the 
environment in ways that the same domestic products cannot.”41 This category of conflict 
has been brought to the attention of the GATT and WTO dispute settlement bodies in at 
                                                 
41 Id. at 28. 
 
 16
least three prominent disputes: the Thai Cigarette case,42 the Reformulated Gasoline 
case,43 and the Beef Hormones case.44 
 
a. The Thai Cigarette Case45 
 
In the Thai Cigarette case (a pre-WTO case), the main issue under consideration 
was whether Thai restrictions on the import of tobacco and tobacco products were 
legitimate measures to protect public health. Between 1966 and the late 1980s, Thailand 
granted only three import licenses for cigarettes.46 Domestic demand was supplied by 
national monopolies and import control measures, such as high tariffs, discriminatory 
taxes, and discriminatory marketing.47 At the same time, with the steady decline in 
consumption of cigarette in the US, American cigarette companies sought to expand their 
markets in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand.48  The conflict between US 
attempts to enter the Thai tobacco market and Thailand’s refusal to import US cigarettes 
gave rise to GATT proceedings initiated by a US complaint. 
 
                                                 
42 Panel Report, Thailand – Restrictions on Importation of Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, DS10/R-37S/200 
(Nov. 7, 1990) (GATT document) [hereinafter Thailand – Cigarettes]. 
43 Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter US – Reformulated Gasoline]. 
44 Report of the Appellate Body, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 
WT/DS26/AB/R and WT/DS48/AB/R, AB-1997-4 (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter EC – Hormones]. 
45 Thailand –  Cigarettes, supra note 235. See also Weiss & Jackson, supra note 8, at 41-44. 
46 Id. at 42. 
47 See Young Duk Park, The Thai Ban on Cigarettes Case: A Current Critique , in RECONCILING TRADE 
AND ENVIRONMENT 5 (Edith Brown-Weiss & John H. Jackson eds., 2001) [hereinafter The Thai Ban on 
Cigarettes Case]. 
48 Id. at 47-48. 
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The US argued that the restrictions on imports of cigarettes by Thailand were 
inconsistent with Article XI of the GATT 1947, which provides for the general 
elimination of quantitative restrictions. In addition, the complaining party alleged that the 
Thai measures were not justified by the exceptions contained in Article XI:2(c), which 
exempts certain agricultural products from the prohibition on the use of quantitative 
restrictions, or under Article XX(b), which allows the use of measures necessary to 
protect human health. Lastly, the US argued that Thailand’s Protocol of Accession did 
not cover the Thai measures, and that Thailand’s excise tax and its business and 
municipal taxes on cigarettes were inconsistent with GATT Articles III:1 and III:2, which 
require national treatment49 of internal taxation. Thailand argued that the challenged 
measures fell within the range of GATT’s Article XX (b) measures necessary to protect 
human life or health, and requested that the panel consult with the World Health 
Organization (WHO) about technical aspects of the case. 
 
The Panel held that the Thai measures were a quantitative restriction on the 
importation of cigarettes inconsistent with Article XI:1 and not justified under Article 
XI:2(c), Article XX(b), or Thailand’s Protocol of Accession.50 
 
Article XX of the GATT states that: 
                                                 
49 The National Treatment obligation requires WTO members to accord imported products treatment “no 
less favorable” than that accorded to “like products” of national origin. 
50 During the Panel review, in July 1990, the Thai government introduced a measure to ban business and 
municipal taxes on cigarettes that exceeded taxes applied to domestic cigarettes. As for the import 
prohibition on cigarettes, the Thai government lifted the ban and revised its laws and regulations to 




Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised 
restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party 
of measures: 
… 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
… 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such 
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption[.] 
 
 
The Panel accepted Thailand’s argument that smoking constitutes a serious risk to 
human health and that, consequently, measures pursuant the reduction of cigarette 
consumption falls, a priori, within the range of GATT’s Article XX(b) measures 
designed to protect human health.51 In order to interpret the meaning of the term 
“necessary” in Article XX(b), the Panel adopted the “least-inconsistent test”/“least trade 
restrictive test” from a precedent in the US Section 337 Case.52 This case, which involved 
a dispute between the U.S and the E.C. over patent infringement, discussed the meaning 
of the term “necessary” in the context of Article XX(d) of the GATT which exempts 
from GATT consistency measures that are “necessary to secure compliance with laws or 
regulations that are not inconsistent” with the provisions of the General Agreement.53 In 
the Thai Cigarette case, the Panel concluded that it “could see no reason why, under 
                                                 
51 See Park, supra note 47, at 50. 





Article XX, the meaning of the term ‘necessary’ under paragraph (d) should not be the 
same as in paragraph (b).”54 
 
According to the test, the import restrictions imposed by Thailand could be 
considered to be necessary in terms of Article XX(b) only if there were no alternative 
measure consistent with the GATT, or less inconsistent with it, which Thailand could 
reasonably be expected to employ to achieve its health policy objectives.55 
  
According to the United Sates, the Thai measures were unjustified because of the 
existence of alternatives consistent with the GATT.56 Thailand, on the other hand, argued 
that the measures met the “necessary test” because they achieved the public policy 
objective of reducing the consumption of tobacco and protecting the public from harmful 
ingredients in imported cigarettes.57 
 
Thailand argued that opening its cigarette market to imports would run against 
Thai’s public health policies oriented toward decreasing total cigarette sales and health 
risks from smoking, and protecting its citizens from harmful ingredients in imported 
                                                 
54 Thailand – Cigarettes, supra note 42, P 74. 
55 See id. 




cigarettes. Under this scenario, Thailand stated that prohibiting cigarette imports was its 
only option.58 
 
The Panel applied the “least-inconsistent test” to the Thai measures and 
concluded that there existed quantity-related alternatives less trade restrictive consistent 
with Article XX(b). Namely, the Panel stated that Thailand could use the Thai Tobacco 
Monopoly to regulate overall supply of cigarettes, their retail availability, and their 
prices, provided that it treats imported cigarettes no less favorably than it treats domestic 
cigarettes.59 In addition, in order to reduce cigarette consumption in Thailand, the Panel 
recommended the adoption of a price-raising policy suggested by the WHO.60 
 
Moreover, the Panel, applying the “least-inconsistent test,” concluded that there 
existed at least one quality-related alternative to the Thai measures consistent with Article 
XX(b).61 Thus, the Panel suggested a non-discriminatory regulation requiring full 
disclosure of ingredients, in addition to a ban on unhealthy substances.62 Accordingly, the 
Panel concluded that there existed various alternatives – less trade restrictive and 
                                                 
58 Id. at 52-53. 
59 Id. at 53. 
60 Id. 
61 See Park, supra note 47, at 55. 
62 Id. Park heavily criticizes this finding, because the Panel did not take into consideration Thailand’s 
economic constraints to implement the alternative measure. As he states: “[I]f an enormous budget and 
well-trained human resources were needed to institute and maintain the regulatory system requiring this 
“complete” disclosure of cigarette ingredients, it would be very difficult for a developing country facing 
fiscal constraints to implement that alternative effectively and completely….” Hence, “[t]he ‘least-
inconsistent’ test proposed by the Thai Cigarettes case is unworkable because the test does not address the 
issue of feasibility and efficiency in implementing measures in a particular country.”  Id. at 63-64.  
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economically feasible – consistent with the test of Article XX(b) of the GATT, readily 
available to Thailand. 
 
The test used in the Thai Cigarette Case to determine the meaning of the term 
“necessary” in Article XX(b) of the GATT has had great impact on subsequent panels. In 
the Tuna-Dolphin I case, for instance, the Panel concluded that measures inconsistent 
with the GATT were only acceptable “to pursue overriding public policy goals to the 
extent that such inconsistencies were unavoidable.”63 In other words, a valid Article 
XX(b) exception requires the country to have exhausted all other alternatives available to 
reaching the policy objective pursued.64 
 
b. The Reformulated Gasoline Case65 
 
                                                 
63 Panel Report, United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Aug. 16, 1991, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th 
Supp.) at 155, P 5.27 (unadopted Panel Report), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) [hereinafter US – Tuna 
I]. 
64 See Patricio Leyton, Evolution of the “Necessary Test” of Article XX (b): From Thai Cigarettes to the 
Present, in RECONCILING TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT 81 (Edith Brown-Weiss & John H. Jackson eds., 
2001). 
65 See generally Weiss & Jackson, supra note 5, at 163-65; Hansen, Transparency, supra note 7, at 1048; 
Lewis Briggs, Conserving “Exhaustible Natural Resources”: The Role of Precedent in the GATT Article 
XX(g) Exception, in RECONCILING TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT 261 (Edith Brown-Weiss & John H. Jackson 
eds., 2001). See also Kenichiro Urakami, Unsolved Problems and Implications for the Chapeau of GATT 
Article XX after the Reformulated Gasoline Case, in RECONCILING TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT 167 (Edith 
Brown-Weiss & John H. Jackson eds., 2001) (discussing interpretative problems raised in the Gasoline 
case and limitations of the chapeau); Christopher John Duncan, Reconciling US Regulatory Procedure with 
the WTO Reformulated Gasoline Decision, in RECONCILING TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT 185 (Edith 
Brown-Weiss & John H. Jackson eds., 2001) (arguing that the US will have a better chance of prevailing in 
WTO DSB decisions if it increases regulatory procedures that take into account the international interests 
noted by the Appellate Body in the Gasoline Case); Victoria H. Imperiale, Characterizing Air as an 
Exhaustible Natural Resource, in RECONCILING TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT 243 (Edith Brown-Weiss & 
John H. Jackson eds., 2001) (examining the origins of the term “exhaustible natural resources” within 
Article XX(g) of GATT 1994). 
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In a 1990 amendment to the Clean Air Act, the United States Congress instructed 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to issue regulations on the composition and 
emissions effects of gasoline in order to improve air quality in the most polluted areas of 
the country by reducing vehicle emissions of toxic air pollutants and ozone-forming 
volatile organic compounds.66 United States refiners, blenders, and importers would be 
subject to the new regulations. The amendment divided the United States market for sale 
of gasoline into two parts.67 The first part was comprised of areas that experienced 
serious ozone pollution problems. In these areas, only reformulated gasoline could be 
sold to consumers. The second part of the market consisted of less polluted areas, where 
conventional gasoline could be sold to consumers. Certain compositional and 
performance specifications for reformulated and conventional gasoline were set by the 
1990 amendment to the CAA. Reformulated gasoline was required to have a 15 percent 
reduction in the emissions of both volatile organic compounds (“VOCs”) and toxic air 
pollutants (“toxics”) and no increase in emissions of nitrogen oxides (“NOx”).68 With 
regard to conventional gasoline, the new regulation established that no refiner, blender or 
importer of gasoline could sell conventional gasoline that emits VOCs, toxics, NOx or 
carbon monoxide (“pollutants”) in greater amounts than the gasoline sold in the United 
States in 1990.69 These determinations distinguished between two types of baselines to 
assess gasoline quality: individual baselines, which represent the quality of gasoline 
                                                 
66 US – Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 47, P 2.1. 
67 Id. P 2.2. 
68 Id. P 2.3. 
69 Id. P 2.4. 
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produced by a specific refiner, and a statutory baseline that reflects average US 1990 
gasoline quality.70 In EPA’s final 1994 Proposal Regulation, domestic refiners in 
operation for at least six months in 1990 had the option of using one of three methods to 
determine their baseline, including an individual baseline. Other domestic or foreign 
refiners did not have these same choices of methods under the new regulation. In some 
cases, the individual baselines were more advantageous than the statutory baseline. 
 
Venezuela and Brazil brought a claim to the WTO, alleging that the US regulation 
violated Articles I:1 (General Most-Favored-Nation Treatment),71 III:1 and III:4 
(National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation), Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), relating to the preparation, adoption 
and application of technical regulations, and nullification and impairment of benefits. 
 
The Panel held that the gasoline regulations were inconsistent with Article III:4 
GATT, which requires that imported like products must be treated no less favorably than 
like domestic products with respect to laws and regulations.72 Moreover, the Panel 
concluded the US measures were not justified under the exception of Article XX(g) of 
                                                 
70 Id. P 2.3. 
71 The Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) obligation requires any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity 
granted to an imported product from any country to be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the 
“like product” imported from other WTO members. The general scope of the MFN obligation was 
discussed by the Appellate Body in European Communities – Regime for The Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted by the DSB on September 25, 1997.  
72 US –  Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 43, P 8.1. 
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GATT 1994, as a measure relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.73 
First, the Panel noted that a policy to reduce the depletion of clean air was a policy to 
conserve a natural resource within the meaning of Article XX(g).74 Second, the Panel 
addressed the issue of whether, within the scope of Article XX(g), the United States 
baseline establishment levels were “related to” the conservation of clean air and made 
effective “in conjunction” with restrictions on domestic production or consumption. In 
the Panel’s opinion, following previous GATT jurisprudence,75 the term “relates to” 
means that a measure be “primarily aimed at” the conservation of an exhaustible natural 
resource.76 In the present case, the Panel saw no direct connection between less favorable 
treatment of imported gasoline that was chemically identical to domestic gasoline and the 
US objective of improving air quality in the United States.77 Therefore, the Panel 
concluded that the United States establishment methods do not relate to the conservation 
of an exhaustible natural resource under Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994. Because the 
Panel identified this inconsistency, it did not have to examine whether the measure was 
taken “in conjunction” with restrictions on domestic production or consumption or 
whether the measure met the conditions of the chapeau of Article XX.78 
 
                                                 
73 Id. 
74 Id. P 6.37. 
75 GATT Panel Report, Canada – Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, 
L/6268, (adopted March 22,1988), GATT B.I.S.D. 35S/98. 
76 US – Gasoline, supra note 43, P 6.39. 
77 Id. P 6.40. 
78 Id. P 6.41. 
 
 25
The Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s findings that the measures did not fall 
within the scope of Article XX(g),79 ruling that the measures fall under the exception of 
Article XX(g), but failed to meet the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX. The 
chapeau provides that a measure may not be applied in a manner that would constitute 
either a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the 
same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade.80 The Appellate 
Body departed from the Panel’s finding that the baseline rules were not regarded as 
“primarily aimed at” the conservation of natural resources for the purposes of Article 
XX(g): 
 
The baseline establishment rules, taken as a whole (…) need to be related 
to the ‘non-degradation’ requirements set out elsewhere in the Gasoline 
Rule. Those provisions can scarcely be understood (…) totally divorced 
from other sections of the Gasoline Rule which certainly constitute part of 
the context of these provisions. The baseline establishment rules whether 
individual or statutory, were designed to permit scrutiny and monitoring of 
the level of compliance of refiners, importers and blenders with the ‘non-
degradation’ requirements. Without baselines of some kind, such scrutiny 
would not be possible and the Gasoline Rule’s objective of stabilizing and 
preventing further deterioration of the level of air pollution prevailing in 
1990, would be substantially frustrated. The relationship between the 
baseline establishment rules and the ‘non-degradation’ requirements of the 
Gasoline Rule is not negated by the inconsistency, found by the Panel, of 
the baseline establishment rules with the terms of Article III:4. We 
consider that, given that substantial relationship, the baseline 
establishment rules cannot be regarded as merely incidentally or 
inadvertently aimed at the conservation of clean air in the United States 
for the purposes of Article XX(g).81  
 
                                                 
79 See US – Reformulated Gasoline Appeal, supra note 43, at 633. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 623. 
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 The Appellate Body also examined whether the baseline establishment rules “are 
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.” 
The Appellate Panel initially noted that it interpreted the second clause of Article XX(g) 
– “if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption” – to be read as a requirement that the measures concerned 
impose restrictions not only in respect to imported gasoline, but also with respect to 
domestic gasoline.82 In other words, the clause is a requirement of even-handedness in 
the treatment of imported and domestic goods. The Appellate Body noted that clean air 
restrictions regulating the domestic production of “dirty gasoline” are established jointly 
with corresponding restrictions regarding imported gasoline. Provided that Article XX(g) 
is not concerned with equal treatment between imported and domestic goods, the fact that 
imported gasoline receives less favorable treatment than its domestic counterpart does not 
detract from the Appellate Body’s conclusion that the US measure is made effective in 
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.83 
 
 Having concluded that the baseline establishment rules of the Gasoline Rule fall 
within the terms of Article XX(g), the Appellate Panel moved to the last part of the 
Article XX analysis of whether those rules also meet the requirements of the chapeau of 
Article XX. In other words, the Appellate Body faced the difficult question of whether 
the application of the measure was conducted in a manner that constituted arbitrary or 
                                                 
82 Id. at 624. 
83 Id. at 625. 
 
 27
unjustifiable discrimination where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction 
on international trade.  In the Appellate Body’s opinion, arbitrary discrimination, 
unjustifiable discrimination and disguised restriction on international trade impart 
meaning to one another and should be read together:84 
 
It is clear to us that ‘disguised restriction’ includes disguised 
discrimination on international trade. It is equally clear that concealed or 
unannounced restriction or discrimination in international trade does not 
exhaust the meaning of ‘disguised restriction.’ We consider that ‘disguised 
restriction’, whatever else it covers, may properly be read as embracing 
restrictions amounting to arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination in 
international trade taken under the guise of a measure formally within the 
terms of an exception listed in Article XX.85 
 
In examining the manner in which the measure was applied, the Appellate Body 
noted that the United States had failed to pursue the possibility of entering into 
cooperative arrangements with the governments of Venezuela and Brazil.86 In addition 
the Appellate Body noted that the United States failed to take into account the costs to the 
foreign refiners, which results from the imposition of the statutory baselines.87 Based on 
these two omissions, the Appellate Body concluded that the United States applied the 
measure in a manner that constitutes unjustifiable discrimination and a disguised 
restriction on international trade.88 
 
                                                 
84 See US – Reformulated Gasoline Appeal, supra note 43, at 629. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 631. 
87 Id. at 632. 
88 Id. at 633. 
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c. The Beef Hormones Case89 
 
The use of growth-promoting hormones to treat cattle in the United States and in 
certain parts of Europe dates back at the 1950s.90 However, in the 1980s, the European 
Communities prohibited the sale of meat and meat products containing growth-
stimulating hormones, which had a negative impact on the American and Canadian 
export market to the EC.91 This import prohibition was present in a series of Directives.92 
Effective 1 July 1997, two of these Directives were repealed and replaced by a new 
Directive,93 which maintained the prohibition of the administration to farm animals of 
substances having a hormonal or thyrostatic action. 
 
                                                 
89 See Weiss & Jackson, supra note 8, at 299-301.  See also Charles F. De Jager, The European Union’s 
Position on Agriculture After the WTO Appellate Body’s Decision in Beef Hormones, in RECONCILING 
TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT 303 (Edith Brown-Weiss & John H. Jackson eds., 2001) (exploring the links 
between the Appellate Body’s decision in the Beef Hormones case and the European Union’s negotiating 
position on agriculture).  See also Andrew T. Guzman, WTO Dispute Resolution in Health and Safety 
Cases, UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 989371, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=989371 (last visited Sep. 3, 2007) (arguing that the 
DSB should apply a more deferential standard of review when evaluating health and safety cases). 
90 See Weiss & Jackson, supra note 5, at 299. 
91 See id. 
92 Council Directive 81/602/EEC of 31 July 1981 Concerning the Prohibition on Certain Substances Having 
Hormonal Action and of any Substances Having Thyrostatic Action, 1981 O.J. (L 222) 32 (prohibiting the 
administration to farm animals substances having a hormonal action and substances having a thyrostatic 
action; prohibiting the placing on the European market both domestically produced and imported meat 
products derived from farm animals to which such substances had been administered); Council Directive 
88/146/EEC of 7 March 1988 Prohibiting the Use in Livestock Farming of Certain Substances Having a 
Hormonal Action, 1988 O.J. (L 70) 16 (prohibiting both the intra-EEC trade and the importation from third 
countries of meat and meat products obtained from animals to which substances having oestrogenic, 
androgenic, gestagenic or thyrostatic action had been administered);  Council Directive 88/299/EEC of 17 
May 1988, 1988 O.J. (L 128) 36 (establishing certain conditions under which trade in meat and meat 
products derived from animals treated substances for therapeutic or zootechnical purposes was allowed). 
93 Council Directive 96/22/EC, 1996 O.J. (L 125) 3 (prohibiting the use in livestock farming of certain 
substances having a hormonal action). 
 
 29
In 1996, the United States and Canada separately challenged the European 
measure based on the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement [hereinafter SPS 
Agreement]. The SPS Agreement, as an application of Article XX (b) of the GATT 1994, 
is considered “special law” (lex specialis) with regard to measures necessary to protect 
human, animal, or plant life and health.94 It was negotiated in order to avoid member 
states’ abuse of Article XX(b) in agricultural matters, assuring that rules regarding the 
protection of life and health do not create technical obstacles to international trade.95 
  
The Agreement permits countries to take food and safety measures, provided 
several conditions are met; for example, an SPS measure must be based on sufficient 
scientific evidence (Article 2.2) and risk assessment (Article 5.1). While the SPS 
Agreement encourages harmonization of SPS measures (Article 3.1), it allows the 
maintenance of measures resulting in a higher level of protection than would be achieved 
by international standards (Article 3.3). 
 
On 20 May 1996, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) established a WTO Panel 
to examine the consistency of the EC measure with GATT rules.96 The United States 
argued that the EC measure that restricts or prohibits the importation of meat and meat 
products from the US violated Article III (requiring national treatment) and XI of GATT 
                                                 
94 See Sandrine Maljean-Dubois, DROIT DE L’ORGANISATION MONDIALE DU COMMERCE ET PROTECTION 
DE L’ENVIRONNEMENT [WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION LAW AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION] 56 
(Sandrine Maljean-Dubois ed., 2003). 
95 Id. 
96 See  EC – Hormones, supra note 44. 
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1994 (prohibiting quantitative restrictions); Articles 2, 3, and 5 of the SPS Agreement; 
Article 2 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (on the preparation, adoption 
and application of technical regulations); and Article 4 of the Agreement on Agriculture 
(on market access commitments). On 16 October 1996, the DSB established another 
WTO Panel to analyze a complaint brought by Canada against the EC on similar grounds 
as the one brought by the United States.97 The composition of both panels was identical. 
 
The Panel circulated its Reports to the Members of the WTO on 18 August 1997, 
recommending that the DSB requests the European Communities to bring its measures 
into conformity with its obligations under the SPS Agreement.98  
 
The Panels concluded that the European Communities had breached several 
obligations assumed under the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures.99 First, by maintaining sanitary measures that were not based on 
a risk assessment, the European Communities acted inconsistently with the requirements 
contained in Article 5.1.100 Second, by adopting arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in 
the levels of sanitary protection it considers to be appropriate in different situations which 
result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade, the European 
Communities acted inconsistently with the requirements contained in Article 5.5 of the 
                                                 
97 Id. 
98 Id. P 9.2. 
99 Id. P 9.1. 
100 Id. P 9.1(i). 
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SPS Agreement.101 Third, the Panel concluded that the European Communities acted 
inconsistently with Article 3.1 of that Agreement by enforcing unjustified sanitary 
measures different from existing international standards under Article 3.3 of the 
Agreement.102 The Appellate Body confirmed the Panel’s first findings in both disputes – 
that the European Communities’ import ban was inconsistent with Article 5.1 (requiring 
risk assessment) – but reversed the others.103   
 
2) Unilateral National Measures to Protect the Environment outside National 
Jurisdiction104 
 
The main characteristic of this type of measure is that a national measure is 
implemented which is not pursuant to an international or multilateral agreement.105 For 
example, a country may not want to watch helplessly as an endangered species is forced 
into extinction by international fishing methods that destroy the animals as by-catch.  
Such a dilemma warrants a clash between environment and trade interests.106 Principle 12 
of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development recommended avoidance 
of unilateral national measures aimed at protecting the environment outside national 
                                                 
101 See  EC – Hormones, supra note 44, P 9.1(ii). 
102 Id. P 9.1(iii). 
103 See  EC – Hormones Appeal, supra note 44. 
104 See generally Hansen, Transparency, supra note 200 (arguing that environment and trade disputes may 
be reduced if governments adopt more transparent decision-making procedures). See also Richard W. 
Parker, The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage to Protect the Global Commons: What Can We Learn from 
The Tuna-Dolphin Conflict, 12 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1999) (concluding that there are more pros 
than cons in the use of environmental trade leverage).  




jurisdiction.107 This type of conflict between environment and trade is evident in the 
Tuna-Dolphin I,108 Tuna Dolphin-II,109 and Shrimp-Turtle cases.110 
 
a. The Tuna-Dolphin I Case 
 
 On 5 November 1990, Mexico requested consultations with the United States 
regarding restrictions on imports of tuna.111 On 6 February 1991, the GATT Council 
agreed to establish an arbitration panel, which submitted its conclusions to the parties on 
August 16 1991.112 The dispute between Mexico and the United States arose from an 
American embargo against imports of yellowfin tuna or yellowfin tuna products from 
Mexico caught using methods (“purse-seine”) that kill or harm Eastern spinner 
dolphins.113 
 
                                                 
107 Principle 12: … “Unilateral actions to deal with environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of the 
importing country should be avoided. Environmental measures addressing Transboundary or global 
environmental problems should, as far as possible, be based on an international consensus.” 
108 US – Tuna I, supra note 256, at 155. 
109 United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, June 1994, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 839 [hereinafter US – 
Tuna II]. 
110 Panel Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, May 1998, 
reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 832 (1998) [hereinafter US – Shrimp]; Appellate Body Report, United States – 
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter 
US – Shrimp Appeal]. 
111 US – Tuna I, supra note 63, P 1.1. 
112 Id. P 1.3. 
113 On October 10, 1990, the United States Government imposed an embargo, pursuant to a court order, on 
imports of commercial yellowfin tuna and yellowfin tuna products harvested with “purse-seine” nets in the 
Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP) from Mexico. The embargo was conditioned on Mexico’s showing 
that the “percentage of Easter spinner dolphins killed by the Mexican fleet over the course of an entire 
fishing season did not exceed 15 per cent of dolphins killed by it in that period.” Id. P 5.2. 
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The harvesting of tuna in the United States is regulated by the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act (MMPA). The MMPA requires that fishermen conducting their activities 
in American jurisdiction use certain fishing techniques that reduce incidental harm to 
dolphins while harvesting fish.114 Moreover, the MMPA bans the importation of fish (or 
products of such fish) caught with commercial fishing technology resulting in the 
incidental death or injury of ocean mammals in excess of United States standards.115 
 
 Before the GATT Panel, Mexico argued that the US embargo violated several 
provisions of the General Agreement, namely Article XI [General Elimination of 
Quantitative Restrictions], Article XIII [Non-discriminatory Administration of 
Quantitative Restrictions], Article III [National Treatment of Internal Taxation and 
Regulations], Article IX [Marks of Origin] and Article I [General Most-Favored-Nation 
Treatment].116  
 
The United States responded that the challenged measures fell within the General 
Exceptions of Article XX of the General Agreement, namely parts (b) (measures 
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health), (d) (measures necessary to 
secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the General 
                                                 
114 The MMPA applies to all persons and vessels subject to United States jurisdiction, on the high seas and 
in the United Sates territory, including the territorial sea of the United Sates and the United States 
Exclusive Economic Zone. See id. P 2.4. 
115 Id. P 5.2. 
116 US – Tuna I, supra note 63, PP 3.1-3.5. 
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Agreement), and (g) (measures relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources).117 
 
The Panel concluded that the United States direct prohibition on certain yellowfin 
tuna and certain yellowfin tuna products of Mexico directly imported from Mexico, and 
the provisions of the MMPA under which it is imposed could not be justified under the 
exceptions in Article XX(b) and (g) of the General Agreement.118 
 
First, concerning Article XX(b), the Panel noted that the main issue under 
consideration was whether this provision covers measures necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health outside the jurisdiction of the contracting party taking the 
measure.119 Because the provision refers to life and health generally, without express 
limitation of the jurisdiction of the contracting party imposing the measure, the Panel 
decided to look at the legislative history of Article XX(b) and concluded that the 
concerns of the drafters focused on the use of sanitary measures to safeguard life or 
health of humans, animals or plants within the jurisdiction of the importing countries.120 
 
The Panel recalled Thailand’s Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes 
on Cigarettes, which stated that letter b of Article XX was intended to allow contracting 
                                                 
117 Id. PP 3.6-3.9. 
118 See id. PP 5.29, 5.34. 
119 Id. P 5.25. 
120 Id. P 5.26. 
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parties to impose trade restrictive measures inconsistent with the General Agreement to 
pursue overriding public policy goals, at least to the extent that such inconsistencies were 
unavoidable.121 But, as the Panel concluded, the United States had not demonstrated that 
it had exhausted all options reasonably available to it to pursue its dolphin protection 
objectives through measures consistent with the General Agreement, in particular through 
negotiation of international cooperative arrangements.122 Furthermore, the Panel noted 
that even if there were no alternative measures available to the United States, the 
challenged measures could still not be considered necessary within the meaning of 
Article XX(b) due to the unpredictable conditions set by the United States for Mexico to 
comply with.123 
 
With relation to Article XX(g), the Panel noted that measures relating to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources be taken “in conjunction with restrictions 
on domestic production or consumption,” which has been interpreted to mean that the 
measure “was primarily aimed at rendering effective these restrictions.”124 Because 
Mexico’s maximum incidental dolphin-taking rate were set by the United States at 
unpredictable terms, the Panel concluded the US measures were not primarily aimed at 
conserving exhaustible natural resources (dolphins).125 Moreover, the Panel concluded 
                                                 
121 US – Tuna I, supra note 63, P 5.27. See also Thailand – Cigarettes, supra note 42, PP 73-74. 
122  US – Tuna I, supra note 63, P 5.28. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. P 5.31 n.43. See also Canada – Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, 
114, P 4.6, (adopted March 22,1988), B.I.S.D. 35S/98.  
125 US – Tuna I, supra note 63, P 5.33. 
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that the effective control of the production or consumption of an exhaustible natural 
resource is limited to the jurisdiction of the country imposing the restrictions.126 
 
b. The Tuna-Dolphin II Case 
 
 This dispute arose out of the European Economic Commission (EEC) complaint 
that the US restrictions affecting indirect imports of tuna were inconsistent with the 
General Agreement. Section 101(a)(2)(c) of the MMPA provides that any nation 
(“intermediary nation”) that exports yellowfin tuna or yellowfin tuna products to the 
United States and that imports yellowfin tuna or yellowfin tuna products that are subject 
to a direct prohibition on import into the United States must certify and provide 
reasonable proof that it has not imported products subject to the direct prohibition within 
the preceding six months. 
 
 The EEC argued that the import prohibitions on tuna and tuna products imposed 
pursuant to Section 101(a)(2)(c) of the MMPA were contrary to Articles XI [General 
Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions] and III [National Treatment on Internal 
Taxation and Regulation], not justified by Article XX [General Exceptions] of the 
General Agreement.127 The United States contended that the import prohibition on tuna 
                                                 
126 Id. P 5.31. 
127 US – Tuna II, supra note 109, P 3.1. 
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and tuna products imposed pursuant the MMPA was consistent with the GATT, since it 
came within the scope of letters (g), (b), and (d) of Article XX.128  
 
 The Panel suggested the adoption of a three-prong test in order to determine 
whether the challenged measure falls under Article XX(g) exception.129 First, one must 
determine whether the policy in respect of which these provisions are invoked fall within 
the range of policies to conserve exhaustible natural resources. Second, one must decide 
whether the measure for which the exception is being invoked is “related to” the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources, and whether it is made effective “in 
conjunction” with restrictions on domestic production or consumption. Third, one must 
determine whether the measure is applied in conformity with the requirement set out in 
the preamble to Article XX, namely that “measures are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade.” 
 
 In the Tuna-Dolphin II case, the Panel noted that dolphin stocks could potentially 
be exhausted, regardless of the fact that they were not depleted at the time. Thus, a policy 
to conserve dolphins fell within the range of policies to conserve exhaustible natural 
resources.130 Moreover, while the Panel in Tuna-Dolphin I rejected the US arguments for 
                                                 
128 See id. P 3.2. 
129 Id. P 5.12. 
130 See id. P 5.13. 
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extraterritorial application of the Article XX (b) and (g) exceptions,131 this Panel allowed 
for the possibility of extraterritorial application of Article XX (g),132 stating that it could 
see no valid reason supporting a conclusion otherwise.133  
 
 The Panel also considered whether the embargo imposed by the United States on 
yellowfin tuna and yellowfin tuna products could be considered to be “related to” or 
“primarily aimed”134 at the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource within the 
meaning of Article XX(g), and whether it was made effective in “conjunction with” or 
“primarily aimed at”135 restriction on domestic production or consumption. The Panel 
concluded that the United States embargo forcing other the EEC countries to change their 
policies could not be primarily aimed at the conservation of an exhaustible natural 
resource or at rendering effective restrictions on domestic production or consumption.136 
The Panel noted that the ban on imports of tuna into the United States taken under the 
intermediary nation embargo could not, by itself, further US conservation objectives.137 
According to the Panel, the only way to achieve the objective of conserving exhaustible 
natural resources was through changes in policy of the tuna-exporting countries, and not 
                                                 
131 Patricia Isela Hansen, The Impact of the WTO and NAFTA on US Law, 46 J. OF LEGAL EDUC., 569, 576 
(1996). 
132 See Hansen, Transparency, supra note 7, at 1027, 1031. 
133 US – Tuna II, supra note 304, P 5.20. 
134 Report of the Panel in Canada – Measures affecting the exports of unprocessed herring and salmon, 
35S/98,114, P 4.6 (adopted March 22,1988). 
135 See id. 
136 US – Tuna II, supra note 109, P 5.27. 
137 Id. P 5.23. 
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in those of the intermediary country exporting tuna to the United States.138 Finally, 
because the United States failed to meet the second prong of the test, the Panel did not 
advance the analysis of whether the measure is applied in conformity with the 
requirement set out in the preamble to Article XX.139 
 
In order to determine whether the United States intermediary embargo was 
consistent with Article XX(b) of the General Agreement, the Panel followed a three-
prong test similar to the one used in determining whether a measure is consistent with 
Article XX(g).140 Namely, the Panel determined whether the United States measures fall 
within the range of policies to protect human, animal, or plant life or health. Then the 
Panel determined whether the measure that was inconsistent with the General Agreement 
was “necessary” to protect human, animal, or plant life or health. Finally, the Panel 
decided whether the measure was applied in a manner consistent with the requirement set 
out in the preamble to Article XX. 
 
The Panel answered the first prong in the affirmative, regardless of the fact that 
the measures were taken pursuant living things located outside the territorial jurisdiction 
of the country imposing them.141 Secondly, the Panel found that the intermediary 
embargo, taken so as to force other countries to change their environmental policies and 
                                                 
138 Id. 
139 Id. P 5.27. 
140 Id. P 5.29. 
141 US – Tuna II, supra note 109, P 5.30-5.33. 
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that were effective only if such changes occurred, could not be considered “necessary” 
for the protection of animal life and health within the meaning of Article XX(b) of the 
General Agreement.142 The Panel determined that the term “necessary” in Article XX(b) 
means that no other consistent measures are reasonably available to fulfill the policy 
objective.143 Accordingly, the Panel did not advance the third prong of the test, namely 
whether the measure is applied in conformity with the requirement set out in the 
preamble to Article XX. 
 
c. The Shrimp-Turtle Case144 
 
In the Shrimp-Turtle case, the WTO Appellate Body concluded that a US 
prohibition on shrimp harvested by methods that are harmful to sea turtles was 
unjustifiable and arbitrary, regardless of the fact that the US banned the use of such 
methods by its own shrimp fleet, and that the sea turtles species protected by the 
prohibition were recognized to be in danger of extinction. The WTO revisited the dispute 
in 2001.145 
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India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand requested the establishment of a WTO 
Panel to examine the GATT-consistency of a United States ban imposed upon 
importation of certain shrimp and shrimp products under Section 609 of US Public Law 
101-162 and the “Revised Notice of Guidelines for Determining Comparability of 
Foreign Programs for the Protection of Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations.”146 
Section 609 provides that shrimp harvested with technology that may adversely affect 
certain sea turtles may not be imported into the United States, unless the President 
certifies to Congress annually that the harvesting nation has a regulatory program and an 
incidental take rate comparable to that of the United States, or that the particular fishing 
environment of the harvesting nation does not pose a threat to sea turtles.147 The Revised 
guidelines for assessing the comparability of foreign regulatory programs with the US 
program provides that the latter needs to contain a commitment to require all shrimp 
trawl vessels to use turtle excluder devices (TEDs)148 at all times (or reduce tow times for 
vessels under 25 feet), or, alternatively, a commitment to engage in a statistically reliable 
scientific program to reduce the mortality of sea turtles associated with shrimp fishing.149 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
interpretation of the 1998 Shrimp-Turtle decision, which preserves broad leeway for the use of 
environmental trade measures). 
146 See US – Shrimp, supra note 305. 
147 Id. P 2.7. 
148 A turtle excluder device (TED) is a “grid trapdoor installed inside a trawling net that allows shrimp to 
pass to the back of the net while directing sea turtles and other unintentionally caught large objects out of 
the net.” Id. P 2.5. 
149 Id. P 2.8. 
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Presently, sea turtles are included in Appendix I of the 1973 Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species (“CITES”), in Appendix I and II of the 1979 
Convention on Migratory Species of Wild Animals (“CMS”), appear in the IUCN Red 
List as endangered or vulnerable, and in the 1973 United States Endangered Species 
Act.150 
 
India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand requested the Panel to find that Section 
609 of US Public Law 101-162 and its implementing measures are inconsistent with the 
GATT 1994 Articles XI:1, XIII:1, I:1 and not justified by the exceptions under Article 
XX (b) and (g) of the GATT 1994.151 The United States, on the other hand, asked the 
Panel to find that Section 609 and its implementing measures fall within the scope of 
Article XX, paragraphs (b) and (g) of GATT 1994.152 
 
The Panel recalled that, as for Article XX, the issue under analysis was “whether 
Article XX (b) and (g) apply at all when a Member has taken a measure conditioning 
access to its market for a given product on the adoption of certain conservation policies 
by the exporting Member(s).”153 Contrary to GATT/WTO jurisprudence, the Panel 
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152 See id. P 3.3. 
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decided to conduct the Article XX analysis starting by the chapeau, to, if needed, move to 
its paragraphs.154 
 
The Panel stated that the chapeau to Article XX does not address the challenged 
measure or its specific contents, but rather addresses the manner in which that measure is 
applied.155 Thus, the manner in which a certain measure is applied shall constitute neither 
a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable enforcement between countries where the same 
conditions prevail, nor a disguised restriction on international trade. Recalling the 
Appellate Body reading of the chapeau, the Panel states that “the purpose and object of 
the introductory clause of Article XX is generally the prevention of abuse of the 
exceptions [what was latter to become] Article XX.”156 
 
In interpreting the chapeau of Article XX as an integral part of the WTO 
Agreement, the Panel notes that although the Preamble of the WTO Charter 
acknowledges that the optimal use of the world’s resources must be pursued in 
accordance with the objective of sustainable development, the “central focus of the 
[General Agreement] remains the promotion of economic development through trade.”157 
Under this framework, the Panel concluded that conditioning access to a country’s 
                                                 
154 Id. P 7.28. 
155 Id. P 7.29. 
156 See US – Shrimp, supra note 145, P 7.29. 
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internal market to the adoption of certain conservation processes would compromise the 
needed security and predictability in the multilateral trading system:158 
 
If Article XX were interpreted to permit contracting parties to deviate 
from the obligations of the General Agreement by taking trade measures 
to implement policies, including conservation policies, within their own 
jurisdiction, the basic objectives of the General Agreement would be 
maintained. If however Article XX were interpreted to permit contracting 
parties to take trade measures so as to force other contracting parties to 
change their policies within their jurisdiction, including their conservation 
policies, the balance of rights and obligations among contracting parties, 
in particular the right of access to markets, would be seriously impaired.159 
  
 Moreover, the Panel noted that developing internationally accepted environmental 
standards would constitute a legitimate way to avoid threatening the multilateral trading 
system with unilateral conservation measures.160  The United States did not enter into 
negotiations to develop a multilateral accepted environmental policy before it imposed 
the import ban.161 
 
Finally, the Panel concluded that, in light of the chapeau to Article XX of the 
GATT 1994, the manner in which the United States measures were applied was 
unjustifiably discriminatory.162 Because the Panel concluded that the measure at issue 
does not satisfy the conditions contained in the chapeau of Article XX, the exam of 
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whether the United States measure is covered by the terms of Article XX (b) and (g) 
became unnecessary.163 
 
In the appeal, the Appellate Body was asked to decide whether the Panel erred in 
finding that the measure at issue constitutes unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail and, consequently, not within the scope of 
measures permitted under Article XX of the GATT 1994.164 
 
The Appellate Body noted that the Panel failed to examine the ordinary meaning 
of the words of Article XX of the GATT 1994: instead of focusing on the manner in 
which the measure is applied, it analyzed the design of the measure itself.165 The 
Appellate Body remarked that the latter is to be examined in the course of determining 
whether a measure falls within one of the paragraphs of Article XX. As a result, the Panel 
failed to look into the object and purpose of the chapeau of Article XX.166 This 
misinterpretation of Article XX is attributable to the Panel’s disregard of the correct steps 
for analyzing Article XX claims.167 The Appellate Body, in United States – Reformulated 
Gasoline,168 set the correct methodology for interpreting Article XX claims: 
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In order that the justifying protection of Article XX may be extended to it, 
the measure at issue must not only come under one or another of the 
particular exceptions – paragraphs (a) to (j) – listed under Article XX; it 
must also satisfy the requirements imposed by the opening clauses of 
Article XX. The analysis is, in other words, two-tiered: first, provisional 
justification by reason of characterization of the measure under XX(g); 
second, further appraisal of the same measure under the introductory 
clauses of Article XX.169 
 
Having reversed the Panel’s legal conclusion that the United States measure at 
issue is not within the scope of measures permitted under the chapeau of Article XX of 
GATT 1994, the Appellate Body undertook the two-tiered analysis, established in United 
States – Reformulated Gasoline, to determine whether Section 609 qualifies for 
justification under the chapeau of Article XX. Accordingly, the Appellate Body 
examined the consistency of Section 609 with the General Exceptions of Article XX. It 
proceeded to analyze whether the measure could be characterized as provisionally 
justified under the terms of Article XX(g) – and alternatively under Article XX(b). 
Because Section 609 fell under within the ambit of Article XX(g), the Appellate Body 
moved to the second tier of the analysis, i.e., the consistency of the manner in which the 
measure was applied with the terms of the chapeau of Article XX. 
 
Paragraph (g) of Article XX covers measures “relating to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with 
restrictions on domestic production or consumption.”  The Appellate Body divided the 
paragraph (g) analysis into three parts: whether turtles protected under Section 609 fall 
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within the definition of “exhaustible natural resources,” whether the measure undertaken 
by the United States relates to the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource, and 
whether Section 609 was made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption. 
 
As for the first part of the paragraph (g) analysis, the Appellate Body concluded 
that “measures to conserve exhaustible natural resources, whether living or non-living, 
may fall within Article XX(g).”170 Accordingly, the Appellate Panel moved to examine 
whether sea turtles fall within the category of exhaustible living-natural resources within 
the meaning of Article XX(g). The Appellate Body noted that it would be difficult to 
conclude that sea turtles are not exhaustible, provided that all of the seven recognized 
species of sea turtles are presently listed in Appendix 1 of the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).171 
 
Moving to the second part of the paragraph (g) analysis, the Appellate Body 
looked into the relationship between the measure at stake and the legitimate policy of 
conserving exhaustible natural resources. The Appellate Body noted that “[t]he means 
and ends relationship between Section 609 and the legitimate policy of conserving an 
exhaustible natural, and, in fact, endangered species, is observably a close and real one, a 
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relationship that is every bit […] substantial.”172 Thus, the Appellate Body concluded that 
Section 609 is a measure relating to the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource 
under paragraph (g) of Article XX.173 
 
In the third part of the paragraph (g) analysis, the Appellate Body addressed the 
even-handedness of the measure, that is, whether the import restrictions imposed by 
United States Section 609 directed at foreign shrimp are also imposed with respect to 
shrimp caught by the United States shrimp trawl vessels.174 Supported by the finding that 
similar process requirements were imposed on domestic producers, the Appellate Body 
held that all three parts of the paragraph (g) analysis had been met. Thus, the Appellate 
Body reached the general conclusion that Section 609 is a measure “relating to” the 
conservation of an exhaustible natural, made effective in conjunction with restrictions on 
domestic production, within the meaning of Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994.175 
 
Having concluded that Section 609 falls within the scope of paragraph (g) of 
Article XX, the Appellate Body moved to the second tier of the Article XX analysis, that 
is, whether the application of the United States measure, although the measure itself falls 
within the terms of Article XX(g), nevertheless constitutes “a means of arbitrary or 
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unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail” or “a 
disguised restriction on international trade.”  
 
As a matter of treaty interpretation, the Appellate Body notes that the express 
language of the chapeau requires that a measure be applied in a manner which would not 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where 
the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade.176 
Therefore, a measure that passes the scrutiny of Article XX’s chapeau must not exhibit 
arbitrary discrimination where the same conditions prevail, exercise an unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or be a disguised 
restriction on international trade. 
 
The Appellate Body notes that three elements are necessary in order to render a 
measure applied in a manner that arbitrarily unjustifiably discriminates between countries 
where the same conditions prevail:177 the application of the measure must result in 
discrimination, the discrimination must be arbitrary or unjustifiable in character, and 
discrimination must occur between countries where the same conditions prevail. 
 
                                                 




Having noted that the purpose of the chapeau of Article XX is the prevention of 
abuse of the exceptions of Article XX,178 the Appellate Body moved on to examine 
whether Section 609 was applied in a manner constituting unjustifiable discrimination 
where the same conditions prevail.179 The Appellate Body concluded that the manner in 
which the United States applied the measure amounts to unjustifiable discrimination 
within the scope of the chapeau of Article XX for two reasons: because “[t]he actual 
application of the measure … requires other WTO Members to adopt a regulatory 
program that is not merely comparable, but rather essentially the same, as that applied to 
the United States shrimp trawl vessels,”180 and because the United States failed “to 
engage the appellees, as well as other [WTO] Members exporting shrimp to the United 
States, in serious, across-the-board negotiations with the objective of concluding bilateral 
or multilateral agreements for the protection and conservation of sea turtles, before 
enforcing the import prohibition against the shrimp exports of those other Members.”181  
 
Next, the Appellate Body concluded that Section 609 was applied in a manner 
constituting arbitrary discrimination between countries where the same conditions 
prevail.182 The Appellate Body noted that the United States import measure was applied 
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with rigidity and inflexibility,183 in denial of basic fairness, due process and 
transparency:184 
 
Section 609, in its application, imposes a single, rigid and unbending 
requirement that countries applying for certification under Section 
609(b)(2)(A) and (B) adopt a comprehensive regulatory program that is 
essentially the same as the United States’ program, without inquiring into 
the appropriateness of that program for the conditions prevailing in the 
exporting counties.185 […] [W]ith respect to neither type of certification 
under Section 609(b)(2) is there a transparent, predictable certification 
process that is followed by the competent United States government 
officials […] there is no formal  opportunity for an applicant country to be 
heard, or to respond to any arguments that may be made against it, in the 
course of the certification process before a decision to grant or deny 
certification is made […] no formal written, reasoned decision, whether of 
acceptance or rejection, is rendered on applications for either type of 
certification […] [and] [n]o procedure for review of, or appeal from, a 
denial of an application is provided.186 
 
Having found that, under the terms of the chapeau of Article XX, the United 
States measure constituted arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions prevail, the Appellate Body concluded it was not necessary to 
examine whether Section 609 was applied in a manner that constitutes a disguised 
restriction on international trade.187 
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3) Measures Taken Under Multilateral Environmental Agreements  
 
Because the environment overlaps states territorial divisions, countries are forced 
to enter into international agreements to protect shared environmental resources.188 Such 
agreements may include the prohibition of imports and exports of products if the 
importing and exporting countries are not parties to the agreement or are not complying 
with it.189 In order to avoid nonmember states becoming “havens” that jeopardize the 
effectiveness of the agreement (free riding), these agreements should include obligations 
that encourage the participation of as many countries as possible.190 The Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,191 the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species (CITES),192 the Basel Convention on the Transboundary 
Movement of Hazardous Waste,193 and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety194 are 
illustrative examples of multilateral environmental agreements that restrict trade in 
controlled items. For international trade law, the issue is “whether these agreements 
violate Article I (Most Favored Nation Treatment), III (National Treatment) and XI 
(Prohibition of Quantitative Restrictions) of GATT 1994, and if so, whether Article XX 
                                                 
188 See Weiss & Jackson, supra note 8, at 30. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. at 30-31. 
191 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, done at Montreal on 16 September 
1987, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1550 (1987). 
192 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, done at Washington 
on 3 March 1973, 993 U.N.T.S. 243, 27 U.S.T. 1987, T.I.A.S.8249, reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 1088 (1973). 
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exceptions apply to make them nonetheless GATT consistent.”195  However, WTO 
members have not yet brought any cases challenging the requirements of an international 
environmental agreement. 
 
4) Measures Regulating Foreign Production Processes 
 
GATT focuses on products, whereas the production process is generally accepted 
as falling outside the reach of the non-discriminatory principles of national treatment and 
most-favored-nation. However, from an environmental perspective, “[p]roducts that are 
produced by processes that pollute the air, water or land, or that destroy living natural 
resources and their habitats may be far more destructive of sustainable development than 
the products themselves.”196 More recent trade and environment disputes, such as the 
Tuna-Dolphin I and II cases and the Shrimp-Turtle case, indicate that this distinction is 
highly disputable, noting that processes can both endanger the environment and distort 
trade. Trade distortion happens if certain countries are allowed to work under lax 
environmental standards when making products that compete with those of countries 
complying with rigid environmental laws and regulations (in a sort of subsidy). But if 
these concerns are worthy of the trade community’s attention, the merit of the 
product/process distinction is attributable to the fact that GATT closes the door to using a 
variety of regulatory differences to pose barriers to trade, undermining the goal of trade 
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liberalization.197 The issue here, as Professors Brown Weiss & Jackson correctly recall, is 
“how to develop criteria by which to judge whether trade barriers based on processes are 
an appropriate accommodation of the competing trade and environment policies, or 
whether on the contrary the barriers are really protectionist measures in the guise of 
environmental (or other process) considerations.”198 
 
C.  Summary 
 
In this Chapter, I have shown that the assumption that trade will benefit the 
environment has come under serious attack by legal scholars, due to concerns that more 
trade and economic activity may result in more environmental degradation; that the 
competition brought about by free trade may put pressure on governments to lower 
environmental standards; and that trade agreements may prevent governments from 
enacting certain environmental regulations.  These concerns have given rise to 4 types of 
trade-environment disputes.  In some early cases, the approach taken by GATT panels 
proved so controversial that it was never adopted by the GATT parties.  In subsequent 
cases, WTO panels have taken a different approach.  They have determined that a 
measure is not “necessary” to protect human, animal or plant life or health (Art. XX(b)) 
unless there is no less-trade-restrictive alternative that would achieve the 
environmental/health objective.  However, these measures must also satisfy the Chapeau 
                                                 
197 Id. at 33. 
198 See id. 
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of Article XX, which requires WTO members to ensure that measures are not applied in a 
manner that produces “arbitrary and unjustifiable” discrimination or a “disguised” 
restriction on trade.  WTO panels have found that the Chapeau is violated if there is a 
failure to enter cooperative arrangements with foreign producers; failure to take into 
account the costs imposed on foreign producers; or a failure to apply the measure flexibly 
-- taking into account the need to permit different regulatory approaches in different 







Chapter II. The MERCOSUR Trade and Environment Linkage Debate 
 
 
Having examined the general debate over the linkage between trade and 
environment, and the WTO jurisprudence in this area, I now look at the jurisprudence 
that has emerged with respect to trade-environment conflicts in MERCOSUR.   
 
In 1991, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay signed the Treaty of 
Asuncion,199 which established a new economic block, known as Mercado Común del 
Sur [Common Market of the South] (MERSOSUR). The Treaty of Asuncion was 
supplemented by the Protocol of Ouro Preto, an additional protocol on the institutional 
structure of MERCOSUR.200 During the 1990s, Bolivia and Chile became associated 
members of MERCOSUR.201  In 2006, Venezuela became a full member of the 
MERCOSUR.202 
 
Article 1 of the Treaty of Asuncion sets out the general objectives of 
MERCOSUR, including the elimination of  tariff and non-tariff restrictions on imports 
from other MERCOSUR countries; establishment of a common external tariff in relation 
                                                 
199 Treaty Establishing a Common Market between the Argentine Republic, the Federative Republic of Brazil, 
the Republic of Paraguay and the Eastern Republic of Uruguay (1991), 30 I.L.M. 1044 [hereinafter Treaty of  
Asuncion].  
200 Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Asuncion on the Institutional Structure of Mercosur (1994), 34 I.L.M. 
1248 (1995).  
201 See Protocolo de Ushuaia sobre Compromisso Democrático no MERCOSUL, Bolívia e Chile, available 
at http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/portal%20intermediario/pt/index.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2007). 
202 See Protocolo de Adesão da República Bolivariana da Venezuela ao Mercosul, available at 
http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/portal%20intermediario/pt/index.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2007). 
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to third countries; and coordination and harmonization of domestic laws and 
regulations.203    
 
This Chapter discusses MERCOSUR rules relating to environmental policies; 
MERCOSUR dispute settlement procedures; and MERCOSUR case law regarding trade-
environment disputes.  I then compare this framework to the WTO framework discussed 
in Chapter 1.   
 
A. MERCOSUR Law Concerning Environmental Policies 
 
The preamble of the Treaty of Asuncion states that the treaty’s objective is 
“economic development with social justice.”204  However, it recognizes that this 
objective must be achieved in conjunction with various competing goals, including “the 
preservation of the environment,” based on the principles of “gradualness, flexibility and 
balance.”205  In addition to the Asuncion Treaty, MERCOSUR countries approved an 
                                                 
203  Treaty of Asuncion, supra note 1, art. 1.  See generally JOSÉ ÂNGELO ESTRELLA FARIA, O MERCOSUL: 
PRINCÍPIOS, FINALIDADES E ALCANCE DO TRATADO DE ASSUNÇÃO[MERCOSUR: PRINCIPLES, OBJECTIVES 
AND REACH OF THE ASSUNÇÃO TREATY] (1993); MERCOSUL: SEUS EFEITOS JURÍDICOS, ECONÔMICOS E 
POLÍTICOS NOS ESTADOS-MEMBROS [MERCOSUL: ITS LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL EFFECTS ON THE 
MEMBER COUNTRIES] (Maristela Basso ed., 1997) [hereinafter MERCOSUR]; GRUPO DE REFLEXÃO 
PROSPECTIVA SOBRE O MERCOSUL [MERCOSUL GROUP OF PROSPECTIVE THINKING] (CLODOALDO 
HUGUENEY FILHO & CARLOS HENRIQUE CARDIM eds., 2003). 
204 Preamble to the Asuncion Treaty, available at 
http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/portal%20intermediario/pt/index.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2007) 
(“Considerando que a ampliação das atuais dimensões de seus [Estados-Partes] mercados nacionais, através 
da integração, constitui condição fundamental para acelerar seus processos de desenvolvimento econômico 
com justiça social.”).   
205 Id.  (“Entendendo que esse objetivo deve ser alcançado mediante o aproveitamento mais eficaz dos 
recursos disponíveis, a preservação do meio ambiente, o melhoramento das interconexões físicas, a 
 
 58
Annex to the Asuncion Treaty that bans non-tariff restrictions among Member Countries.  
For the purposes of this Annex, the adoption measures with trade restrictive effect 
“destined to” protect the life and health of persons, animals and plants does not violate 
MERCOSUR law.206  Such exceptions were foreseen in Article 50 of the 1980 
Montevideo Treaty. 
 
Article 50 of the 1980 Montevideo Treaty states that its trade liberalization 
provisions should not be interpreted to impede the adoption or implementation of 
measures “destined to” certain legitimate objectives, including the “protection of the life 
and health of persons, animals and plants.”207  This Article is the MERCOSUR 
equivalent of GATT Article XX.  However, the MERCOSUR and GATT provisions 
differ in at least three significant ways.  First, GATT Article XX applies only to measures 
that are “necessary” to protect life and health, while Article 50(d) applies to measures 
that are “destined to” these goals.  Second, GATT Article XX contains a separate 
exception for measures “related to” environmental conservation, while Article 50(d) 
contains no similar provision.   Finally, GATT Article XX includes a “chapeau” 
providing that the exception does not apply to measures that are applied in a manner that 
                                                                                                                                                 
coordenação de políticas macroeconômicas da complementação dos diferentes setores da economia, com 
base nos princípios de gradualidade, flexibilidade e equilíbrio.”). 
206 See Annex I to the Asuncion Treaty – Programa de Liberalização Comercial, Article 2(b), available at 
http://www.interlegis.gov.br/processo_legislativo/copy_of_20020319150524/20030529151030/TRTASS02
.HTM#E49E2 (last visited Oct. 29, 2007) (“Não estão compreendidas no mencionado conceito as medidas 
adotadas em virtude das situações previstas no Artigo 50 do Tratado de Montevidéu de 1980”).  
207 Id. Article 50(d) (“Nenhuma disposição do presente Tratado será interpretada como impedimento à 
adoção e ao cumprimento de medidas destinadas à * * * proteção da vida e saúde das pessoas, dos animais 
e dos vegetais”). 
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constitutes “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” or a “disguised restriction on 
international trade.”  An equivalent to the chapeau of Article XX of GATT 1994 does not 
exist in the MERCOSUR context, which means that trade tribunals are under no 
constraint to analyze the manner in which the measure is applied.   
 
Unlike the WTO, MERCOSUR has also produced a number of legal instruments 
that directly address environmental policy.  In 1992, the Presidents of the MERCOSUR 
countries signed the Canela Declaration, which stressed shared responsibility for 
environmental problems.208 That same year, the MERCOSUR countries approved a 
Cooperation Agreement on Environmental Issues which establishes a Commission on 
Environmental Cooperation to harmonize environmental laws and regulations, and to 
create programs to monitor regional environmental quality.209  
 
In 1994, the MERCOSUR countries signed the Protocol of Ouro Preto, which 
establishes a Common Market Council (CMC) and a Common Market Group (GMC).  
The CMC is the highest political organ in MERCOSUR. It consists of the Ministers for 
Foreign Affairs and the Economy and the Heads of State, and has the power to issue 
Decisions, which are legally binding on Member States.210  The GMC is comprised of 
four permanent and four alternate members, composed of representatives of the Ministry 
                                                 
208 See Declaração de Canela dos Presidentes dos Países do Cone Sul Prévia à Conferência das Nações 
Unidos sobre Meio Ambiente e Desenvolvimento, available at 
http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/portal%20intermediario/pt/index.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2007). 
209 Decreto Presidencial No. 2.241, de 2 de junho de 1997, D.O.U. de 03.06.1997 (Brazil), art. 4. 
210 Ouro Preto Protocol, art. 3, 9, available at 
http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/portal%20intermediario/pt/index.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2007). 
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of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Economics, and representatives of each central bank.211 
The GMC has the power to issue Resolutions, which are legally binding on Member 
States.212  The GMC also runs working groups, ad hoc groups and specialized meetings 
concerning agricultural matters, the harmonization of technical product norms, the 
environment, financial services, border control, and tourism.213  
 
During 1993 and 1994, the GMC called a number of Reuniãos Especializadas em 
Meio Ambiente (Specialized Meetings on the Environment) [“REMAs”] to analyze 
environmental laws and regulations in place in each of the MERCOSUR Member States 
and propose specific environmental policies.214  REMA I took place in Montevideo in 
1993, and established the rules of procedure for future REMA meetings. The next four 
REMAs produced a number of recommendations, including the creation of consultation 
proceedings for activities conducted in one Member Country with potential 
transboundary effects on the others.215  After five meetings, the REMAs were 
discontinued and a permanent MERCOSUR working group, Subgrupo de Trabalho 6 
[“SGT-6”] was set up to promote sustainable development and the preservation of the 
                                                 
211 Id. Art. 11. 
212 Id. Art. 15. 
213 Id. Art. 14. 
214 See MERCOSUL: SEUS EFEITOS JURÍDICOS, ECONÔMICOS E POLÍTICOS NOS ESTADOS-MEMBROS 
[MERCOSUL: ITS LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL EFFECTS ON THE MEMBER COUNTRIES]  405 (Maristela 
Basso ed., 1997) [hereinafter MERCOSUR] (arguing that the elimination of non-tariff barriers will only be 
achieved in MERCOSUR through harmonization of environmental laws and regulations). 
215 Id. at 407-08. Professor Basso argued that although the REMAs have not produced relevant concrete 




environment and to formulate policies that guarantee the integrity of the environment 
within the process of liberalizing trade.216 
 
Partly as a result of the REMAs, the GMC adopted a number of resolutions 
referring explicitly to the objective of sustainable development and the importance of 
environmental protection.  For example, it has adopted a resolution requiring member 
states to abide by gas emission control regulations;217 a resolution proposing regulatory 
harmonization for recipients used to trade food within the region for environmental 
purposes;218 a resolution adopting a Conduct Code for the introduction and liberation of 
biological-controlled agents for the environment;219 a resolution approving guidelines for 
MERCOSUR energy policy including completion of environmental impact assessment 
studies;220 a resolution approving Basic Guidelines on Environmental Policies produced 
                                                 
216 André de Carvalho Ramos, Restrições Ambientais ao Livre-comércio e as Decisões Arbitrais no 
Mercosul [Environmental Restrictions to Free Trade and the Mercosul Arbitral Awards], 45 REVISTA DE 
DIREITO AMBIENTAL 35 (2007). 
217 GMC Resolution 9/91, available at 
http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/portal%20intermediario/pt/index.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2007).   
218 GMC Resolution 10/91, available at 
http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/portal%20intermediario/pt/index.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2007). 
219 GMC Resolution 53/93, available at 
http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/portal%20intermediario/pt/index.htm.  See Basso, supra note 398, at 414. 
220 GMC Resolution 57/93, available at 
http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/portal%20intermediario/pt/index.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2007). 
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by REMA;221 and a resolution establishing technical regulations on automotive 
emissions.222  
 
In addition, the CMC has adopted Decisions approving a number of important 
environmental agreements, including an Agreement on Transportation of Hazardous 
Goods;223 a Decision requiring Member Countries’ customs to provide preferential 
treatment for vehicles transporting hazardous products, to avoid long delays in unsafe 
places.;224 a MERCOSUR Action Plan, which states that MERCOSUR trade goals should 
be accomplished through effective environmental protection;225 the MERCOSUR 
Environmental Frame Agreement, which acknowledges the importance of the 
environment for the consolidation of MERCOSUR226 and its Article 3 provides that 
sustainable development policies shall not include measures that unjustifiably and 
arbitrarily restrict or distort the free circulation of goods and services within 
                                                 
221 GMC Resolution 10/94, available at 
http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/portal%20intermediario/pt/index.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2007) . See also 
Ramos, supra note 411, at 42. 
222 GMC Resolution 084/94, available at 
http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/portal%20intermediario/pt/index.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2007).  See 
generally Basso, supra note 398, at 414. 
223 CMC Decision 02/94, available at 
http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/portal%20intermediario/pt/index.htm (last visited Oct. 30 2007).  See 
generally Basso, supra note 398, at 415. 
224 CMC Decision 01/94, available at 
http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/portal%20intermediario/pt/index.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2007).  See 
generally Ramos, supra note 411, at 42. 
225 CMC Decision 09/95 (MERCOSUR Action Plan), available at 
http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/portal%20intermediario/pt/index.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2007). See 
Ramos, supra note 411, at 43. 
226 Preamble to CMC Decision 02/201 (MERCOSUR Environmental Frame Agreement), available at 
http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/portal%20intermediario/pt/index.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2007). 
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MERCOSUR Member States.227 In future trade and environment disputes, Article 3 may 
be applied similarly to Article XX Chapeau of GATT 1994, to prohibit the adoption of 
measures applied in a manner that unjustifiably restrict or distort trade within 
MERCOSUR.  
 
B. MERCOSUR Dispute Settlement 
 
 
MERCOSUR dispute settlement was first regulated by the Brasilia Protocol.228 
This Protocol was proposed on December 17, 1991, and became effective on April 22, 
1993. A decade later, the Brasilia Protocol was replaced by the Olivos Protocol.229 This 
Protocol was signed by the member countries on February 18, 2002, and became 
effective on January 1, 2004.  The current framework is quite similar to the dispute 
settlement framework in the WTO. 
 
Under MERCOSUR’s current framework, private parties may request that their 
states bring claims against another member country.230 Trade panels are composed of 3 
                                                 
227 Id. Art. 3. 
228 See Luiz Olavo Baptista, Solução de Divergências no MERCOSUL  [Dispute Settlement in MERCOSUR], 
in MERCOSUL, supra note 214, at 157. See also DEISY VENTURA, LAS ASÍMETRIAS ENTRE EL MERCOSUR 
Y LA UNIÓN EUROPEA: LOS DESAFÍOS DE UNA ASOCIACIÓN INTERREGIONAL [THE ASYMETRIES BETWEEN 
MERCOSUR AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: CHALLENGES OF AN INTER-REGIONAL ASSOCIATION] 238 
(2005). 
229 See Olivos Protocol, available at http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/principal/contenido.asp (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2007). 
230 See Gabriella G. Lucarelli de Salvio & Jeanine Gama Sá Cabral, Reflexões sobre o Mecanismo de 
Solução de Controvérsias do Mercosul e o Impacto no Mecanismo de Solução de Controvérsias da OMC 
[Reflections about the Mercosul Dispute Resolution Mechanism and the Impact of Its Decisions on the 
WTO Dispute Resolution Mechanism], 4(I) CEBRI 5, 9-10 (2006) [hereinafter Reflexões]. 
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members, and each party involved in the dispute nominates a panelist. The third panelist 
is nominated by the chosen panelists and may not be a national of any Member State 
involved in the dispute. This third panelist presides over the proceedings. The trade panel 
applies MERCOSUR law, which included the Asuncion Treaty and other treaties made 
under it, decisions of the Common Market Council, and resolutions of the Common 
Market Group and general principles of international law.231  
 
Under the Brasilia Protocol, the parties could not appeal reports issued by 
MERCOSUR trade panels.232  The creation of a permanent Appellate Body was among 
the main innovations brought by the Olivos Protocol.233 
 
C. MERCOSUR Case Law on Trade and Environment 
 
 
 MERCOSUR jurisprudence concerning the link between trade and the 
environment is far less developed than that of the WTO. Prior to the retreaded tire 
dispute, MERCOSUR tribunals had issued only one decision dealing with this topic.  On 
April 19, 2002, a MERCOSUR panel issued an arbitration award pursuant the Brasilia 
Protocol,234 concerning Brazil’s prohibition on the importation of phytosanitary 
                                                 
231 Article 19 of the Brasília Protocol. 
232 Article 21 of the Brasília Protocol. 
233 See Lucarelli de Salvio & Gama Sá Cabral, Reflexões, supra note 230, at 13. 
234 Award of the Ad Hoc MERCOSUR Arbitration Panel, formed to decide the dispute brought by the 
Argentine Republic against the Federal Republic of Brazil on barriers to the entrance of phytosanitary 
products in the Brazilian market:  non-incorporation of GMC Resolutions N. 48/96, 87/96, 149/96, 156/96 
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products.235  This measure was inconsistent with several resolutions of the Common 
Market Group concerning requirements for importation of such products within 
MERCOSUR.236 Accordingly, Argentina claimed that Brazil violated Articles 38 of the 
Ouro Preto Protocol, which states that Member Countries are committed to adopt 
measures necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations issued by 
MERCOSUR institutions,237 and Article 42 of the same Agreement, which states that the 
laws or regulations issued by MERCOSUR institutions are legally binding on Member 
Countries.238 
 
Brazil, on the other hand, argued that its measure was permissible under Article 
50(d) of the 1980 Montevideo Treaty, which allows a Member Country not to adopt 
                                                                                                                                                 
and 71/98 that impedes their enforcement within MERCOSUR, available at http://www.mercosur.org.uy 
(last visited May 9, 2005) [hereinafter Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Phytosanitary Products]. 
235 A “phytosanitary product” is any substance, biological agent, combination of substances or biological 
agents, applied to prevent, control or destroy any harmful organism, including undesired species of plants, 
animals or microorganisms which cause damage or have a negative effect on the production, manufacturing 
or storing of plants and derived products. The term includes other aids, phyto-regulators, dessicants and 
substances applied to plants before and after harvest for protection from deterioration during transportation 
and storing. See http://www.proz.com/kudoz/723796 (last visited Oct. 30, 2007).  
236 GMC Resolution No. 48/96, which establishes the requirements for the free circulation of phytosanitary 
products within MERCOSUR, available at 
http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/portal%20intermediario/pt/index.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2007); GMC 
Resolution No. 87/96, which regulates the registration procedures for phytosanitary products (active 
substances and formulas) to circulate within MERCOSUR, available at 
http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/portal%20intermediario/pt/index.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2007); GMC 
Resolution No. 149/96, which interprets GMC Resolution No. 48/96; GMC Resolution No. 156/96, which 
updates the list present in GMC Resolution 87/96 of active substances and formulas that can freely 
circulate within MERCOSUR, available at 
http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/portal%20intermediario/pt/index.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2007) ; and 
GMC Resolution No. 71/98, which updates the list present in GMC Resolution 156/96 of active substances 
and formulas that can freely circulate within MERCOSUR list, available at 
http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/portal%20intermediario/pt/index.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2007). 
237 Article 38 of the Ouro Preto Protocol. 
238 Id. Article 42. 
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measures that threaten the life and health of persons, animals and plants. Brazil argued 
that it was taking its time to analyze whether liberalizing trade of phytosanitary products 
within MERCOSUR would constitute a threat to the environment and human life and 
health. Once Brazil had determined that no actual threat existed, it would start internal 
proceedings to internalize those resolutions.239  Brazil sustained that the Ouro Preto 
Protocol does not stipulate a time limit for a country to internalize MERCOSUR laws or 
regulations.240 
  
The Panel was asked to determine whether Brazil’s non-incorporation of GMC’s 
Resolutions concerning a common system for MERCOSUR phytosanitary products fell 
under the public health exception of Article 50 (d) of the 1980 Montevideo Treaty.   It 
concluded that Brazil’s non-incorporation of GMC’s Resolutions concerning a common 
system for MERCOSUR phytosanitary products did not fall under the public health 
exception of Article 50(d) of the 1980 Montevideo Treaty. First, the Panel noted that 
Brazil had not demonstrated any actual harm to the health of persons, animals and plants 
that would arise from the establishment of a common system for MERCOSUR 
phytosanitary products.241 Second, the Panel found that Article 50(d) did not apply 
because Brazil had already agreed to create by decree a common system for 
                                                 
239 Decreto No. 4074, de 4 de janeiro de 2002, D.O.U. de 08.01.2002 (Brazil). 
240 Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Phytosanitary Products, supra note 234, P 5.6. 
241 Id. P 9.7. 
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phytosanitary products with the effect of liberalizing trade of such products within 
MERCOSUR.242 
 
D. Summary  
 
The MERCOSUR framework for addressing trade-environment conflicts is 
similar to the WTO framework discussed in Chapter I in several important respects.  Like 
the Agreement Establishing the WTO, the Treaty of Asuncion expressly recognizes that 
the objective of economic development must be achieved with competing goals, 
including the preservation of the environment. Moreover, the WTO and MERCOSUR 
both provide exceptions that ostensibly permit members to restrict trade in order to 
further environmental goals.  Finally, both bodies permit disputes to be settled by 
independent ad hoc trade panels, subject to review by a permanent Appellate Body.   
 
However, there are also important differences between the two frameworks.  In 
the WTO, such measures must be “necessary” to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health, or “relat[ed]” to natural resource conservation.  They must also satisfy the Article 
XX Chapeau, which prohibits “arbitrary or unjustifiable” discrimination and “disguised” 
restrictions on trade.  In MERCOSUR, trade-restrictive measures are permitted so long as 
they are “destined to” protect the life and health of persons, animals and plants. There is 
                                                 




no provision equivalent to the Chapeau of GATT Article XX. MERCOSUR case law is 
also much less developed than that of the WTO.  Prior to the retreaded tire dispute, 
MERCOSUR panels had only addressed trade and environment conflicts in one case. In 
that case, the trade panel decided that the environmental/health exception did not apply 
because no harm had been demonstrated. 
 
 Finally, unlike the WTO, MERCOSUR has produced a number of legal 
instruments that directly address environmental policy, and has run several Specialized 
Meetings on the Environment. In addition, MERCOSUR has set up a permanent working 
group to promote sustainable development and the preservation of the environment and to 
formulate policies that guarantee the integrity of the environment within the process of 
trade liberalization.  MERCOSUR has even created an Environmental Frame Agreement, 






Chapter III. The MERCOSUR Disputes over Trade in Retreaded Tires  
 
 
In the previous two Chapters, I examined the framework developed in the WTO 
and MERCOSUR to address disputes involving conflicts between trade and 
environmental concerns.  In this Chapter, I will examine how this framework was applied 
by MERCOSUR tribunals with respect to the two MERCOSUR disputes concerning 
trade in retreaded tires.  Section A addresses the MERCOSUR retreaded tire dispute 
between Uruguay and Brazil.  Section B addresses the MERCOSUR retreaded tire 
dispute between Uruguay and Argentina, which resulted in the first decision ever issued 
by the new MERCOSUR Appellate Body.   Section C summarizes the legal impact of 
both of these decisions. 
 
A. The Brazil-Uruguay Dispute 
 
In 1991, Brazil’s Ministry of Economic, Finance and Planning adopted a 
“portaria” prohibiting the importation of used tires into Brazil.243  However, Brazilian 
courts issued a number of injunctions permitting the importation of used tires, on the 
ground that the portaria had not been authorized by any law enacted by the Brazilian 
                                                 
243 Portaria No. 8, de 13 de maio de 1991, D.O.U. de 14.05.1991 (Brazil). Portarias are binding internal 
administrative acts under which heads of state departments issue general or special determinations to their 
subordinates.   
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Congress.244  In 1999, the Brazilian Ministry of the Environment adopted a resolution 
requiring manufacturers and importers of new and used tires to dispose of waste tires in 
an “environmentally adequate” manner.245   
 
In 2000, the Brazilian Ministry of Development, Industry and International 
Commerce issued a new portaria that also banned imports of retreaded tires, which are 
made from used tires.246  The following year, the President of Brazil issued a Decree 
subjecting the importation, marketing, transportation, and storage of retreaded tire 
imports to a fine of 400 Brazilian reais per tire.247  In addition, in 2003, the Brazilian 
Ministry of the Environment issued an amendment clarifying that the requirement of 
“environmentally adequate” disposal also applied to manufacturers and importers of 
retreaded tires.248   Meanwhile, the Brazilian courts continued to issue injunctions 
permitting imports of both used and retreaded tires on the grounds that they had not been 
authorized by any Brazilian legislation.   
 
Uruguay initiated dispute settlement proceedings in MERCOSUR to challenge the 
2000 ban on imported retreaded tires.  It argued that the ban violated CMC Decision No. 
22/00, which requires that “the member states shall not adopt any trade restrictive 
                                                 
244 Brazilian public administration is informed by fundamental principles, such as the principle of legality. 
The principle of legality, present in Article 37, caput of the Brazilian Constitution, states that the activities 
of the public administration are subject to laws.   
245 Resolução No. 258, de 26 de agosto de 1999, D.O.U. 02.12.1999. No guidance has been provided on 
what constitutes an environmentally adequate manner.   
246 Portaria No. 8, de 25 de setembro de 2000, D.O.U. de 27.09.2000 (Brazil).  
247 Decreto No. 3.919, de 14 de setembro de 2001, D.O.U. 17.09.2001 (Brazil).   
248 Resolução No. 301, de 21 de março de 2002, D.O.U. 28.08.2003 (Brazil). 
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measure, of any nature”,249  Article 1 of the Asunción Treaty, which establishes the 
objective of consolidating the process of integration and economic cooperation; Articles 
1 and 10(2) of Annex 1 to the Asuncion Treaty, which bans non-tariff restrictions; and 
the general international law principle of estoppel.250  Brazil, on the other hand, argued 
that its ban on retreaded tire imports did not violate Decision No. 22 or violate the 
principle of estoppel.251 First, Brazil argued that the ban was not a new prohibition on 
retreaded tires, but merely a clarification of its pre-existing ban on imports of used tires.  
Restrictions on importation of used tires are expressly permitted by MERCOSUR’s 
automotive policy.  Brazil argued that retreaded tires are used tires that have been 
subjected to an industrial process aiming at augmenting their longevity.252  It noted that 
Argentina had also banned the importation of retreaded tires based on a finding that 
retreaded tires are used tires253  According to Brazil, the 2000 ban on imported retreaded 
tires was enacted solely to clarify the scope of its previous used tire import ban, rather 
than to establish a new trade restriction.254  
  
                                                 
249 See Article 1 of CMC Decision 22/00, available at 
http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/portal%20intermediario/pt/index.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2007).  In the 
original: “Os Estados Partes não adotarão nenhuma medida restritiva ao comércio recíproco, qualquer que 
seja a sua natureza, sem prejuízo do previsto no art. 2 b) do Anexo I do Tratado de Assunção.”  
250 As discussed above, the Ouro Preto Protocol expressly incorporated general principles of international 
law as part of MERCOSUR law.  See supra pp. 145-46.   
251 See Articles 1 and 2 of GMC Resolution No. 109/94, available at 
http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/portal%20intermediario/pt/index.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2007). 
252 Id. at 10. 
253 According to Brazil’s argument in the arbitral award, Argentina has alleged that retreaded tires are used 
tires because they are manufactured from used tires.  See Arbitral Award VI – Tires – from Uruguay to 
Brazil – 01/09/2002, at 11, available at www.mercosur.org.uy (last visited May 9, 2005 [hereinafter Brazil 
Award]. 
254 Id. at 9.  
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1. The Panel’s Interpretation of MERCOSUR Law 
 
  In its decision, the panel agreed with Uruguay’s claim that Brazil’s ban on 
retreaded tire imports was a trade restriction prohibited by Decision 22/00, and rejected 
Brazil’s contention that the ban was justified as part of a prior permissible ban on used 
tire imports.  The panel found that examination of Brazilian laws and regulations 
concerning trade in retreaded tires and related commercial practices in Brazil supported 
the conclusion that Brazil considered used and retreaded tires as two different goods, 
subject to distinct legal treatment. 
 
  First, the panel examined the documents emanating from different Brazilian 
authorities during the almost ten-year period between 1991 and 2000.255  The Panel 
rejected Brazil’s argument that these documents were not representative of Brazil’s 
official legal understanding on the issue because they were issued by  sectors of the 
Brazilian public administration that do not have the competency to regulate foreign trade 
in Brazil.256 It noted that the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility had concluded that “the behavior of any governmental body will be 
considered as an act of state, regardless of the legislative, executive or judiciary function 
                                                 
255 The panel looked at a memorandum issued by the National Legal Division, of the Directorate General 
for Brazil’s Customs; Opinion 18/98, of the Directorate General for Brazil’s Customs, Letter 154/00, of the 
Ministry of Development, Industry and Commerce; a memorandum of the Technical Department for 
Tariffs, of the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Tourism; Consultation 32/98 before MERCOSUR’s 




of such body.”257 Consequently, the Panel concluded that the separate laws and 
regulations issued by different governmental bodies of the Brazilian government were all 
representative of the country’s legal understanding on the legal relationship between used 
and retreaded tires.258 
 
  Second, the Panel took into account the evidence presented by Uruguay indicating 
that there was a continuous and growing trade in used and retreaded tires between that 
country and Brazil between 1991 and 2000. In the Panel’s view, this ongoing trade was 
warranted by the lack of a specific regulation banning imports of retreaded tires.259  
Accordingly, the panel agreed with Uruguay that the import ban imposed on used tires by 
the 1991 ban on imported used goods was never intended to be extended to retreaded 
tires, given the internal practice of Brazil in accepting the importation of Uruguayan 
retreaded tires during 1991-2000, which indicated that the Brazilian public administration 
never considered retreaded tires as used tires.260  
 
  Third, the panel rejected Brazil’s argument that GMC Resolution 109/94261 
permitted it to issue national legislation defining the meaning of “used tires,” because that 
                                                 
257 See International Law Commission, Report on the Work of Its Fifty-Second Session, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., 
Supp. No. 10, at 124, U.N. Doc. A/55/10 (2000). For information on the ILC and its work, see 
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/index.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2007). 
258 Brazil Award, supra note 253, at 20. 
259 Id. at 18. 
260 Id. at 19. 
261 The Common Market Group (GMC) is the executive branch of MERCOSUR. The GMC runs all 
working groups, ad hoc groups and specialized meetings concerning agricultural matters, the harmonization 
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resolution expressly permits the implementation of national trade legislation in areas 
where no MERCOSUR regulation has been adopted.262  Article 2 of Resolution 109/94 
provides that “while a single Regulation mentioned in Article 1 is not approved, the 
Member States will apply their respective national legislation concerning importation of 
used goods, either in trading with third countries or within MERCOSUR.”263  The Panel 
emphasized that the Resolution establishes an exception to the Treaty of Asunción and 
therefore should be interpreted restrictively.264 In addition, the panel found that the 
Resolution did not permit members to adopt “arbitrary” changes in their national trade 
legislation.265 In that regard, the Panel concluded that the 2000 ban on imported retreaded 
tires could not be justified under the Resolution because it contradicted established 
commercial practices in the region, i.e., the constant and growing trade flow of retreaded 
tires.266  
  
 Finally, the panel found that the general international law principle of estoppel did 
not apply in this case.  It agreed with Uruguay’s contention that Brazil’s ban on imported 
retreaded tires could give rise to a claim under the general international law principle of 
“venire contra factum proprium” (estoppel or acquiescence, préclusion), which states that 
                                                                                                                                                 
of technical product norms, the environment, financial services, border control, tourism, etc. (Article 10 of 
Protocol of Ouro Preto).  
262 Brazil Award, supra note 253, at 21. 
263 Article 2 of Resolution 109/94. In the original: “Enquanto não se aprovar o Regulamento Comum 
mencionado no Artigo 1, os Estados Partes aplicarão suas respectivas legislações nacionais referentes à 
importação de bens usados, tanto no comércio com terceiros países quanto no comércio intra-Mercosul.” 
264 Brazil Award, supra note 253, at 21. 
265 Id. at 21. 
266 Id.  at 21. 
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“it is an established rule of law that a plea of error cannot be allowed as an element 
vitiating consent if the party advancing it contributed by its own conduct to the error.”267  
The panel found that Brazil’s ban on imports of retreaded tires contradicted (a) the 
extensive commercial practice in Brazil, allowing the importation of retreaded tires from 
Uruguay and third countries prior to 2000, and (b) the interpretation and application of 
the existing body of Brazilian law related to the treatment of retreaded and used tires 
prior to 2000.  The Panel concluded that the continuous commercial trade in retreaded 
tires between Brazil and Uruguay, and official declarations of Brazilian authorities 
regulating directly or indirectly the importation of used and retreaded tires were sufficient 
to create a “legitimate expectation” on the part of Uruguay that Brazil would continue to 
permit imports of imported retreaded tires, and that Brazil was estopped from interfering 
with this expectation by virtue of the principle of “venire contra factum proprium.”268  
However, the Panel found that this principle did not apply to MERCOSUR, since its 
members were engaged in an integration process, and should therefore rely on principles 
of “mutual trust” (confiança) rather than “venire contra factum proprium.”269 
 
                                                 
267 See the Temple case, ICJ Reports (1962), at 26. See also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 615 (6th ed. 2003) (stating that “[t]here is a tendency among writers to refer to any 
representation or conduct having legal significance as creating an estoppel, precluding the author from 
denying the ‘truth’ of the representation, express or implied.”) 
268  Brazil Award, supra note 253, at 21. 
269 Id. at 24 (noting that the application of the principle of estoppel to situations that take place between 
Member States of  integration processes, such as MERCOSUR, cannot overlook the special relation these 
processes confer upon the Member States). 
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  Accordingly, the Panel decided that the 2000 ban on imported retreaded tires is 
not compatible with MERCOSUR law and ordered Brazil to adapt its laws to conform to 
its legal findings.  
 
2. Brazil’s Response 
 
  In response to the Panel decision, Brazil enacted a new “portaria” eliminating the 
ban on retreaded tires imported from other MERCOSUR countries,270 and issued a 
Presidential Decree exempting retreaded tires imported from other MERCOSUR 
countries from the financial penalties established under its prior laws.271 However, the 
new Portaria expressly stated that imports of retreaded tires from non-MERCOSUR 
countries would continue to be prohibited.272 
   
Although none of the arguments raised by Brazil in the MERCOSUR proceedings 
dealt with environmental concerns, soon after the MERCOSUR panel issued its decision, 
the media in Brazil devoted close attention to the negative environmental impacts of the 
                                                 
270 Portaria No. 17, de 1 de dezembro de 2003, D.O.U. de 2.12.2003 (Brazil) [hereinafter 2003 Portaria]. 
271 Decreto No. 4.592, de 11 de fevereiro de 2003. 
272 2003 Portaria, supra note 461, Art. 39. TRF-4, Ap. 2004.70.01.010625-6, Relator: Vilson Darós, D.J.U. 
10.05.2006, p. 569, available at 
http://www.trf4.gov.br/trf4/processos/pdf_it2.php?numeroProcesso=200470010106256&dataPublicacao=1
0/05/2006 (last visited Oct. 13, 2007). 
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panel’s findings. The main newspapers in Brazil published articles with headings such as 
“Brazil May Become Garbage Deposit for the World’s Waste Tires”.273 
 
In July 2003, Brazil’s Public Prosecutor (Ministério Público Federal) filed a class 
action, with a preliminary injunction request, challenging the Presidential Decree 
exempting retreaded tires imported from other MERCOSUR countries from the financial 
penalties established under prior law.274  The class action raised environmental arguments 
that Brazil had failed to raise in the MERCOSUR proceedings. The Public Prosecutor 
argued that the Brazilian ban on retreaded tires was justified by the adverse effects that 
trade in retreaded tires had on the environment itself and on public health in Brazil. The 
Public Prosecutor argued that trade in retreaded tires violates Article 225 of the Brazilian 
Constitution, which provides that everyone has the right to an ecologically balanced 
environment, whose duty to preserve and defend it for present and future generations is 
borne by the collectivity and the public administration.275 In order to assure this right, the 
public administration will control production, commercialization, and the employment of 
techniques, methods and substances that impose risk to life, quality of life and to the 
                                                 
273 Silvio Bressan, Brasil Pode Virar “Lixão” Mundial de Pneus: Com 100 Milhões de Carcaças, País 
Corre o Risco de Receber Sobras da Europa Via Mercosul [Brazil May Become World’s Waste Tires 
Dump: With 100 Million Casings, Country Receiving Unused Tires from Europe via Mercosul], Jornal O 
Estado de São Paulo [The State of São Paulo Newspaper], 03.17.2003. 
274 See Ação Civil Pública Ministério Público Federal contra União Federal, Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do 
Sul, 07.02.2003 (on file with author).   
275 See Article 225 of the Brazilian Constitution. In the original: “Todos têm direito ao meio ambiente 
ecologicamente equilibrado, bem de uso comum do povo e essencial à sadia qualidade de vida, impondo-se 
ao poder público e à coletividade o dever de defendê-lo e preservá-lo para as presentes e futuras gerações”. 
Paragraph 1, section V of the Brazilian Constitution. In the original: “Para assegurar a efetividade desse 
direito, incumbe ao Poder Público: controlar a produção, a comercialização e o emprego de técnicas, 
métodos e substâncias que comportem risco para a vida, a qualidade de vida e o meio ambiente.” 
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environment.276  In support of his argument, he cited the precautionary principle, which 
allows for the adoption of measures to protect the environment even though the risks are 
not yet scientifically proved,277 and Article 50 of the Montevideo Treaty, which expressly 
permits the adoption of measures aimed at protecting the environment.278  The class 
action requested that the new laws exempting imports of retreaded tires from 
MERCOSUR countries from the prior penalties be struck down, and that the prior fines 
continue to apply to retreaded tire imports from all countries, without exception. 
 
The class action did not challenge the constitutional validity of the MERCOSUR 
Panel Report. As pointed out by Celso Amorin, Minister of Foreign Affairs, “for a 
country that aspires to be the MERCOSUR leader, questioning the Arbitral Award would 
be like ‘a shot on ones own foot’, because later Brazil would lose its legitimacy in other 
disputes of its interest.”279 
 
The federal judge did not grant the Public Prosecutor’s request for preliminary 
injunction banning imports of retreaded tires.280 According to her, one cannot assume that 
because retreaded tires are made from previously used tires are bad for the environment. 
                                                 
276 See id. 
277 Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration: “In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach 
shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.  See Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 876 (1992).   
278 See discussion of Article 50, supra Chapter II. 
279 See Bressan, supra note 273. 




In addition, the federal judge concluded that imports of retreaded and used tires are 
positive for the global environment, because Brazil is using goods no longer desired in 
the European Communities. This interpretation was confirmed in the final ruling.281 
 
Moreover, in 2004 the State of Rio Grande do Sul passed a law banning the 
commercialization of used tires, which are considered to include retreaded tires that have 
been manufactured outside of Brazil from casings of used tires and imported into 
Brazil.282 In 2005, this law was amended to allow the importation and marketing of 
imported retreaded tires, provided that the importer proves to have destroyed ten used 
tires in Brazil for every retreaded tire imported. However, in the case of imports of used 
tire casings, Law 12.381 requires the destruction of one used tire per imported tire.283 
 
                                                 
281 J.F. 6, Porto Alegre, Ação Civil Pública No. 2003.71.00.033004-2, Juíza: Ana Inês Algorta Latorre, 
04.11.2004 (Brazil). 
282 Lei No. 12.114, de 05 de julho de 2004, D.O.E.R.S. 06.07.2004 (Brazil). 
283 Lei No. 12.381, de 28 de novembro de 2005, D.O.E.R.S. 30.11.2005 Art. 1(Brazil): 
Article 1. The sole paragraph of Article 1 of Law 12.114 of July 5, 2004, prohibiting the sale of used tires 
imported into the State [of Rio Grande do Sul] and from other sources becomes paragraph 1, and the 
following paragraphs 2 and 3 are added: 
Para. 1. … 
Para. 2. The following shall be permitted: 
 I – the import of a used tire carcass where importers can demonstrate that they will collect on 
Brazilian territory and destroy, in an environmentally adequate manner, 1 (one) existing used tire on the 
domestic territory for each used tire carcass to be imported; 
 II – the import of a carcass of a tire retreaded by means of top-capping, remolding, or recapping, 
outside of Brazil, where importers can demonstrate that they will collect within the domestic territory and 
destroy, in an environmentally-adequate manner, 10 (ten) existing used tires within the domestic territory 
for each used tire carcass to be imported. 
Para. 3 – tire retreaders shall have the right to import one used tire carcass for each used or retreaded tire 
exported without having to comply with the environmental counterpart referred to in part I of paragraph 2 
of this Article.” 
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B. The Argentina-Uruguay Dispute 
 
In August 2002 – just eight months after the MERCOSUR panel ruled against 
Brazil’s ban on retreaded tire imports – the Argentinean legislature enacted a law banning 
retreaded tire imports.284  Three years later, in 2005, Uruguay initiated a second 
MERCOSUR proceeding to challenge the validity of the Argentinean law.285   
 
As in the case initiated against Brazil, Uruguay argued that the Argentinean ban 
violated CMC Decision 22/00, which requires that the member states shall not adopt any 
trade restrictive measure, of any nature, and the general international law principle of 
estoppel.  Uruguay also sustained that the Argentinean ban on imported retreaded tires 
was incompatible with CMC Decision 57/00, which provides that, along the lines of 
CMC Decision No. 22/00, Member States should eliminate non-tariff restrictions.286 
Finally, Uruguay noted that the measure was inconsistent with the general international 
law principles of pacta sunt servanda and good faith.287  
                                                 
284 Law No. 25.626, July 17, 2002 (Argentina).   
285 See Laudo do Tribunal Ad Hoc do Protocolo de Olivos, sobre a controvérsia "PROIBIÇÃO DE 
IMPORTAÇÃO DE PNEUMÁTICOS REMODELADOS,” available at 
http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/SM/pt/Controversias/TPR/TPR_Tribunal%20AdHoc_Laudo%20Neumati
cos_PT.pdf  (last visited Jan. 10, 2006) [hereinafter Argentina Award], revoked by Laudo do Tribunal 
Permanente de Revisão constituído para Entender no Recurso de Revisão Apresentado pela Republica 
Oriental do Uruguai contra o Laudo Arbitral do Tribunal Arbitral Ad Hoc datado de 25 de Outubro de 2005 
na Controvérsia "Proibição de Importação de Pneumáticos Remodelados Procedentes do 
Uruguai,"available at http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/SM/es/Controversias/TPR/TPR_Laudo001-
2005_Importacion%20de%20Neumaticos%20Remoldeados.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2007) [hereinafter 
Argentina Apellate Body Award].   
286 CMC Decision 57, Dec. 12, 2000. 
287 For background information on the principles of pacta sunt servanda and good faith in international law, 
see Free Zones case (1930), PCIJ, Ser.. A, no. 24, p. 12. See also Article 26 of the Vienna Convention; 




Argentina, on the other hand, argued that its ban on imported retreaded tires was 
justified under the exception set out in Article 50(d) of the Montevideo Treaty.288 
According to Argentina, the 2002 Argentinean ban on imported retreaded tires was 
“destined to” prevent potential environmental and public health harm caused by the 
importation of retreaded tires. In order to support this argument, Argentina relied on the 
legislative history of the measure. First, the legislative debate focused on the need to 
avoid the entrance of waste disguised as goods with limited durability. Second, the 
legislative history of the measure also pointed to the negative environmental impact of 
retreaded tires, in light of the complexity associated with and the high costs of used tire 
incineration.289    
 
Uruguay argued that the ban could not be justified under Article 50(d) as a 
measure “destined to” protect life and health of persons, animals and plants because a 
retreaded tire lasts for the exact same amount of time as a new tire; thus no extra burden 
on the environment is imposed.290 Argentina responded that Article 50(d) should be 
interpreted consistently with general international law principles, including the 
“precautionary principle,” which states that “[w]here there are threats of serious or 
                                                 
288 See discussion of Article 50, supra Chapter II. 
289 Argentina Award, supra note 474, P 35. In the original: “[L]a defensa presentada por Argentina se 
refiere largamente al processo legislativo des que resultó la aprobación de la Laey No. 25.626, indicando 
que en el debate parlamentario quedó claro que la medida se destinaba a prevenir el ingreso de resíduos 
disfrazados de mercaderías con vida útil comprometida o agotada, así como los impactos ambientales, 
actuales o latentes resultantes de tales mercaderías, teniendo en cuenta la complejidad de su gestión y los 
elevados costos involucrados.” 
290 Argentina Award, supra note 285, P 18. 
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irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”291  
Accordingly, Article 50(d) should be interpreted to apply to measures “destined to” 
protect against scientifically uncertain risks.  Argentina argued that Article 50(d) should 
be interpreted very broadly, based on the reference to “the preservation of the 
environment” in the preamble to the Asuncion Treaty;292 and provisions in the 
MERCOSUR Environmental Agreement acknowledging the necessity of Member States 
to cooperate for the protection of the environment and for the sustainable use of natural 
resources, in order to achieve better quality of life, and social and economic development 
that is sustainable.293  
 
Uruguay also argued that Argentina’s import ban was not “destined to” protect 
environment or health, because the ban was in fact intended to protect the domestic tire 
industry from import competition, and references to environmental and health concerns 
                                                 
291 Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration.  See Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 876 (1992).    
292 Asuncion Treaty, available at http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/principal/contenido.asp (last visited 
January 15, 2007). The relevant part of the Preamble states that the objective of economic development and 
social justice shall be achieved under the effective use of available resources, the preservation of the 
environment, the improvement of the physical interconnections, the coordination of macroeconomic 
policies of different economic sectors, based on the principles of graduality, flexibility and equilibrium. 
293 Acordo-Quadro sobre Meio Ambiente do Mercosul, available at  http://www.cnrh-
srh.gov.br/camaras/GRHT/itemizacao/Acordo_quadro_mercosul_2001.PDF (last visited January 15, 2007). 
Preamble of the Agreement. In the original: “Reconhecendo a necessidade de cooperar para a proteção do 
meio ambiente e para a utilização sustentável dos recursos naturais, com vistas a alcançar a melhoria da 
qualidade de vida e o desenvolvimento econômico, social e ambiental sustentável (...) bem como a 
necessidade de sinergia entre as políticas ambientais e comerciais para assegurar o desenvolvimento 
sustentável no âmbito do MERCOSUL.” 
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were merely intended to “disguise” this motive.294 Argentina argued that it had very little 
motivation to protect the domestic tire industry from imports, since trade in retreaded 
tires between Argentina and Uruguay had been insignificant 295prior to the 2002 ban. In 
addition, Argentina noted that it had unsuccessfully proposed alternative solutions, such 
as limiting the number of retreaded tires imported from Uruguay to the number of used 
tires that Argentina exported to Uruguay.296 Argentina sustained that this proposal not 
only shows its lack of interest in the retreaded tire trade between the two countries, but it 
also highlights the policy problem that the measure seeks to correct, namely the reduction 
of unnecessary generation of waste tire within the Argentinean territory.297 Argentina 
argued that Article 50 (d) of the 1980 Montevideo Treaty should be interpreted to include 
any measure that was even in part motivated by environmental or health concerns, since 
free trade principles and the protection of the environment rest on equal grounds under 
                                                 
294 See Argentina Award, supra note 285, P 38. 
295 The President of the Argentina Panel stated that from 1999 to 2000, the actual value of retreaded tires 
exported from Uruguay to Argentina was about 50.000 American dollars. In his opinion, this claim against 
Argentina was brought by Uruguay as a strategic maneuver to guarantee Uruguayan access to the Brazilian 
market. Once Argentina was banned from imposing restrictions to imports of retreaded tires from Uruguay, 
it would become evident that the Uruguayan practices concerning exports of retreaded tires within 
MERCOSUR were absolutely legal. See Interview with Dr. Hermes Marcelo Huck, MERCOSUR trade 
panelist in the retreaded tire dispute between Uruguay and Argentina, in São Paulo, Brazil (Mar. 10, 2006). 
296 See Argentina Award, supra note 476, PP 26, 34. The Argentineans considered their proposal to be 
desirable because they would end up exporting more used tires to Uruguay than importing Uruguay’s 
retreaded tires. The logic behind the Argentineans assumption is the following: suppose Argentina exports 
100 used tires to Uruguay, and Uruguay exports 100 retreaded tires. It is very likely that not all of the 100 
used tires exported to Uruguay will be suitable for retreading, but still Uruguay will only be allowed to 
export back to Argentina 100 retreaded tires. In this process, it is likely that Uruguay will receive tires that 
would originally be discarded in Argentina (this assumption is grounded on the fact that the importing 
country is the one to verify the actual retreading conditions of tires). Interview with Dr. Hermes Marcelo 
Huck, MERCOSUR trade panelist in the retreaded tire dispute between Uruguay and Argentina, in São 
Paulo, Brazil (Mar. 10, 2006). 
297 See Argentina Award, supra note 285, P 34. 
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MERCOSUR laws and regulations.298 Lastly, Argentina sustained that the ban was 
“destined to” environmental and health protection because no other less trade restrictive 
alternative existed to achieve its chosen level of environmental and health protection.299 
 
1. The Panel’s Interpretation of MERCOSUR Law 
 
The Panel acknowledged it was before a dispute that confronted two 
MERCOSUR structural principles: free trade and environmental preservation.300 The 
Panel decided in favor of the application of the precautionary and preventive principle to 
the dispute.301  It recognized the lack of scientific evidence of the harms used tires cause 
to public health and the environment, but found that, in light of these principles, Article 
50(d) should be interpreted to apply to measures “destined to” protect against 
environmental and health risks that had not yet been conclusively established.302  
 
The Panel noted that the factual elements in the dispute were similar to those in its 
previous decision involving Brazil.  However, the Panel found no basis to grant 
                                                 
298 Argentina Award, P 34. 
299 Argentina Award, P 39. Uruguay did not suggest alternative measures Argentina should have adopted in 
lieu of the import ban. Interview with Dr. Hermes Marcelo Huck, MERCOSUR trade panelist in the 
retreaded tire dispute between Uruguay and Argentina, in São Paulo, Brazil (Mar. 10, 2006). 
300 Argentina Award, P 55. See also interview with Dr. Hermes Marcelo Huck, MERCOSUR trade panelist 
in the retreaded tire dispute between Uruguay and Argentina, in São Paulo, Brazil (Mar. 10, 2006). 
301 Although these two principles are used interchangeably in the Argentina Panel Report, they stand for 
different concepts in environmental law and policy. The preventative principle “implies assessment of  
risks to avoid harm and action based upon existing knowledge”. The precautionary approach “suggests that 
certain measures should be taken or not taken where scientific uncertainty exists about the likelihood of 
harm or the degree of environmental risk.” See ALEXANDRE KISS & DINAH SHELTON, MANUAL OF 
EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 39-40 (2nd ed. 1997). 
302 Argentina Award, supra note 285, P 107. 
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precedential value to its previous decision, because the disputes were different in 
significant ways. First, the parties to the Brazilian dispute did not raise Article 50(d)303 or 
any of the other general principles of international law and MERCOSUR provisions 
relating to environmental and health protection.304 Second, Argentina had brought 
convincing data and arguments to support the conclusion that the import ban in this case 
was justified under Article 50(d).305 
 
2. The MERCOSUR Appellate Body’s Report 
 
Uruguay appealed the Panel’s finding to the new MERCOSUR Appellate Body, 
which had only recently been established and had never before issued a decision in any 
MERCOSUR dispute.   In its first decision, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s 
conclusion and found that Argentina’s ban on retreaded tire imports violated 
MERCOSUR law.  
 
The Appellate Body rejected the Panel’s view that the dispute should be read as 
confronting two equally foundational principles: free trade and environmental protection 
(exceptions to free trade).306 In the Appellate Body’s opinion, in integration processes, 
such as MERCOSUR, there exists only one foundational principle and that is free 
                                                 
303 Id. P 110. 
304 Id. P 110. 
305 Id. P 111. 
306 Id  P 55. 
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trade.307 Against this governing principle, exceptions may be opposed, such as the one 
based on environmental protection.308 These exceptions, however, must pass a rigorous 
test. 
 
The Appellate Body found that the panel should first have determined whether 
Argentina’s import ban is a trade restrictive measure.  It found that the ban on imports of 
retreaded tires is a measure that restricts free trade. Second, the Appellate Body found 
that the panel should have determined whether the trade restrictive measure is 
discriminatory. Here the Appellate Body found the Argentinean measure to be 
discriminatory because it is aimed at foreign retreaded tires only. In other words, the 
Appellate Body concluded that Argentina treated imported retreaded tires less favorably 
than domestically-produced retreaded tires.309   
 
Third, the panel should have determined whether the asserted environmental or 
health justification for the measure was valid.  The Appellate Body found that the 
environmental justification given by Argentina was not valid, because the legislative 
history of the ban on imported retreaded tires showed that it was in part aimed at 
environmental and health protection, but was also aimed at protecting the domestic 
retreaded tire industry.310 Accordingly, the ban could not be justified under Article 50(d). 
                                                 
307 Argentina Appellate Body Award, supra note 285, P 9. 
308 Id. P 9. 
309 Id. PP 14, 15. 




The Appellate Body noted that no further analysis was required, since a law 
passed with any intent of protecting a certain industry of a Member State is inconsistent 
with MERCOSUR law. However, the Appellate Body decided to complete the analysis, 
and set out the test that would apply if a valid environmental justification had been found.  
It stated that, in this case, panels must determine whether the discriminatory effect of the 
challenged measure was proportional to the interest pursued.311 Thus, if the Argentinean 
ban on imported retreaded tires had been grounded on genuine environmental interests, 
the panel should have determined whether it was more trade restrictive than necessary to 
achieve the policy objective of environmental conservation.312  
 
By majority, the Appellate Body determined that the Argentinean law is 
inconsistent with MERCOSUR law, based o the correct legal interpretation and 
application of the exceptions of Article 50 of the 1980 Montevideo Treaty.313 The 
Appellate Body concluded that the Argentinean ban on imported retreaded tires was 
disproportional to the perceived policy goal for several reasons.314 First, it noted that a 
retreaded tire is neither waste nor a used tire. This conclusion is important because it 
dismisses doubts as to the quality of these tires and the treatment they are subjected to 
                                                 
311 Id. P 17. 
312 Argentina Appellate Body Report, supra note 285, P 17. 
313 Id. P 26.2. In the original: “Por mayoría, determinar que la Ley argentina 25.626 promulgada en fecha 8 
de agosto de 2002 es incompatible con la normativa Mercosur, en base a una correcta interpretación y 
aplicación jurídica de las excepciones previstas en el Art. 50 del Tratado de Montevideo de 1980.”. 
314 Argentina Appellate Body Report, supra note 285, P 17. 
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receiving in international trade.315. Second, the alleged harm to the environment is neither 
serious nor irreversible. Third, other less trade restrictive measures were available. 
Fourth, the 2002 Argentinean ban on imported retreaded tires does not prevent the 
alleged harm to the environment. Fifth, the Appellate Body noted that measures to be 
adopted in the present dispute should be better oriented towards limitation and 
elimination of tires. Accordingly, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel decision and 
found that the Argentinean ban on imported retreaded tires was inconsistent with 
MERCOSUR law: 
Consecuentmente, este TPR en relación a la medida analizada estima, acoge 
la tesis uruguaya, de que la misma es desproporcionada frente a un 
producto, neumático remoldeado, que no es un desecho ni un neumático 
usado según la propria conclusión des laudo arbitral. Consta igualmente en 
autos de la prohibición tomada no ha reducido objetivamente hablando, el 
concepto de daño ambiental aplicable as caso. Tampoco es irreversible 
(presupuestos éstos que se deben dar para la aplicación del princípio 
precautorio) según lo analiza correctamente la representación uruguaya. 
Tampoco es proporcional desde el punto de vista de que no se puede 
impedir el libre comercio, salvo que sea la única medida disponible, 
eliminando de circulación de un producto extranjero que es igual de seguro 
a un producto nacional, según el mismo laudo arbitral en revisión; pero que 
tal vez, y no en todos los casos, es de menor duración. Tampoco es 
proporcional a nuestro entender porque la medida tomada no previene el 
daño. Las medidas a ser adoptadas en el caso en questión, ante las presentes 
circunstancias, deberían estar más bien orientadas a la limitación y 





                                                 
315 Remember that Brazil tried to justify its position based on the argument that retreaded tires are used 
tires, whose imports are prohibited based on a 1991 ban on used goods. See Brazil Award, supra note 443. 
316 Argentina Appellate Body Report, P 17. 
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This Chapter has demonstrated that in the dispute over trade in retreaded 
tires between Uruguay and Brazil, Brazil lost an excellent chance to defend its 
import ban on the basis of the environmental exceptions foreseen in Article 50(d) of 
the 1980 Montevideo Treaty. Instead, Brazil opted to defend its ban on the ground 
that it was enacted solely to clarify the scope of its previous ban on imports of used 
tires), rather than to establish a new trade restriction.  The trade panel rejected this 
argument because it found that used tires and retreaded tires had been treated as 
different products under various Brazilian regulations and related commercial 
practices. 
 
Argentina did not make the same mistake in its dispute with Uruguay concerning 
trade in retreaded tires.  The MERCOSUR panel initially accepted Argentina’s 
environmental defense, finding that the Argentinean ban was fell within the 
environmental exception of Article 50(d) as a measure “destined to” protect the life and 
health of persons animals and plants. Less than a month after it was rendered, this ruling 
became the subject of the first report issued by MERCOSUR’s new Appellate Body.  The 
report concluded that the Argentinean law violated MERCOSUR law, based on a four-
pronged test.  Under this test, trade restrictions imposed for environmental reasons are 
only permissible if the trade-restrictive and discriminatory measure asserts a valid 
environmental or health justification. If the panel finds that the measure has a valid 
environmental or health justification, it must still determine whether the discriminatory 
effect of the challenged measure is proportional to the interest pursued. In concluding that 
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the Argentinean ban failed both parts of this test, the Appellate Body focused on three 
main factors:  the fact that the measure was motivated by both environmental and 
economic concerns, that the alleged harm to the environment was neither serious nor 
irreversible, and the fact that the import ban did not prevent the alleged harm to the 
environment. 
 
We have also seen that a number of relevant factors were NOT included in the 
Appellate Body’s analysis.   First, its decisión did not attempt to analyze the actual 
economic impact of the measure.  Second, the decision included little discussion of the 
scientific evidence relating to the asserted environmental risks, or to the effectiveness of 
alternative means that might be used to regulate these environmental risks.  Third, 
although the Appellate Body concluded that the Argentinean measure was at least 
partially motivated by protectionist interests, it did not analyze the actual political 
conditions in Argentina that led to the measure.  Finally, the decision failed to address the 
MERCOSUR commitment to environmental protection, or the fragility of the 






Chapter IV. The WTO Dispute over Trade in Retreaded Tires 
 
 
In the previous chapter, we saw the legal approach adopted in MERCOSUR in 
response to Uruguay’s challenges to Brazilian and Argentinean restrictions on retreaded 
tire imports.  In this chapter, I will focus on the legal approach adopted in the WTO in 
response to a similar challenge initiated by the European Union (EU).317  Part A provides 
background on the dispute.  Parts B, C and D discuss the panel’s decision relating to 
GATT Arts. XX(b),  XX(d), and the Article XX chapeau.  Part E summarizes the analysis 
of the WTO panel. 
 
A. The EU-Brazil Dispute 
 
Prior to 2000, when Brazil introduced its ban on retreaded tire imports, the EU 
exported approximately two million retreaded tires per year to Brazil, equivalent to an 
estimate of 20 per cent of the Brazilian market for such products.318  The Brazilian 
measures resulted in company closures and job losses within the Community.319  In an 
effort to stem these losses, the Bureau International Permanent des Associations de 
                                                 
317 Because the European Union has no legal personality, it is not technically a member of the WTO. WTO 
membership belongs to  an entity known as the “European Communities” (EC).  Although the WTO 
documents generally refer to the EC, this dissertation will use the more commonly used term “European 
Union.”    
318 See Report to the Trade Barriers Regulation Committee Concerning An Obstacle to Trade, Within the 
Meaning of Council Regulation (EC) No. 3286/94, Consisting of Trade Practices Maintained by Brazil 
Affecting Trade in Retreaded Tires [hereinafter Report] at 32, available at http://trade-
info.cec.eu.int/doclib/cfm/doclib_section.cfm?sec=205&lev=2& (last visited May 23, 2005). 
319 See id. at 33. 
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Vendeurs et Rechapeurs de Pneumatique [Permanent International Office of Tire Sellers 
and Retreaders Association] (BIPAVER).320  
 
On January 7, 2004, the European Commission initiated an investigation into 
Brazilian practices relating to imports of retreaded tires in response to this complaint. As 
a result of the EU investigation, the European Commission’s Directorate-General for 
Trade issued a Report321 recommending that the EU initiate proceedings to challenge the 
Brazilian measures in the WTO.  The Commission initiated formal dispute settlement 
proceedings in the WTO after a series of unsuccessful efforts to negotiate a diplomatic 
solution. Argentina, Australia, Korea and the United States joined the proceedings as 
interested third parties, followed by China, Cuba, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, the 
Chinese Taipei, and Thailand.322 
 
The EU claimed that Brazil’s ban on retreaded tire imports from non-
MERCOSUR countries, and its imposition of penalties relating to such imports, were 
non-tariff restrictions on trade prohibited by GATT Article XI.  In addition, it argued that 
the laws enacted by the state of Rio Grande do Sul in relation to imports of retreaded tires 
                                                 
320 See Notice of Initiation of an Examination Procedure Concerning Obstacles to Trade Within the 
Meaning of Council Regulation (EC) No. 3286/94, consisting of trade practices maintained by Brazil in 
relation to imports of retreaded tires, available at http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/doclib/html/115548.htm (last 
visited May 23, 2005).  
321 Id. 
322  Panel Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tires, WT/DS332/R (June 12, 2007), P 
1.7 [hereinafter Brazil – Retreaded Tires]. 
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accorded “less favorable treatment” to imported goods than to “like” products of 
domestic origin, in violation of GATT Article III:4 (National Treatment).323 
 
 Brazil contended that the import ban and financial penalties were justified under 
Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994, which allows a country to depart from its WTO 
commitments if necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, provided that it 
does not do so in a manner that would constitute “arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination” or a “disguised restriction on international trade.” It also contended that 
the financial penalties applicable to importers of retreaded tires were justified under 
Article XX(d), which allows a country to depart from its trade commitments if the 
challenged measure is “necessary to secure compliance with laws and regulations which 
are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement (...)”.324  
 
On June 12, 2007, the Panel issued its Report. The panel found that the ban on the 
importation of retreaded tires and the financial penalties on imported retreaded tires 
constituted non-tariff trade restrictions in violation of GATT Article XI:1. and that the 
Rio Grande do Sul laws discriminated against “like” imported products in violation of 
GATT Article III.325   The Panel then analyzed whether these violations were justified 
under Article XX of GATT 1994.   
                                                 
323 Id. P 3.1.  The Rio Grande do Sul law is discussed supra p. 136.  In addition, the EC claimed other 
GATT 1994 violations which were ignored by the Panel. 
324 Brazil – Retreaded Tires, supra note 322, P 3.3. 




B. The Panel’s Analysis under GATT Article XX(b) 
 
 In deciding whether a measure is “necessary to protect human, animal or plant 
life or health”, the Panel recalled the Report of the Panel in US – Reformulated Gasoline, 
which requires the existence of two elements:326 
 
(a) the policy in respect of the measures for which the provision is 
invoked falls within the range of policies designed to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health; and 
 
(b) the inconsistent measure for which the exception is invoked is 
necessary to fulfill the policy objective.327 
 
 
The panel found that the import ban, financial penalties, and state laws satisfied 
both of these tests.  The panel concluded that these measures fell within the range of 
policies designed to protect human, animal or plant life or health because (1) a risk to 
human and animal or plant life or health did in fact exist; and (2) the objective of the 
import prohibition was in fact to reduce such risk.328 
 
With respect to the issue of whether a risk to human and animal or plant life or 
health in fact existed, Brazil argued that the accumulation of waste tires creates a risk of 
                                                 
326 See id. P 7.40. See also US – Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 43, P 6.20. 
327 US – Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 43, P 6.20. 
328 Brazil – Retreaded Tires, supra note 322, PP 7.43, 7.102.  
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mosquito-borne diseases such as dengue and yellow fever in Brazil because waste tires 
create perfect breeding grounds for disease carrying mosquitoes and that these diseases 
are also spread through interstate transportation of waste tires for disposal operations. 
Brazil also contended that the accumulation of waste tires creates a risk of tire fires and 
toxic leaching and that this risk has substantial adverse effects on human health and the 
environment. The European Communities did not dispute the existence of health risks to 
humans in connection with mosquito-borne diseases. On the other hand, the EU argued 
that Brazil had not demonstrated  that there was a specific link between the spread of 
mosquito-borne diseases or the harmful effects of tire fires and the accumulation of waste 
tires.329 
 
Concerning the question whether the objective of Brazil’s import prohibition was 
the reduction of these risks, Brazil argued that the sole policy objective behind its 
measures is the protection of human health and the environment, by preventing the 
generation of additional waste tires in Brazil and consequently reducing the incidence of 
dengue, yellow fever and other risks associated with waste tires. The European 
Communities, however, argued that the real objective of Brazil’s import ban is not the 
protection of life and health but the protection of its domestic industry.330 
 
                                                 
329 Id. PP 7.53, 7.54. 
330 Id. PP 7.94, 7.95. 
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Likewise, in the MERCOSUR dispute between Uruguay and Argentina, the panel 
accepted the arguments made by Argentina that connected the policy in respect of the 
measures for which Article 50 (d) of the 1980 Montevideo Treaty was invoked as falling 
within the range of policies designed to protect human, animal or plant life or health. In 
addition, that panel also considered the Argentinean law banning imports of retreaded 
tires necessary to prevent the generation of additional waste tires in Argentina.331  
 
 
The panel found that the challenged measures were also all necessary to fulfill the 
policy objective of reducing the risks arising from the accumulation of waste tires, based 
on (1) “a process of weighing and balancing” of the “relative importance of the interests 
or values furthered” by the measures, the “contribution” of the measures to the realization 
of the ends pursued, and the “restrictive impact” of the measures on international 
trade;332and (2) a comparison between the challenged measure and possible alternatives 
to determine “whether a WTO-consistent alternative measure, or less WTO-inconsistent 
measure, which the Member concerned could reasonably be expected to employ, is 
available.”333  
 
                                                 
331 See Argentina Award, supra Chapter III. Note however, that the panel decision was revoked by 
MERCOSUR’s Appellate Body because it concluded that the panel had wrongly interpreted the exceptions 
of Article 50 of the 1980 Montevideo Treaty. See Argentina Appellate Body Award, supra Chapter III. 




With respect to the balancing test, the Panel found that the objective of protecting 
human health and life against life-threatening diseases, such as malaria and dengue fever, 
was both “important and vital in the highest level,”334 and that the objective of protecting 
animal and plant life and health should also be considered “important.335 The panel also 
found that the measures contributed to the realization of the policy of reducing exposure 
to the risks to human, animal and plant life and health arising from the accumulation of 
waste tires,336 since they contributed to the reduction of the number of waste tires 
generated in Brazil, which in turn contributed to the reduction of the risks to human, 
animal and plant life and health arising from waste tires.337  Finally, the panel concluded 
that all the measures – and particularly the import ban -- had a significant restrictive 
impact on trade in retreaded tires from non-MERCOSUR countries.”338 
 
Having found that the measures contributed to the realization of important 
interests or values, but also significantly restricted international commerce, the Panel 
turned to determine whether a WTO-consistent alternative measure, or less WTO-
inconsistent measure, which the Member concerned could reasonably be expected to 
                                                 
334 Id. P 7.111. 
335 Id. P 7.112. 
336 See id. P 7.122.  The Panel noted that retreaded tires have “by definition a shorter lifespan than new 
tires.”  If Brazilian consumers who would otherwise buy imported retread tires instead bought new tires 
with longer life spans, “overall less tires would be necessary to fulfill the needs of the market.”  See Brazil 
– Retreaded Tires, supra note 322, P 7.130.  Similarly, if more domestically produced tires were retreaded, 
the import ban might contribute to the “reduction of the overall amount of tires generated in Brazil.”  Id. P 
7.142. 
337 See id. P 7.147. 
338 Id. P 7.114. 
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employ, was available.339   The panel considered each of the alternative measures 
identified by the EU as ways of reducing the number of waste tires in Brazil,340 or 
improving the management of waste tires in Brazil.341  However, it concluded that none 
of these measures constituted “reasonably available alternatives” that would “achieve 
Brazil’s objective of reducing the accumulation of waste tires on its territory.”  
Accordingly, it found that the measures found to violate GATT rules were all ‘necessary’ 
within the meaning of Article XX(b) and thus provisionally justified under Article 
XX(b).”342  
 
C. The Panel’s Analysis Under GATT Article XX(d) 
 
As discussed above, Brazil also argued that its financial penalties were justified 
under GATT Article XX(d)., which reads as follows: 
                                                 
339 See Appellate Body Report on United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services, P 308, WT/DS285/AB/R (adopted April 20, 2005):  “An alternative 
measure may be found not to be ‘reasonably available’, however, where it is merely theoretical in nature, 
for instance, where the responding Member is not capable of taking it, or where the measure imposes an 
undue burden on that Member, such as prohibitive costs or substantial technical difficulties.  Moreover, a 
‘reasonably available’ alternative measure must be a measure that would preserve for the responding 
Member its right to achieve its desired level of protection with respect to the objective pursued…”. 
340 The EC identified various measures to reduce the number of waste tires in Brazil, including, for 
instance, education campaigns and the use of government procurement to require the installation of 
retreaded tires on government vehicles; measures to improve the low suitability of Brazilian passenger car 
tires for retreading; measures that would reduce the use of cars in Brazil; measures aiming at a longer safe 
use of retreaded tires; and measures to prevent the constant and growing flow of used tires into Brazil.  See 
Brazil – Retreaded Tires, supra note 322, P 7.160. 
341 The EC contended that Brazil already had in force measures to achieve the policy objective of domestic 
management of waste tires, including a voluntary multi-sector program to collect waste tires for disposal, 
and a CONAMA resolution requiring domestic manufacturers of new tires and tire importers (new and 
retreaded) to dispose of waste tires in an “environmentally adequate” manner. Moreover, the EC argued 
that federal waste tires collection programs, controlled land filling, stockpiling, energy recovery and 
material recycling constitute disposal methods that are alternative to the import prohibition.  Id. PP 7.161, 
7.181. 




Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised 
restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party 
of measures …(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations 
which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, 
including those relating to customs enforcement, the enforcement of 
monopolies operated under paragraph 4 of Article II and Article XVII, the 
protection of patents, trademarks and copyrights, and the prevention of 
deceptive practices; 
 
The Panel recalled the Appellate Body Report on Korea – Various Measures on 
Beef that stated the need to demonstrate the following two elements for a measure, 
otherwise inconsistent with the GATT 1994, to be justified provisionally under paragraph 
(d) of Article XX:343 
 
(i) the measure must be designed to “secure compliance” with laws 
or regulations that are not themselves inconsistent with some 
provision of the GATT 1994; and  
 
(ii) the measure must be “necessary” to secure such compliance. 
 
 It was undisputed that the fines are a measure introduced to enforce the import 
ban and that they are indeed a measure the existence of which would be meaningless 
without the import prohibition. Consequently, the Panel notes that the fines are “designed 
                                                 
343 Id. P 7.384. See also Appellate Body Report on Korea – Various Measures on Beef, P 157. 
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to secure compliance with the import ban.”344 However, it follows that for the fines to be 
justified under paragraph (d) of Article XX of General Agreement, they be must be 
“designed to secure compliance with laws or regulations not themselves inconsistent with 
some provision of the GATT 1994.”  Provided that the very regulation, i.e. the import ban 
under the 2004 ban on imported retreaded tires, was found not to be consistent with 
Article XX of the General Agreement, the Panel concluded that the fines cannot be 
justified under Article XX(d). Thus, the Panel found unnecessary to address the second 
prong of the test set in Korea – Various Measures on Beef, i.e. whether the fines are 
necessary to secure such compliance.345 In conclusion, the Panel found that the fines 
imposed by the 2001 regulation concerning fines on importation, marketing, 
transportation, storage, keeping or warehousing of retreaded tires are inconsistent with 
Article XI:1 and not justified under Article XX(b) or under Article XX(d) of GATT 
1994.346 
   
D. The Panel’s Analysis under the Article XX chapeau 
 
In order to complete the Article XX analysis, the Panel needed to determine 
whether the measure is applied in a manner that is consistent with the chapeau of Article 
XX. The chapeau of Article XX reads as follows: 
 
                                                 
344 See Brazil – Retreaded Tires, supra note 322, P 7.387. 
345 Id. P 7.389. 
346 Id. P 7.390. 
 
 101
Article XX (General Exceptions). Subject to the requirement that such 
measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the 
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, 
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or 
enforcement by any contracting party of measures: …” (emphasis added). 
 
 
The Panel recalled the Appellate Body’s ruling in US – Gasoline to base its 
decision to limit its analysis to the manner in which the measure is applied, and not so 
much the questioned measure or its specific contents as such.347 Therefore, concerning 
the chapeau of Article XX, the Panel centered its attention on “whether, although the 
measure itself falls within the terms of Article XX(b), the application by Brazil of its 
import ban on retreaded tires is such as to constitute ‘a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail’ or ‘a disguised 
restriction on international trade’”:348 
 
[W]e note the Appellate Body’s indication that ‘the fundamental theme – 
when interpreting the chapeau – is to be found in the purpose and object of 
avoiding abuse or illegitimate use of the exceptions to substantive rules 
available in Article XX’; and that the task of interpreting this introductory 
paragraph is essentially the ‘delicate one of locating and marking out a 
line of equilibrium ‘between the rights of the Member invoking the 
exception and those of other WTO Members. This line of equilibrium is 
not fixed and unchanging and moves ‘as the kind and the shape of the 
measures at stake vary and as the facts making up specific cases 
differ.’”349 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
 
                                                 
347 Id. P 7.220. See also Appellate Body Report on US – Gasoline, P 21. 
348 See Brazil – Retreaded Tires, supra note 322, P 7.220. 
349 See id. P 7.221. 
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The Panel observed that three types of situations concerning the application of 
measures provisionally justified under a specific paragraph of Article XX might lead to 
an inconsistency with the chapeau of the said Article:350 first, arbitrary discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail; second, unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail; and third, a disguised restriction on 
international trade. In the present dispute, the Panel decided to address the existence of 
arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination separately from the existence of a disguised 
restriction on international trade.351 In order to determine if a measure is applied in a 
manner that constitutes a means of “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail”, three conditions should be met:352 
 
(a) The application of the measure results in discrimination; 
 
(b) The discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable in character; 
 
(c) This discrimination occurs between countries where the same conditions 
prevail.353 
 
                                                 
350 Id. P 7.223. 
351 Id. P 7.225. 
352 Id. P 7.226. 




In order to determine whether the import prohibition on retreaded tires is applied 
in a manner that results in discrimination, the Panel analyzed three different situations 
that were described by the European Communities as discriminatory practices maintained 
by Brazil in relation to the EU’s retreaded tires. First, the Panel considered whether 
discrimination arises from the MERCOSUR exemption, i.e. the exemption of remolded 
tires originating in MERCOSUR countries from the import ban.354 The Panel concluded 
that “the MERCOSUR exemption can be considered to form part of the manner in which 
the import ban imposed by Brazil on retreaded tires – the measure provisionally justified 
under Article XX(b) – is applied and that it gives rise to discrimination within the 
meaning of the chapeau of Article XX, between MERCOSUR and non-MERCOSUR 
countries.”355 Second, the Panel addressed whether discrimination arises from the 
importation of used tires through court injunctions356 and concluded that “to the extent 
that [the court injunctions] enable retreaded tires to be produced in Brazil from imported 
casings while retreaded tires using the same casings cannot be imported, permitting 
imports of used tires through court injunctions results in discrimination in favor of tires 
retreaded in Brazil using imported casings, to the detriment of imported retreaded 
tires.”357  Third, the Panel examined whether discrimination arises from the lack of 
comparable measures in relation to new tires,358 in light of the EU’s contentions that 
Brazil has not adopted any measure to guarantee that new tires consumed in Brazilian 
                                                 
354 See Brazil – Retreaded Tires, supra note 322, P 7.233. 
355 Id. P 7.238. 
356 Id. P 7.238. 
357 Id. P 7.243. 
358 Id. P 7.243. 
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territory are retreaded when they become used tires, and that Brazil does not restrict the 
importation and sale of non-retreadable new tires.359 With regard to the first contention, 
the Panel concluded “that Brazil has established that, prima facie, the tires produced 
domestically have the capacity to be retreaded in Brazil, and that the European 
Communities has failed to demonstrate that these tires are not suitable for retreading.”360 
Concerning the second contention, the Panel concluded “that Brazil has established that, 
prima facie, the new tires it allows onto the market are of retreadable quality meeting 
relevant international standards, and that the European Communities has failed to 
demonstrate that new tires sold in the Brazilian market (whether produced in or imported 
into Brazil) are low-quality tires not suitable for retreading, such that this would 
constitute discrimination against imported retreaded tires.”361 Accordingly, the Panel 
found that no discrimination arises from the lack of comparable measures in relation to 
new tires. However, as established in the WTO jurisprudence,362 a discriminatory practice 
maintained by one Member country is WTO-inconsistent if it is “arbitrary and/or 
unjustifiable” within the terms of the chapeau of Article XX.363 
 
As for the question of whether the discrimination in the application of the 
measure is “arbitrary”364 and/or “unjustifiable”365, the Panel focused on the application of 
                                                 
359 See Brazil – Retreaded Tires, supra note 322, P 7.244. 
360 Id. P 7.247. 
361 Id. P 7.250. 
362 Id. P 8.226. 
363 Id. P 7.251. 
364 The term “arbitrary” was interpreted according to the Panel Report on US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – 
Malaysia) and Appellate Body Report on US – Shrimp: 
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the MERCOSUR exemption and on the permission of imports of used tires through court 
injunctions, both of which the Panel found to be discriminatory. Concerning the 
MERCOSUR exemption, the Panel found that it has not resulted in the measure being 
applied in a manner that would constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.366 The 
Panel took into account Brazil’s contention that the MERCOSUR exemption is neither 
unjustifiable nor arbitrary because it results from Brazil’s obligation to adopt a decision 
of a MERCOSUL Panel, which required it to permit MERCOSUR imports of retreaded 
tires.367 This alone does not render Brazil’s course of action capricious or unpredictable. 
Next, the Panel addressed “the manner in which the import ban is applied, taking into 
account the existence of an exception for MERCOSUR members, in order to determine 
whether the discrimination arising from the MERCOSUR exemption is arbitrary or 
unjustifiable.”368 The Panel concluded that the MERCOSUR exemption would indeed be 
                                                                                                                                                 
“In US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia), the Panel similarly considered ‘the ordinary meaning 
of the word ‘arbitrary’, i.e. ‘capricious, unpredictable, inconsistent’’. In the same case, the 
Appellate Body highlighted two factors that it found, in that case, to be relevant to an assessment 
of whether the measure was arbitrary within the meaning of the chapeau of Article XX, namely 
‘rigidity and inflexibility’ of the application of the measure; and the fact that the measure is 
imposed without inquiring into its appropriateness for the conditions prevailing in the exporting 
countries.” 
See Brazil – Retreaded Tires, supra note 510, P 7.258. See also Panel Report on US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 
– Malaysia), P 5.124; Appellate Body Report on US – Shrimp, P 177. 
365 The Panel interpreted the term “justifiable” as “the need to be able to ‘defend’ or convincingly explain 
the rationale for any discrimination in the application of the measure.” See Brazil – Retreaded Tires, supra 
note 512, P 7.260. See id. P 7.261: 
“In its ruling on US – Gasoline, the Appellate Body found that discrimination that could have been 
‘foreseen’ and that was not ‘merely inadvertent or unavoidable’ would be unjustifiable. Two 
specific elements for the justification of the discrimination can also be identified in the Panel and 
in the Appellate Body reports in US – Shrimp and US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia): first, a 
serious effort to negotiate with the objective of concluding bilateral and multilateral agreements 
for the achievement of a certain policy goal, and secondly, the flexibility of the measure.” 
366 Id. P 7.289. 
367 Id. P 7.270. 
368 Id. P 7.288. 
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unjustifiable if imports were to take place in amounts that would undermine Brazil’s 
policy objective to reduce the accumulation of waste tires. However, the Panel noted that, 
at the time of the examination proceedings, volumes of imports of retreaded tires were 
insignificant to compromise the stated goal of the ban.369 As for the allowance of imports 
of used tires through court injunctions, the Panel concluded that “since used tires have 
been taking place under the court injunctions in such amounts that the achievement of 
Brazil’s declared objective is being significantly undermined, the measure at issue is 
being applied in a manner that constitutes a means of unjustifiable discrimination.”370 
  
After concluding that the import ban is being applied in a manner that constitutes 
a means of unjustifiable discrimination, the Panel turned to the issue of whether the 
discrimination occurs between countries where the same conditions prevail, concluding 
in the affirmative: 
 
The European Communities has argued that ‘it is manifest that a casing 
originating in the Eu[r]opean Communities is not more problematic from a 
waste management point of view just because it is retreaded in the 
Eu[r]opean Communities rather than in Brazil’. In this respect, we recall 
our earlier observation that it has not been suggested by either party that 
there was any significant difference between retreaded tires made in Brazil 
from imported casings and imported retreaded tires. We also note that 
Brazil has not identified any difference between the conditions prevailing 
in Brazil and in other WTO Members, that would be pertinent in the 
context of considering whether the discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions prevail. In light of these elements, we conclude 
                                                 
369 See Brazil – Retreaded Tires, supra note 512, PP 7.287, 7.288. 
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that this discrimination occurs between countries where the same 
conditions prevail.”371 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 
Finally, having found that the import prohibition on retreaded tires is an 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, the 
Panel moved to determine whether it constitutes a disguised restriction on international 
trade. In order for the application of a measure to constitute a disguised restriction on 
international trade, three elements must exist:372 
 
(a) the assessment of whether a violation arises under this part of 
the chapeau of Article XX relates to the manner in which the 
measure is applied; 
 
(b) the measure is applied in a manner that would constitute a 
restriction on international trade; 
 
(c) a violation arises if this restriction on international trade is 
disguised. 
 
From the outset, the Panel recalls the Appellate Body’s definition on US – 
Gasoline of a disguised restriction within the meaning of the chapeau of Article XX: 
 
‘Arbitrary discrimination’, ‘unjustifiable discrimination’ and ‘disguised 
restriction’ on international trade may … be read side-by-side; they impart 
meaning to one another. It is clear to us that ‘disguised restriction’ 
includes disguised discrimination in international trade. It is equally clear 
that concealed or unannounced restriction or discrimination in 
                                                 
371 Id. P 7.309. 
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international trade does not exhaust the meaning of ‘disguised 
restriction’.373 
 
 The EU argued that the import ban is a disguised restriction on international trade 
because it is not motivated by genuine environmental interests, but by concealed interests 
to protect the domestic industry from the competition of foreign industry. In this sense, 
for instance, the EU contended that the fact that the import ban emanates from the 
Ministry responsible for Development, Industry and Foreign Trade, and not by the 
Ministry of the Environment, indicates that the intention of the measure is not to protect 
the environment and public health.374 However, the Panel concluded that the fact that the 
ban has been adopted by the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade in an 
instrument regulating import licensing does not imply that the specific prohibition it 
contains in relation to retreaded tires could not have reflected health and environmental 
objectives.”375 Overall, the Panel was not persuaded that the elements presented to them 
by the EU conclusively demonstrate that Brazil did not adopt the prohibition on 
importation of retreaded tires with the intention of protecting the public health or the 
environment.376 Moreover, the EU contended “that the ban protects new tire 
manufacturers in Brazil, who benefit from not facing competition from imported retreads, 
and that the import ban is applied in a manner that amounts to a disguised restriction on 
                                                 
373 See Brazil – Retreaded Tires, supra note 322, P 7.318. See also Appellate Body Report on US – 
Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 43, p. 25. 
374 See Brazil – Retreaded Tires, supra note 322, P 7.328. 
375 Id. P 7.331. 
376 Id. P 7.341. 
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international trade, to the benefit of Brazilian and other MERCOSUR retreaders.”377 In 
light of this contention, the Panel felt compelled to address the existence of a disguised 
restriction on international trade in the manner in which the import ban is applied under 
the same circumstances that gave rise to the investigation of application of the import ban 
in a manner that could constitute an arbitrary and/or unjustifiable discrimination where 
the same conditions prevail, namely the importation of used tires through court 
injunctions and the application of the MERCOSUR exemption. The analysis of the Panel 
to determine whether the application of the import ban on retreaded tires constitutes a 
disguised restriction on international trade led to the following conclusions: 
 
[T]he Panel finds that, since imports of used tires are taking place to the 
benefit of the Brazilian retreading industry in such quantities as to 
seriously undermine the achievement of the stated objective of avoiding 
the further accumulation of waste tires in Brazil, the measure at issue is 
being applied in a manner that constitutes a disguised restriction on 
international trade. We also find that the MERCOSUR exemption, 
although is also has the potential to similarly undermine the achievement 
of the stated objective of the measure, has not been shown to date to result 
in the measure at issue being applied in a manner that would constitute 
such a disguised restriction on international trade.378 
 
  
As results of the overall analysis of the Article XX(b) exception applied to Article 
40 of the 2004 ban on imported retreaded tires – the principal current legal basis of the 
ban on the importation of retreaded tires into Brazil, the Panel concluded that although 
the Brazilian import prohibition on retreaded tires is provisionally justified under 
                                                 
377 Id. P 7.346. 
378 Id. P 7.355. 
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paragraph (b) of Article XX, it is applied in a manner that constitutes a means of 
unjustifiable discrimination and a disguised restriction within the meaning of the chapeau 
of Article XX of GATT 1994.379 
 
E.  Summary 
 
This Chapter has demonstrated that WTO panel’s analysis of the retreaded tire 
dispute pays more attention to environmental considerations than the approach adopted in 
MERCOSUR.   The panel determined that the Brazilian import ban fell under paragraph 
(b) of GATT Article XX, as a measure “necessary” to protect human, animal or plant life 
or health.  However, at the end of the day, neither panel was willing to uphold Brazil’s 
import ban.  The WTO ruled against the ban on the grounds that the ban had been applied 
in a manner that resulted in “arbitrary or unjustifiable” discrimination and a “disguised” 
restriction on trade.  In reaching this conclusion, the panel relied heavily on the fact that 
the Brazilian courts continue to allow imports of used tires, which benefit the domestic 
retreading tire industry. Like the MERCOSUR Appellate Body, the WTO panel did NOT 
consider the actual economic impact of the import ban; the scientific aspects of the 
dispute; the political situation that led to adoption of the ban; or the potentially harmful 
consequences that the decision might have on support for WTO institution in developing 
countries such as Brazil. 
 
                                                 
379 See Brazil – Retreaded Tires, supra note 322, PP 7.356, 7.357. 
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Chapter V. The Lessons of Regulatory Competition Theory 
 
 
This Chapter examines the literature on regulatory competition theory – which 
asserts that there are significant welfare gains to be derived from allowing a proliferation 
of different regulatory standards -- to see if it holds any useful lessons for WTO and 
MERCOSUR panels deciding trade-environment disputes such as the dispute involving 
retreaded tires.  Section A explains the foundational elements of that theory in economic 
terms. Section B examines the theory of regulatory competition in law, particularly 
environmental regulation. Section C analyzes the lessons of the regulatory competition 
literature examined in the two previous Sections and argues that these welfare gains will 
depend on a number of specific factors largely ignored by the WTO and MERCOSUR 
decisions. 
 
A. The Economics of the Regulatory Competition Theory 
 
Two contrasting views on interjurisdictional competition divide the literature on 
local public finance.380 The seminal work of Charles Tiebout381 contends that 
interjurisdictional competition is a beneficent force that, similar to its function in the 
                                                 
380 See Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, Economic Competition among Jurisdictions: Efficiency 
Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?, 35 J. PUB. ECON. 333 (1988) (arguing that local choices under simple-
majority rule will be socially optimal for jurisdictions homogeneous in workers and that distortions in local 
fiscal decisions and in local environmental choices arise in cases where jurisdictions are not homogeneous). 
381 See Charles Tiebout, supra note 6, at 416; But see Truman F Bewley, A Critique of Tiebout’s Theory of 
Local Public Expenditures, 49 ECONOMETRICA 713 (1981) (arguing that the conditions under which 
interjurisdictional competition produces an equilibrium that is Pareto optimal are quite limited). 
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market for private goods, compels public agents to make efficient decisions.382 Tiebout’s 
economic model for public expenditures assumes that383 consumer-voters are fully 
mobile and will move to a community that best satisfies their preferences patterns. In this 
model, differences across residents in preferences for environmental quality are not taken 
into account, because migration (“voting with one’s feet”) should eliminate such 
differences, giving rise to jurisdictions defined by constituents’ preferences for 
environmental standards and other public goods.384   Tiebout’s model also assumes that 
consumer-voters are fully informed about revenue and expenditure patterns, consumer-
voter are free to live in a variety of communities, there are no restrictions due to 
employment opportunities and everyone is assumed to live on dividend income. Under 
the model, public services supplied show no external economies or diseconomies 
between communities and there is an optimum community size for every pattern of 
community services, whereas the older residents of the community set community 
services and the number of residents for which services can be produced at the lowest 
average cost defines optimality. Finally, the model assumes that communities below the 
optimum size seek to attract new consumer-voters to lower the average costs of providing 
services. 
 
                                                 
382 See Oates and Schwab, supra note 77. 
383 Tiebout, supra note 6, at 419. 
384 See John Douglas Wilson, Capital Mobility and Environmental Standards: Is There a Theoretical Basis 
for a Race to the Bottom?, in 1 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE? 
393, 400 (Jagdish N. Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996). 
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Under the Tiebout’s economic model, perfect mobility is assumed and it is subject 
to preferences of consumer-voters, who will move from communities with greater than 
optimal size to communities with less than optimal size. His model implies that each 
community has a revenue and expenditure pattern that reflects the desires of its 
residents.385 Tiebout’s model also assumes that local governments do not adapt to 
consumer-voter’s preferences; on the contrary, the local governments that attract the 
optimum number of residents are viewed as being adopted by the economic system.386 
Finally, Tiebout’s model compares prices in the private market with taxes in the 
community.387 Tiebout concludes that interjurisdictional competition is desirable388 and 
that a race to the bottom is precluded because local governments have a considerable 
ability to use tax instruments to effectively charge efficient cash payments from firms.389 
 
William Fischel extended Tiebout’s economic model to the environmental 
protection versus firms’ location debate, to conclude that interjurisdictional competition 
is desirable whenever externalities are internalized; that is, polluters compensate local 
residents for forgone environmental quality.390 
 
                                                 
385 Id. at 420. 
386 Id. 
387 “Just as the consumer may be visualized as walking to a private market place to buy his goods, the 
prices of which are set, we place him in the position of walking to a community where the prices (taxes) of 
community services are set.” Id. at 422. 
388 Id. at 418. 
389 See Wilson, supra note 384, at 402. 
390 See William A. Fischel, Fiscal and Environmental Considerations in the Location of Firms in Suburban 
Communities, in FISCAL ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS 119 (Edwin S. Mills & Wallace E. Oates eds., 
1975) (provided that consumer-voters are fully mobile and are not sensitive to employment opportunities). 
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An influential article by Wallace Oates and Robert Schwab concluded that 
interjurisdictional competition might be a source of distortion in public choices.391 One 
strand of this line of argument suggests that public agents, in competition for new 
industry, will lower taxes and other sources of costs to consumer-voters to such a point 
that public outputs will be provided at suboptimal levels.392 In this scenario, Oates and 
Schwab conclude that a race to the bottom is likely to occur if capital is taxed at a 
positive rate, considering the optimal rate is zero.393 On the other hand, a race to the top is 
expected when capital is taxed at inefficiently low rates.394 
 
These authors make two distinct contributions with regard to economic 
competition among jurisdictions.  First, “for jurisdictions homogeneous in workers, local 
choices under simple majority rule will be socially optimum; such jurisdictions select a 
zero tax rate on capital and set a standard for local environmental quality such that 
marginal willingness-to-pay equals the marginal social costs of a cleaner 
environment.”395  For this homogeneous group, “competition among jurisdiction is thus 
conductive to efficient outcomes.”396  
 
                                                 
391 See Oates and Schwab, supra note 77, at 334. 
392 WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM 142-43 (1972). 
393 Id. at 408 (“Governments will view capital as being undersupplied because of the tax distortion, and 
they will possess incentives to lower environmental quality to inefficiently low levels to attract scarce 
resource.”). 
394 Wilson, supra note 384, at 394-95, 403. 
395 See Oates and Schwab, supra note 380, at 333. 
396 Id. at 338-39 and n.10. 
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Second, “in cases where jurisdictions are not homogeneous or, where, for various 
reasons, they set a positive tax rate on capital, distortions arise not only in local fiscal 
decisions, but also in local environmental choices.”397 Thus, Oates and Schwab’s 
investigation points at three different sources of potential distortion in local decision-
making.398 If the jurisdiction in competition for new industry and jobs does not have 
access to efficient tax instruments, distortions will occur in the fiscal and environmental 
decisions. Another potential distortion addresses the incompatibility of public decisions 
with the will of the consumer-voter, i.e the public choice problem. Finally, distortion in 
local decision-making will likely occur in the presence of conflicts of interest within a 
heterogeneous community. 
 
Distortions in environmental decisions are expected to occur because, in 
competing for new businesses, states will lower their environmental standards to reduce 
costs of potential entrants.399 This scenario allowed Cumberland to conclude that “local 
setting of standards for environmental quality would be subject to ‘destructive 
interregional competition.’”400 Accordingly, centralized governance at the central level is 
needed to avoid environmental degradation originated from local or state regulation.401 
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398 Id. at 350-51. 
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A more recent study conducted by John Douglas Wilson402 examines the 
theoretical literature on the race-to-the-bottom over environmental standards. Built on the 
premise that no race can occur if there are no constraints in tax instruments and the 
economy is free of distortions and competitive,403 he concludes that the chances for a 
race-to-the-bottom to occur are at best mixed.404 According to Wilson’s reading of the 
local-public-economics literature, a race to the bottom “is not a generic feature of the 
system of independent governments. Models of a ‘race’ tend to be incomplete, because 
they fail to justify the absence of more direct means of attracting capital to a jurisdiction, 
most notably direct subsidies or at least reduced tax rates on capital. Other models give 
rise to the opposite problem, NIMBY, where environmental standards are inefficiently 
restrictive.”405 
 
 Arik Levinson’s contribution to environmental regulations and industry location 
concludes that despite “anecdotal evidence that political jurisdictions (national or sub-
national) pass environmental laws with an eye toward attracting (or retaining) industry, 
there is no evidence that industry responds to differences in these laws in significant 
ways.”406 As for the relation between international environmental regulation and 
industrial flight, Levinson concludes that survey evidence does not support the claim that 
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406 Arik Levinson, Environmental Regulations and Industry Location: International and Domestic 
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strict environmental standards gives rise to industrial flight, nor that lax environmental 
regulation creates pollution havens.407 This conclusion is attributable to his findings that 
there is a large difference from what firms say they do in a survey to what they actually 
do in practice.408 In addition, international studies on environmental regulation and 
competitiveness suffer from lack of information about relative environmental compliance 
costs and/or they rely on aggregate data.409 As to the relation between US environmental 
regulation and industrial flight, Levinson contends that, just like the related international 
experience, it is difficult to find direct evidence of firms relocating within the country410 
or that environmental regulation affect investment to a degree that is statistically or 
economically relevant.411 Finally, he offers three possible explanations for the 
discrepancy between the industrial flight rhetoric caused by lax environmental standards 
and the lack of economic evidence in that regard.412 One explanation is that 
environmental regulation in developing countries promotes foreign direct investment, 
rather than deter it. Another is that large pollution-intensive industry exists in 
oligopolistic markets, where firms are not sensitive to competitive forces such as 
differences in environmental standards. Levinson also contends that: 
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[P]oliticians receive support from many sources, including industry groups 
using pollution-intensive production processes. One convenient and credible 
way of justifying favorable treatment for these industries is to argue that 
regulations threaten their competitive position and that those industries 
might be forced to relocate.413 
 
 Alvin K. Klevorick argues that, regardless of whether the concern over the race to 
the bottom is justified or not, harmonization of environmental standards will not remedy 
the problems attributable to interjurisdictional competition.414 He contends that the 
concerns behind criticism to the race to the bottom are not associated with 
interjurisdictional competition, but with the failure of individual states to achieve certain 
standards.415 Klevorick presents six rationales for preferring diversity of standards, as 
opposed to harmonization/uniformity.416 First, diversity of standards provides room for 
competitive advantages. Second, equilibrium may be reached efficiently in a context of 
diverse levels of legal and capital infrastructure. Third, in a model of tax competition, 
uniform tax rates are not generally required by governments to attain joint revenue 
maximization. Fourth, diversity of standards is associated with the collective uncertainty 
over the correct standard and the risk of imposing one single and possibly wrong standard 
on all jurisdictions. Fifth, “imposing a uniform standard diminishes the wealth of those 
countries that have the capacity – because either the technology they possess or their 
predilection – to do perfectly well with a lower standard.”417 Sixth, imposing uniformity 
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of standards raises the potential problem of overlooking the fact that differences in 
standard setting may be based on differences in the values of different populations, i.e. a 
moral philosophy problem.  
 
B. Legal Implications of the Regulatory Competition Theory for the Environment 
 
Regulatory competition has generated a significant amount of legal scholarship in 
different areas of the law.418 As in the debate among economists, legal scholars have not 
reached a consensus as to the effects of regulatory competition. As for environmental 
regulation, there is no agreement among those who contend that centralized regulation 
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will avoid environmental degradation419 and those who state that the race to the bottom420 
argument has no support in existing models of interjurisdictional competition.421 
   
1. First-Generation Thinking:422 State environmental regulation decreases social 
welfare 
 
Professor Richard Stewart summarizes the argument in favor of centralized 
environmental decision-making in four rationales:423 the tragedy of the commons and 
national economies of scale,424 disparities in effective representation, spillovers, and 
moral ideals and the politics of sacrifice. 
 
                                                 
419 The most representative scholarship of this argument was developed by Professor Richard B. Stewart. 
See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State 
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L. J. 1196 (1977) [hereinafter Pyramids of 
Sacrifice]; Richard B. Stewart, The Development of Administrative and Quasi-Constitutional Law in 
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420 Race-to-the-bottom “is a race from the desirable levels of environmental quality that states would pursue 
if they did not face competition for industry to the increasingly undesirable levels that they choose in the 
face of such competition.” Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the 
“Race-to-the-bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992) 
[hereinafter Rehabilitating Interstate Competition].  
421 Professor Richard  L. Revesz is the best account of this line of argument. See id. at 1210, 1211-12 
(arguing that “competition among states for industry should not be expected to lead to a race that decreases 
social welfare; indeed, as in other areas, such competition can be expected to produce efficient allocation of 
industrial activity among states.”). 
422 The term is coined by Daniel Esty. See Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 
MICH. L. REV. 570, 600 (1996).   
423 See Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice, supra note 419, at 1211. 
424 Economies of scale are defined as “a situation in which a firm can increase its output more than 
proportionally to its total input cost.” See EDGAR K. BROWNING & MARK A. ZUPAN, MICROECONOMICS: 
THEORY & APPLICATION 208 (7th ed. 2001). 
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The tragedy of the commons rationale arises in an interjurisdictional competition 
structure where public decisions, adopted by self-interested bureaucrats leave all 
bureaucrats worse off than they would have been had they adopted policies formulated 
collectively.425 Besides environmental quality, constituents also value employment and 
economic growth.426 Stringent environmental standards of one community against lax 
environmental standards of others may drive businesses and jobs away of the former to 
the latter. In the name of employment and economic growth, communities with high 
environmental standards may decide to lower their demands for environmental quality in 
an attempt to attract or hold industry, leading to the creation of jobs, and consequently 
increases in wages and taxes.427 Similar moves in neighboring communities will lead to a 
race to the bottom in environmental regulation, in the name of jobs and economic 
development.428 Stewart argues that the race to the bottom argument would be corrected 
by the imposition of nationwide stringent environmental standards.429 Moreover, 
economies of scale benefits would justify centralized environmental decision-making for 
data collection and analysis, and other technical issues.430 
 
The second rationale listed by Stewart for preferring environmental decision-
making at the national level relates to claims of disparities in effective environmental 
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groups’ representation vis-à-vis industry and unions.431 Stewart’s central contention is 
that environmental groups have a greater impact on policy decisions taken at the national 
level, for environmental groups are weakly represented locally and transaction costs for 
concerted action are exacerbated by technical complexities of environmental issues.432 
These comparative disadvantages will often be reduced, however, if decisions are taken 
at the national level, because aggregate costs will be reduced and critical mass will be 
achieved. Moreover, centralized environmental decision-making affords scale economies 
in fundraising and greater political support from Washington bureaucrats.433 
 
Interstate spillovers/externalities appear as the third rationale for centralized 
environmental decision-making.434 Stewart contends that physical, psychic or economic 
spillovers are associated with the regulatory model based on decision-making at the state 
or local level. Provided that the methods available to the states involved to correct these 
distortions have proven ineffective under state regulation, federal intervention appears as 
the best form of eliminating the more problematic types of spillovers.435 
 
The fourth rationale in favor of centralization of environmental decision-making 
is related to moral ideals and the politics of sacrifice,436 which, in the words of Stewart, 
“reflects the sacrifice of preference-satisfaction in order to fulfill duties to others, or to 
                                                 
431 Id. at 1213. 
432 Id. 
433 Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice, supra note 419, at 1213-14. 
434 Id. at 1215. 
435 Id. at 1216. 
436 Id. at 1217. 
 
 123
transform existing preference structures in the direction of lessened dependence upon 
consumption of material goods and greater harmony with the natural environment.”437 In 
other words, Stewart’s sacrifice is translated into renunciation of maximum economic 
growth to preserve and promote non-economic goals, such as the life and health of plants 
and animals for future generations. These objectives, however, cannot be achieved under 
a model of state regulation. States will find it harder to undertake sacrifices if competing 
jurisdictions do not.438 Furthermore, sacrifices undertaken in response to a national 
measure will dilute the costs in local expenditures.439 In addition, public reaction against 
measures taken pursuant environmental objectives will have less of an impact on 
Washington bureaucrats than at the local/state level, making it harder for states to 
abandon it.440 Finally, in the face of public choice concerns,441 it is assumed that groups 
seeking higher levels of environmental protection are more effective at the federal level 
than at the state/local level, which leads to the conclusion that federal regulation is 
arguably more protective of the environment.442 
 
But if the arguments in favor of nationally decided environmental standards raised 
by Stewart seem convincing, it should not go without saying that they are not free of 
criticism, as readily offered by Stewart himself443 and other influential legal scholars. 
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2. Second-Generation Thinking:444 State environmental regulation increases social 
welfare 
 
Stewart identifies several potential sources of local resistance to national 
environmental policies: diseconomies of scale,445 impairment of self-determination, and 
national ideals as “Pyramids/politics of Sacrifice.” Esty addresses arguments related to 
the benefits of diversity, public choice, and transboundary pollution spillovers.446 Finally, 
Revesz challenges race-to-the-bottom fears, and argues that interjurisdictional 
competition produces efficient environmental decision-making and enhances social 
welfare.447 
 
The diseconomies of scale argument arise whenever the costs to the state 
government in implementing and complying with a particular environmental policy are 
higher than the benefits perceived by them. It is typical of a federal regulatory authority 
to implement uniform standards across the federal states. In developing a uniform 
environmental policy designed to correct interstate externalities, it is not surprising that 
some states will end up bearing greater costs than benefits associated with such a policy. 
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Even if total gains of the policy compensate total costs, some states will not be motivated 
to enforce the policy that entails greater local burdens than benefits.448  
 
While recognizing that environmental interests are likely to have greater policy 
impact if shifted from states to the federal government, Stewart acknowledges that this is 
only possible at the expense of the impairment of state-determination.449 Problems arise 
whenever decisions about environmental quality have notable impacts on other sectors of 
the economy that touch state citizens’ interests directly.450 Moreover, federal 
environmental measures decrease local participation considerably.451 
 
Stewart’s idealized “Pyramids/politics of Sacrifice” is likely to find shortcomings, 
which may well compromise the enforcement of national environmental measures.452 To 
some, the sacrifices undertaken in the name of a federal environmental policy may be 
excessive as the case when the poor face increased utility bills.453 In the words of 
Stewart, “[r]esistance and resentment may be heightened by the fact that many 
environmental programs distribute the costs of controls in a regressive pattern while 
providing disproportionate benefits for the educated and wealthy, who can better afford 
to indulge an acquired taste for environmental quality than the poor, who have more 
                                                 




452 Id. at 1221. 
453 Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice, supra note 419, at 1221. 
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pressing needs and fewer resources with which to satisfy them.”454 Even more 
problematic, perhaps, is Stewart’s flawed presumption that it is moral for the federal 
government to force people to pay for goods they don’t want.455  
 
Daniel Esty summarizes additional arguments in favor of decentralized 
environmental policy making: benefits of diversity, public choice and transboundary 
pollution spillovers. First and foremost, decentralized regulatory decision-making 
encourages diversity in environmental regulation, which has two main advantages: from 
the standpoint of economics, diversity of environmental background conditions, 
emissions levels, risk preferences, climate, policy priorities, income levels and weather, 
accompanied by regulation that takes these differences into account, increases social 
welfare.456 From much of the legal and political standpoint, regulatory diversity across 
states or localities encourages policy innovation, as each state or locality is a different 
“laboratory” for public policies.457  
 
                                                 
454 See id. 
455 See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for 
Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, Symposium, Constructing a New Federalism, YALE J. 
on REG. & YALE L. & POL’Y. REV. (1996). 
456 See Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, supra note 422, at 606-07. 
457 Id. at 606. 
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Furthermore, Esty notes, theorists who contend that decentralized environmental 
regulation is welfare increasing quite often base their claim on the theory of public choice 
or interest group:458 
 
In the economists’ version of the interest-group theory of government, 
legislation is supplied to groups or coalitions that outbid rival seekers of 
favorable legislation. The price that the winning group bids is determined 
both by the value of legislative protection to the group’s members and the 
group’s ability to overcome free-rider problems that plague coalitions. 
Payments take the form of campaign contributions, votes, implicit promises 
of future favors, and sometimes outright bribes. In short, legislation is ‘sold’ 
by the legislature and ‘bought’ by the beneficiaries of the legislation.459 
 
Theorists argue that decisions taken at higher and more remote levels of 
regulation tend to be less representative of constituents’ will than policies scrutinized 
locally.460 In addition, it is argued that “rent-seeking”461 efforts are greater at the federal, 
rather than at the state regulatory level.462 In other words, instead of federal regulation 
correcting distortions in disparities of political power representation between 
environmental groups and industry’s interest; quite the contrary, it only works to augment 
it.  
                                                 
458 I rely on Dennis Mueller’s definition of public choice as “the economic study of nonmarket decision 
making, or simply the application of economics to political science.” See DENNIS MUELLER, PUBLIC 
CHOICE II 1 (1989); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL 
INTRODUCTION 7 (1991). 
459 See Richard Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL. J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335 (1974); 
FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 458, at 15. 
460 See Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, supra note 422, at 609-10. 
461 “Rent-seeking refers to the attempt to obtain economic rents (i.e., payments for the use of an economic 
asset in excess of the market price) through government intervention in the market.” See Jonathan R. 
Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group 
Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 224 n.6 (1986). 




Esty also remarks that the relation between interstate pollution spillovers and 
federal regulation takes two different strands in the second-generation thinking. On the 
one hand, one line of thought acknowledges the existence of interjurisdictional 
externalities, but proceeds with policy prescriptions that does not address these 
externalities.463 On the other, theorists contend that interstate pollution spillovers should 
not require governmental attention, because “[a]lthough externalities or other failures 
may arise, […] the capacity of government to regulate effectively is so limited that 
welfare losses are minimized by letting unregulated forces operate” (the Nirvana 
Fallacy).464 
 
In a highly influential article that best represents second-generation thinking, 
Professor Richard Revesz challenges the settled understanding that interjurisdictional 
competition will lead states to a race to the bottom in environmental standards in an 
attempt to attract and retain industry.465 Revesz claims that race-to-the-bottom arguments 
                                                 
463 Id. at 612. 
464 Id. at 612-13. Note, however, that the Nirvana Fallacy argument is not a claim against federal 
governmental regulation, but a claim against governmental regulation altogether, grounded on the 
assumption that governments are ill equipped to design and implement regulatory policies that respond to 
market failures in a manner that increases social welfare.   
465 Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition, supra note 117, at 1211-12. See generally Richard L. 
Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. 
L. REV. 535 (1997); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Normative Critique, 
in THE NEW FEDERALISM: CAN THE STATES BE TRUSTED? 97 (John Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast eds., 
1997); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: Lessons for the European Union 
and the International Community, 83 VA. L. REV. 1331 (1997). See also Richard L. Revesz, Federalism 
and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341 (1996) (criticizing the manner in 
which the federal environmental statutes have dealt with the problem of interstate externalities). But see 
Kirsten H. Engle, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “to the Bottom”?, 48 
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find no support in existing models of interjurisdictional competition, and that, on the 
contrary, state competition for industry can, indeed, produce an efficient allocation of 
industrial activity.466 By comparing interstate competition for industrial activity with 
markets for traditional goods, Revesz finds no basis for the claim that the former will 
result in a competition that decreases welfare.467 Finally, Revesz contends that federal 
regulation aimed at correcting a race-to-the-bottom over environmental standards is likely 
to create distortions elsewhere, by relaxing regulatory controls in other areas.468 In other 
words, even if the contention that state regulation favors a race-to-the-bottom in 
environmental standards holds true, federal regulation will have negative effects on other 
state regulatory matters (such as worker safety and minimum wage laws)469 or fiscal 
interests.470 Perhaps more problematic to a federal system are Revesz findings that the 




                                                                                                                                                 
HASTINGS L. J. 271 (1997); Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (But Only from a National 
Perspective) for Federal Environmental Protection, 7 DUKE ENVLT. L. & POL’Y F. 225 (1997); Peter P. 
Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition Among 
Jurisdiction in Environmental Law, 14 YALE J. on REG. 67 (1996). 
466 Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition, supra note 420, at 1211-12. 
467 Id. at 1234. 
468 Id. at 1212. 
469 Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, supra note 422, at 653 n.144. 




3. Third-Generation Thinking:472 Multi-Tier Environmental Regulation 
 
More recently, Professor Daniel Esty has challenged the presumption that 
decentralized approaches to environmental policy are more welfare enhancing than 
centralized regulatory efforts.473 However, his contribution is not intended to be a new 
defense of environmental policy decided at the federal level; it is intended to be a “break 
with unidirectional conclusions about the proper governmental level of environmental 
policymaking.”474 
 
 Esty’s study addresses three fundamental questions concerning decentralized 
environmental policy:475 which governmental level best resolves technical issues (the 
technical argument), whether a more decentralized regulatory approach will ameliorate or 
aggravate the structural impediments to achieving least-social-cost environmental 
policies (the structural question), and whether public choice problems associated with 
environmental policymaking are reduced or worsened by decentralization. 
 
 The analysis of the question of which regulatory approach best addresses 
technical environmental problems does not support the supposedly settled second-
generation decentralized regulation claim. In order to address this question, Esty breaks 
                                                 
472 See generally Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, supra note 422. 
473 See id. at 570 (arguing for a multi-tier regulatory structure to tackle the complexity and diversity of 
environmental problems).  
474 Id. at 571. 
475 Id. at 613. 
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the analysis into four instances: problem identification,476 data collection and analysis,477 
policy design,478 and implementation, enforcement, and policy evaluation.479 According 
to Esty, identification of risks and harms to the environment can benefit both from 
centralized and decentralized regulation, depending on the problem at hand.480 Some 
problems are peculiar to certain localities, which economically may not justify having 
observers all over the country. However, other environmental problems may benefit from 
nation-wide purview, such as the case of identifying chlorine compounds (CFCs) that 
deplete the ozone layer.481 Furthermore, economies of scale may justify data collection 
and analysis at the federal level.482 For example, decentralized jurisdictions will likely 
conduct the same studies several times and will spend time agreeing on an efficient 
division of technical labor.483 Poor jurisdictions may lack the capacity to conduct reliable 
data collection and analysis.484 Esty also suggests that environmental policies designed 
nationally, implemented locally and following nonuniform standards are the best 
alternative to address welfare-reducing races to the bottom or top and risks of structural 
failures from interstate externalities.485 Finally, as a general rule, Esty states that 
                                                 
476 Id. at 614. 
477 Id. 
478 Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, supra note 422, at 618. 
479 Id. at 623. 
480 Id. at 614. 
481 Id. 
482 However, one may not forget that the benefits of diversity (state-as-laboratories argument) may 
downplay the power of the argument in favor of centralized data collection and analysis. This is arguably 
the case when states are able to identify more effective policy tools, when the competition generated among 
decentralized jurisdictions is welfare-increasing, and when the particular environmental problem is 
geographically heterogeneous. Id. at 614-17. 
483 See Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, supra note 422, at 614-15. 
484 Id. at 615. 
485 Id. at 619. 
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implementation and enforcement of environmental measures are done best on a 
decentralized regulatory level, while policy evaluation is perceived to benefit from 
centralized regulation.486 
 
Esty also addresses whether a more decentralized regulatory approach will 
ameliorate or aggravate the structural impediments to achieving least-social-cost 
environmental policies (the structural question). Esty concludes that structural problems 
are better dealt with a hybrid regulatory system.487 Accordingly, “problems that are by-
and-large local in scope (waste site cleanups, drinking water quality, and spending on 
playgrounds, for example) should be regulated at the local level. Problems that arise on 
regional scale (controlling pollution in a river system or an airshed, for example) should 
be managed on an ecosystem basis across states or even countries when necessary.”488 
This structural question was analyzed under three different perspectives: physical 
externalities;489 economic externalities;490 and psychic externalities, internalities, and the 
choice of public.491  
 
Decentralization of environmental regulation is grounded on the assumption that 
physical externalities are not worthy of attention.492 However, scientific evidence has 
                                                 
486 Id.at 623-24. 
487 Id. at 647. 
488 See Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, supra note 422, at 648. 
489 See id. at 625-27. 
490 Id. at 627-38. 
491 Id. at 638-48. 
492 Id. at 625. 
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pointed to the contrary direction, showing various instances where pollution spillovers 
occur and decentralized environmental policies do very little to correct them.493 The 
immediate question turns not on whether centralized regulation is required, but on what 
form of centralization is needed.   
 
 The economic externalities referred by Esty relate to the “race to the bottom” 
problem in environmental regulation, which is the fear that states/countries in 
competition for firms will lower their environmental standards to suboptimal levels in an 
attempt to attract or retain firms. Second-generation theorists consider that the fear of a 
race to the bottom in environmental regulation is unwarranted from a social welfare 
perspective.494 Esty, on the other hand, concludes that “the scope for failure in the market 
for environmental-policy-determined location rights is significant enough to make 
untenable a presumption that regulatory competition in this domain will be welfare 
enhancing.”495 He asserts that “environmental regulation operates in a realm where 
quantitative welfare comparisons are difficult”496 and contends that “politicians do not 
make environmental policy choices by equating the marginal costs and marginal benefits 
of lowering standards to gain a factory or to avoid losing one.”497 Esty also maintains that 
“governmental bodies are relatively weak instruments of market discipline.”498 
                                                 
493 This is the case of spillovers of DDT, SO2 and acid rain, heavy metals, and bioaccumulative toxics. See 
Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, supra note 422, at 625. 
494 See id. at 628. 
495 Id. at 634. 
496 Id. at 631-32. 
497 Id. at 632. 




With regard to the choice of public, Esty notes that “a presumption in favor of 
decentralized environmental regulation cannot be justified because it prejudges the 
critical question of the relevant political community vis-à-vis the environmental problem 
at hand.”499 The sense of community in environmental regulation does not necessarily fit 
into the political subdivision (state/country) most closely connected to a given 
environmental policy. Needless to say environmental damages that take place in the 
Amazon, for instance, are everyone’s concern, and not only to the concern of Brazilians. 
However, there are cases in which no harm is inflicted on a given community, even 
though they claim to have a legitimate interest into another country’s environment.500 
Esty concludes that “the current devolutionary mood ignores this complex 
interdependence[,] [p]utt[ing] at risk some of the important benefits that accrue from 
having a broader political identity.”501 
 
The last question addressed by Esty is whether public choice problems associated 
with environmental policymaking are reduced or worsened by decentralization. In this 
regard, Esty finds no legitimate grounds to suspect that public choice problems would be 
accentuated by environmental regulation at the central level, and he notes that the 
                                                 
499 See id. at 647. 
500 See supra the Tuna-Dolphin I dispute, Chapter I. 
501 See Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, supra note 422, at 643. 
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opposite could be concluded provided that the media devotes much more attention to 
federal-level activities.502  
 
C. Lessons WTO and MERCOSUR Tribunals Should Learn from Regulatory Competition 
Theory in Trade and Environment Disputes 
 
The previous sections have demonstrated that there are advantages and drawbacks 
to a regulatory approach based on harmonization. According to scholars that defend an 
approach to environmental regulation based on harmonization, this form of regulating the 
environment prevents races to the bottom in environmental regulation. In other words, in 
order to attract and retain industries, states may bring their environmental standards to 
very low levels. Through harmonization, however, states are restrained from lowering 
their environmental standards below a minimum level. In addition, harmonization is an 
effective approach for resolving technical issues, such as data collection and analysis. 
Moreover, scholars argue that harmonization corrects the problems faced by disparities in 
effective representation. It is believed that environmental groups are weakly represented 
in the state and local levels and that this problem would be addressed by bringing 
environmental decision-making to the central government, where environmental groups 
have greater policy impact. Defenders of harmonization of environmental standards also 
contend that this approach avoids negative environmental externalities, such as pollution, 
                                                 
502 Id. at 650. 
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because every state is under the same or similar environmental standards, avoiding that 
some states pollute more and transfer its costs to its neighbors.  
 
Defenders of regulatory competition, on the other hand, contend that there are 
significant welfare gains to be derived from allowing states to adopt different 
environmental regulations. They contradict the assumptions related to the race to the 
bottom, disparities in effective representation and interstate externalities. In addition, 
regulatory competition scholars argue that allowing states to choose their preferred levels 
of environmental protection contributes to policy innovation to best address 
environmental problems. Such benefits of regulatory diversity go unnoticed under a 
mandatory harmonization approach. 
 
Finally, Professor Esty contends that the appropriate level of environmental 
decision-making depends on several factors, and that more welfare gains would accrue 
from a hybrid regulatory approach that relies on harmonization.  While he believes that 
environmental policies are best designed nationally, he argues that implementation and 
enforcement of such policies are done best at the state level. Moreover, Esty also showed 
that an approach that combines harmonization and regulatory competition will be 
welfare-increasing for issues involving externalities and the choice of public. In 
conclusion, Esty’s contribution stands for the claim that the environment could gain from 




Although Esty’s conclusions were developed in the context of US environmental 
policy, I argue that several lessons can be drawn from this literature with a direct impact 
on trade-environment disputes.  The most important lesson of this literature is that the 
appropriate level of environmental regulation will depend on the environmental problem 
or risk that a governmental wishes to regulate. Any other division is superficial and does 
not take into account the complexity of environmental regulation.  
 
As in the US case of environmental regulation, where Professor Esty concluded 
that the level of environmental decision-making will depend on technical and structural 
issues, the appropriate level of deference to regulatory authorities in WTO and 
MERCOSUR trade-environment disputes will also depend on factors that include impact 
on trade, extent of risks to the environment, availability of less-trade restrictive measures, 
domestic politics behind the measure, and the relative strength of WTO and 
MERCOSUR institutions.  
 
WTO and MERCOSUR trade tribunals should first identify the actual economic 
impact of the trade-restrictive measure. An approach based on the sole assumption that 
unrestricted trade is always good for the environment should be rejected. There are trade-
environment disputes, as I will show in the next Chapter, where the impact on trade is 
minimal. Under my suggested approach, the specific impact on trade, balanced with the 
remaining factors will determine the appropriate level of environmental decision-making, 




Second, every MERCOSUR and WTO trade tribunal should evaluate the extent of 
the environmental risks and harm that are posed by imports of a certain product. It would 
not be desirable to permit import bans on products that impose little risk and harm to the 
environment. Therefore, WTO and MERCOSUR trade tribunals should conduct in-depth 
investigations of such environmental risks and harm before rejecting claims brought 
under Article XX (b) or (g) of GATT or Article 50(d) on the 1980 Montevideo Treaty.  
 
In addition, in order to preserve trade (even if minimal) and to protect the 
environment, MERCOSUR and WTO trade tribunals should identify whether there are 
other less trade-restrictive forms of avoiding or eliminating certain environmental risks.  
Especially with relation to developing countries, trade tribunals should determine 
whether alternative measures are readily available, economically feasible, and 
environmentally effective.  
 
On the other hand, trade-environment disputes should look ahead of the actual 
impacts on trade and environment and focus on the politics of each dispute and the 
capacity of WTO and MERCOSUR institutions to address problems present in trade-
environment conflicts. 
 
The politics behind every trade-environment dispute is important because there 
could be cases where the governmental authorities are captured by domestic economic 
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interests. Identification of these political matters is crucial to every trade-environment 
conflict. WTO and MERCOSUR trade tribunals should not jeopardize the legitimacy of 
their decisions by making decisions that overlook this very important aspect of trade-
environment disputes.    
 
The final step of my suggested approach indicates that trade tribunals must take 
into account the relative weakness of WTO and MERCOSUR institutions, and the 
potential threat that its decision could pose to continued political support for these 
institutions.  In other words, WTO and MERCOSUR trade tribunals will be asked to 
consider to what extent their decisions on trade and environment disputes are 
strengthening or weakening political support for these organizations. 
 
In addition, Professor Esty concluded that a unidirectional harmonized central 
approach to environmental regulation in the US is welfare-decreasing, and that great 
weight should be put on a hybrid regulatory system. Similarly, WTO and MERCOSUR 
panels should question the usual assumption that unharmonized regulatory measures are 
always bad for trade. As I will demonstrate in the next Chapter, an approach that properly 
balances economic and environmental interests may actually increase support for WTO 
and MERCOSUR institutions. 
 
In conclusion, borrowing from the analysis on regulatory competition in the US 
environmental context, my suggested analysis indicates that the appropriate deference to 
 
 140
national regulatory authorities will depend on specific economic, environmental, political 




This chapter has demonstrated that a similar interpretation pattern concerning 
regulation and its effects on the environment exists both among economists and lawyers. 
This consensus is divided into two main schools of thought. One school of thought 
concludes that interjurisdictional competition compels public agents to make efficient 
decisions that are welfare increasing. Another school of thought contends that diversity in 
environmental standards will not maximize welfare and will instead cause races to the 
bottom in environmental regulation. Under this approach, harmonization of 
environmental regulation will remedy the problems attributable to interjurisdictional 
competition. A third sub-theory, led by Professor Esty, appears in the legal scholarship to 
contend that there isn’t such thing as a one-size-fits-all regulatory approach to 
environmental policymaking and concludes that technical and structural matters will 
dictate the proper governmental approach. According to this sub-theory, it is often the 
case that a combination of interjurisdictional competition and harmonization creates the 
most efficient environmental decision-making structure. 
 
In Section C, I argued that the latest scholarship on regulatory competition theory 
holds important lessons for WTO and MERCOSUR panels addressing trade-environment 
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disputes. These panels need to go beyond the reflexive assumption that increased trade 
will always further environmental protection. Professor Esty concluded that the 
appropriate level of environmental protection will actually depend on the technical and 
structural issues involved in a particular environmental harm or risk. Similarly, I argued 
that the appropriate level of deference to regulatory authorities will depend on specific 
economic, environmental, political, and institutional considerations. As I demonstrate in 
the next Chapter, the WTO and MERCOSUR trade panels in the retreaded tires dispute 








Chapter VI. Applying the Lessons of Regulatory Competition to the 




In Chapters III and IV, I have showed that the MERCOSUR and WTO tribunals 
found the Brazilian and Argentinean import bans to be restrictive and discriminatory 
without analyzing the actual trade impact of the measures, and that both panels gave little 
weight to the environmental risks involved. I also showed that neither tribunal analyzed 
the specific political obstacles that such alternative measures pose for developing 
countries such as Argentina and Brazil,503 the capacity of WTO and MERCOSUR 
institutions to address environmental issues, or the potential threat that their decisions 
could pose to continued political support for these institutions. In Chapter V, I showed 
that this type of specific analysis is key to arrive at an appropriate resolution of trade-
environment disputes. 
 
 In this Chapter, I will attempt to provide the specific analysis missing from the 
WTO and MERCOSUR reports. In Section A, I discuss the economic impact of the 
Brazilian import ban on the Brazilian and EU tire industries. Section B addresses the 
extent and certainty of environmental risks associated with retreaded tires. Section C 
assesses the availability of less-trade restrictive means for achieving Brazil’s policy of 
reducing additional generation of waste tire. Section D deals with the politics of tire 
                                                 
503 Interview with Dr. Hermes Marcelo Huck, MERCOSUR trade panelist in the retreaded tire dispute 




regulation in Brazil.  Section E explains the weakness of MERCOSUR institutions and 
the impact of the tire decision on political support for these institutions.  In Section F, I 
summarize the results of each section and explain why, taken together, they suggest that 
the WTO and MERCOSUR decisions were wrongly decided. 
 
A. Trade Aspects of the Retreaded Tires Dispute 
 
As discussed in Chapters III and IV, the WTO and MERCOSUR tribunals in the 
retreaded tire dispute did not conduct any measurement of the economic impact of 
Argentina’s trade measures.504   Had they engaged in this analysis, however, they would 
have seen that the trade impact in both cases was relatively small. 
 
 
Prior to the imposition of the Brazilian ban on imports of retreaded tires, Brazil 
had been an important market for European Union’s retreaders, representing 
approximately 20 percent of their export market.505 As shown in Table 7, exports had 
been growing considerably year after year until the import ban was imposed. 
  
                                                 
504 Interview with Dr. Hermes Marcelo Huck, MERCOSUR trade panelist in the retreaded tire dispute 
between Uruguay and Argentina, in São Paulo, Brazil (Mar. 10, 2006). 
505 Report from the Directorate-General for Trade of the European Commission on the Examination 
Procedure Concerning an Obstacle to Trade within the Meaning of Council Regulation (EC) No 3286/94 
consisting of Trade Practices Maintained by Brazil Affecting Trade in Retreaded Tires, to the Trade 
Barriers Regulation Committee (Sept. 13, 2004) (on file with author). 
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Table 7: Imports of retreaded and used tires by unity 






1996 6.149.537 970.136 
1997 1.683.020 2.248.153 
1998 911.237 3.334.362 
1999 1.207.100 2.022.912 
2000 1.407.618 2.002.578 
2001 2.396.898 896.764 
2002 2.659.704 32.491 
2003 4.240.474 0 
2004 7.564.360 0 
2005 10.478.466 0 
TOTAL 16.412.014 11.317.581 
Memorandum from the Ministry of Environment’s Ad Hoc Committee Concerning Trade Practices 
Maintained by Brazil Affecting Trade in Retreaded Tires, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Mar. 20, 
2006) (on file with author). 
 
Table 7 shows that in 2000, Brazil imported 2.022,578 unities of retreaded tires. 
That number steadily dropped to 896,764 in 2001. This decrease in the number of unities 
of retreaded tires exported to Brazil is attributable to the 2000 ban on imported retreaded 
tires that prohibits the issuance of import licenses. However, with regard to used tires, the 
numbers in Table 1 indicate a continuous growth of Brazilian imports since 1999, despite 
the 1991 import ban on used goods. 
 
The retreaded tire industry of the European Union, under normal conditions, had 
anticipated a growth in the number of retreaded tires to be exported to Brazil that would 
reach 3 million by the end of 2003.506 Between 1995 and 2000, the number of retreaded 
tires exported from the European Communities to Brazil increased in approximately 58 




percent, and, for the first time in six years, it fell to 32 percent in 2001, after the 
introduction of the import restriction.507 In 2002 and 2003 exports continued to fall, 
reaching approximately 10 percent of the export volume of previous years.508 Despite the 
ban on retreaded tires, exports remained due either to still valid import licenses, 
deficiencies in the customs information system, or to successful judicial claims brought 
by exporters before Brazilian courts.  
 
Between 1998 and 1999, the volume of retreaded tires exported from the 
European Union to Brazil decreased by 30 percent, while imports of used tires increased 
in exact the same proportion.509 This data, therefore, suggest that consumption in Brazil’s 
domestic market was stable and sustains the European thesis that the European Union’s 
retreaded tires exporters had sufficient reasons to believe in their expected increase of the 
Brazilian market share.510 Moreover, the European Union advanced that their expected 
growth in the demand for their tires found support in the following factors.511 First, that 
demand for European Union’s retreaded tires increased again from 1999 to 2000. Second, 
that there is a continuous demand for retreaded tires in Brazil, in light of price disparities 
between retreaded and new tires and given the growing demand for imports of used tires 
as raw material for domestic manufactures of retreaded tires. 
                                                 
507 Id. 
508 Id. 
509 Report from the Directorate-General for Trade of the European Commission on the Examination 
Procedure concerning an Obstacle to Trade within the Meaning of Council Regulation (EC) No 3286/94 
consisting of Trade Practices Maintained by Brazil Affecting Trade in Retreaded Tires, to the Trade 
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imports to Brazil. In 2001 and 2002, the volume of total imports and imports from the 
European Communities coincided: imports dropped below 10,000 tons in 2001 and below 
5,000 tons in 2002. This reduction may be associated with the 2000 ban on imported 
retreaded tires, which bans imports of retreaded tires and with the 2001 fines on 
importation, marketing, transportation, storage, keeping or keeping in warehouses of 
imported retreaded tires. Total volume of imports kept declining after 2002, and reached 
insignificant amounts of imports in 2003. This volume increased slightly in 2004. 
 
Graph 3 shows a similar pattern with regard to European Union’s exports to 
Brazil. However, the steady decline that started in 2000 reached the zero line in 2003 and 
so remained in 2004. 2005 data from the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign 
Trade show that the situation has remained stable; tire imports occurring at very 
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Retread Exports Retread Imports  
First Written Submission by Brazil to the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization, 




Graph 5 shows the volume of imports and exports, in tons, of used tires in the 
European Union. Similar to what happens in the retreaded tire market, there is a 
disproportional difference between the export volumes to the volume of imported used 
tires. In 1995, the European Union exported a little over 1000,000 tons of used tires, but 
this number almost doubled in 2004, when it was exporting approximately 180,000 used 
tires. The importing sector, however, remained stable and at low levels. During the 10-

























Used Tyre Imp. Used Tyre Exp.  
First Written Submission by Brazil to the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization, 
Concerning Trade Practices Maintained by Brazil Affecting Trade in Retreaded Tires (Jun. 8, 2006) (on file 
with author). 
 
While the volume of retreaded and used tires imported to the European Union’s 
territory has remained stable (at least with regard to used tires) and low, exports of these 
same products have been quite high compared to their imports. The increase in the levels 
of retreaded and used tires exports and the maintenance of their imports at considerably 
low marks may be part of a European Union’s policy oriented towards elimination of 




 As discussed above, the panel in the retreaded tire dispute between Uruguay and 
Argentina did not analyze the economic impact of Argentina’s trade measures.512 
However, Hermes Marcelo Huck, a member of the MERCOSUR panel that issued the 
decision, believes there was little if any trade impact in that case.513 In 1999 and 2000, for 
instance, trade in retreaded tires among these two countries amounted to USD 50,000 
(fifty thousand of American dollars).514 Accordingly, Huck concluded that this litigation 
was in fact a strategic maneuver by Uruguay to preserve imports of retreaded tires from 
Uruguay to Brazil.515 Even though there was a prior MERCOSUR arbitration award 
guaranteeing the right of Uruguay to export retreaded tires to Brazil, Uruguay did not 
want to leave any room for a different interpretation inside MERCOSUR.516 
 
This section points to the following conclusions. First, the data made available by 
the Brazilian Ministry of Environment indicate that Brazil was successful in reducing 
imports of retreaded tires since the imposition of the import ban. However, despite 
specific prohibitions of imports of used tires, the country has imported a growing amount 
of used tires. Second, with relation to the European Union, available data shows a pattern 
of low and stable imports of used and retreaded tires. Available data also point to a 
significant disparity between low imports of retreaded and used tires and high exports of 
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these same products. Exports of used tires have remained stable and unaffected by the 
Brazilian measures.  
 
Concerning exports of retreaded tires, despite the European Union’s claim that the 
Brazilian measures have had a negative impact on them, graph 4 has demonstrated that 
the European Union has been successful in finding alternative markets. With regard to the 
impact of Argentina’s measures on Uruguay’s trade, available information suggests that it 
was extremely small.  
 
 
B. Environmental Aspects of the Retreaded Tires Dispute 
 
As discussed in Chapter III, the MERCOSUR panel in the Argentina-Uruguay tire 
dispute found that the environmental risks posed by retreaded tires were neither serious 
nor irreversible.  The WTO panel acknowledged the risks, but found that they were not 
sufficient to justify the restrictions on trade.  As I show below, however, there is 
significant evidence to contradict these conclusions. 
 
Trade in used and retreaded tires has become a huge environmental and public 
health problem in Brazil over the last decades. Retreaded tires, at first glance, do not 
impose any additional risk that new tires do not also cause. The main difference, 
however, is that retreaded tires become waste faster than new tires, thereby increasing the 
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generation of unnecessary additional tire waste. After new tires have reached the end of 
their first cycle, they can still be retreaded and reused. However, under international 
standards, passenger car tires may be retreaded only once before they become waste.517  
 
Brazilian public administration has demonstrated concern with tire destination 
after it becomes waste. In 1991, Brazil prohibited imports of used tires. After a long 
discussion of whether retreaded tires fall under the category of used tires, it decided to 
expressly ban imports of retreaded tires as well. Brazil argues that avoiding the 
generation of additional waste is the reason behind the measures that ban imports of used 
and retreaded tires within its territory.518 
 
The existence of tires in Brazilian territory, exacerbated by uncontrolled imports 
of used and retreaded tires, has several negative environmental and public health 
impacts.519 First, the disposal of waste tires in landfills increases the risk of fires, which is 
a major cause of toxic gases, and water and soil contamination. Second, tires that are 
abandoned in “water courses” obstruct canals, streams, and “galleries” of pluvial waters, 
                                                 
517 See UNECE Regulation No. 108 (1998), P 6.2. 
518 Interview with Haroldo de Macedo Ribeiro, First Secretary, Coordinator of the Department of 
Economics of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Brasília, Brazil (Mar. 21, 2006). 
519 Pneus: Um Problema Ambiental e de Saúde Pública [Tires: An Environmental and Public Health 
Problem] (Ministério do Meio Ambiente, Brasília, Brazil) 2006, at 11-12. See also Report from the 
Directorate-General for Trade of the European Commission on the Examination Procedure Concerning an 
Obstacle to Trade within the Meaning of Council Regulation (EC) No 3286/94 consisting of Trade 
Practices Maintained by Brazil Affecting Trade in Retreaded Tires, to the Trade Barriers Regulation 
Committee (Sept. 13, 2004) (on file with author) (stating that “waste tires that litter the countryside pose a 
significant environmental and public health problem in Brazil, notably that they can collect rain water and 
thus potentially provide breeding grounds for mosquitoes (aedes aegypti) that can spread dengue and in 
some circumstances urban yellow fever.”). 
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contributing to floods. These floods impose serious damages to local population and 
incalculable costs to the public administration. Outdoor tire burning emits highly toxic 
substances, such as heavy metals, dioxins and furans, which are known causes for cancer 
and other diseases. Third, imports of previously used tires containing mosquitoes’ eggs 
can cause new diseases and epidemics in Brazil. Tires irregularly stocked or discarded 
become ideal habitats for the procreation of mosquitoes responsible for spreading dengue 
and yellow fever. 
 
Dengue fever has become an increasingly serious problem in Brazil. A research 
study conducted by the Brazilian Ministry of Health concluded that the number of dengue 
cases increased dramatically in Brazil between 2004 and 2005.520 Between 1996 and 
2002, Brazilian government’s expenditures, with programs aiming at attacking and 
preventing dengue cases, increased by 284 percent.521 In 2006, 70 percent of all resources 
transferred to States and municipalities to support control-epidemics programs concern 
dengue.522 In 2003, the federal government spent R$ 903,000,000 (approximately USD 
450,000,000) to fight dengue. In 2002, Brazil recorded 709,000 cases of dengue.523  
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A 2003 study conducted by the Brazilian Ministry of Health with 1,240 
municipalities concluded that:524 in 284, waste tires were the number one cause 
associated with dengue-spreading mosquitoes; in 491 municipalities, waste tires were the 
second major cause, and; in 465 municipalities waste tires accounted for the third most 
cited cause associated with the proliferation of dengue mosquitoes. 
 
Table 4: The Dengue Epidemics in Brazil 












Memorandum from the Ministry of Environment’s Ad Hoc Committee Concerning Trade Practices 
Maintained by Brazil Affecting Trade in Retreaded Tires, to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Mar. 20, 2006) 
(on file with author). 
 
 Table 4 shows the number of notified dengue cases from 1994 to 2004. The 
epidemics grew from 56,584 cases, in 1994, to 528,388 in 1998. Notified dengue cases 
fell considerably in 1999, when 209,668 cases were recorded. However, from 1999 to 
2002, notified dengue cases increased exponentially, reaching its peak in 2002, with 
794,000 cases. On May 26 1999, CONAMA adopted Resolution 258, which provides for 
                                                 
524 Pneus: Um Problema Ambiental e de Saúde Pública [Tires: An Environmental and Public Health 
Problem] (Ministério do Meio Ambiente, Brasília, Brazil, 2006), at 11. 
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the limitation and gradual elimination of waste tires, effective since 2002. In 2003, the 
number of notified dengue cases dropped to 346,118, and in 2004, to 107,168 cases. 
However, it should not go without saying that these numbers may conceal failures in the 
Brazilian Ministry of Health’s information system. 
 
In addition, Haroldo de Macedo Ribeiro of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs expressed some certainties concerning the retreaded tires dispute.525 First, Brazil 
is certain that retreaded tires imports increases the generation of unnecessary additional 
tire waste.526 A retreaded tire is a good with a shorter duration given existing regulations 
that prohibits vehicle tires to undergo more than one reforming process. Thus, every 
retreaded tire that comes into Brazilian territory will complete its last “life-cycle” in the 
country and become waste.527 Therefore, there is a certainty that, by importing retreaded 
tires, Brazil is generating additional amounts of waste.528 Second, Brazil is certain that 
tire waste is very difficult to handle, given its toxic chemical components.529 
 
Hermes Marcelo Huck, one of the MERCOSUR panelists in the dispute between 
Uruguay and Argentina, noted that scientific certainty about the negative environmental 
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and public health effects supported Argentina’s environmental claim.530 In that case, 
Huck stated that retreaded tires amount to generation of unnecessary additional tire waste 
without feasible solutions; noting that it takes approximately 500 years for a tire to 
degrade, and alternative forms to eliminate these tires from the environment are not 
affordable.531  
 
 In conclusion, this Section has demonstrated that there is a real link between tire 
accumulation and risks to the environment and public health. Especially, it has pointed to 
the direct correlation between reduction of waste tire accumulation and reduction of 
dengue cases. This Section has also demonstrated that retreaded tires become waste much 
faster than new tires. Once these retreaded tires become waste, they contribute to the 




C. Alternative Means of Tire Disposal in Brazil 
 
The WTO and MERCOSUR tribunals also focused on the need to pursue less-
trade-restrictive alternatives to address the risks associated with retreaded tires.  As I 
show in this section, however, all available alternatives would be significantly less 
effective than an import ban. 
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Article 1 of the 1999 disposal obligations provides that “manufacturers and 
importers of tires are obliged to collect and give an “environmentally adequate” final 
destination to waste tires within the Brazilian territory.” According to Maria Gricia 
Grossi and Geraldo Siqueira of the Brazilian Ministry of the Environment, today there are 
no available alternatives to waste tire management that are, at the same time, 
“environmentally safe” and economically feasible.532 At some point, every available 
alternative has some negative impact on the environment, particularly those processes 
that, under high temperatures, emit toxic substances and residues that require special 
treatment. Presently, Brazil has 5 available destinations for waste tire:533 Co-processing 
of residues in cement kilns; Co-processing in the Petrobras534 schist plant located in the 
State of Paraná; Use in the fabrication of rubber-asphalt; Lamination; Regeneration. 
According to ANIP, lamination is the main destination of waste tires in Brazil, followed 
their use in the co-processing of residues in cement kilns and co-processing in the 
Petrobras schist plant located in the State of Paraná.  
 
First, there is evidence that the burning of tire casings in cement kilns emits 
highly polluting chemical substances and compounds, classified as Persistent Organic 
                                                 
532 Interview with Maria Grícia Grossi and Geraldo Siqueira, Managers of the Secretary of Environmental 
Quality, Brazilian Ministry of Environment, in Brasília, Brazil (Mar. 21, 2006). 
533 Id. 
534 Petrobras stands for Petróleo Brasileiro S.A. It was created in 1953 as the state-owed oil company to 
carry out the activities in a monopolistic manner. For a general account of the oil and gas scenario in Brazil, 
see Marilda Rosado de Sá Ribeiro, The New Oil and Gas Industry in Brazil: An Overview of the Main 
Legal Aspects, 36 TEX. INT’L L. J. 141 (2001). 
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Polluting Substances and Compounds (Poluentes Orgânicos Persistentes - POPs). In 
light of the harmful effects caused by these POPs, countries all over the world have 
developed maximum emission standards and rules for monitoring their compliance. In 
Brazil, CONAMA Resolution 264 deals with processes, criteria, and technical aspects 
concerning environmental licensing for co-processing of residues in ovens. CONAMA 
Resolution 316 regulates the processes and criteria for the functioning of systems 
regarding thermic treatment of residues. In Brazil, there is only one lab that monitors the 
amount of dioxin and furan’s emissions. This factor alone makes impractical large scale 
monitoring. Moreover, while Brazil sets emission-levels for dioxin and furans at 0.5 
ng/Nm3, developed countries work with numbers that are 5 times lower. In addition, 
initial investment in control equipments (filters), required from cement plants, is high and 
tends to augment more, provided that pollutant’s emission levels become increasingly 
restrictive. In the present days, the gas purification system installed in these special ovens 
contains only dust retention filters and chimney, given that the emission of gases is so 
elevated that it becomes technical and economically impractical to proceed otherwise. 
Another limitation associated with this technique of casings’ use is that the substitution of 
coal by waste tires requires that the cement plants have available a constant volume of 
shredded tire to feed its industrial unities. However, Brazil does not have an efficient 
collection and storage system. Finally, data from the Brazilian Ministry of the 
Environment 535shows that from a total of 47 cement plants; only 19 are licensed to co-
process industrial residues. Not all of these 19 plants are presently burning tires; either 




because they do not have the necessary security equipment to reduce gas emissions, 
because tire burning has not proven economically viable; or, still, due to these cement 
plant’s belief that they lack a continuous stream of casings. 
 
A second available destination for tire casings in Brazil is co-processing them in 
the Petrobras schist plant located in the State of Paraná. However, the operational 
capacity of this plant is limited to 3.6 million unities of casings per year. The co-
processing of these tires is able to extract oil from only 50 percent of that product; 
approximately 40 percent is residues, which has to be treated in an environmentally 
sound way. From an environmental and public health perspective, both oil and residues 
that result from this type of co-processing contain highly toxic metals. 
 
A third and popular way of transforming waste tires into something else useful is 
to use in the fabrication of rubber-asphalt. In the past years, this technique has proven to 
be economically viable and environmentally safe. While conventional asphalt is obtained 
from crushed rock, sand and a sticky substance that mixes the two previous components; 
rubber-asphalt, on its turn, is made through three processes: dry, humid and terminal-
blend. In the dry process, the powder of the tire substitutes a small amount of the mineral-
aggregate. This type of rubber-asphalt is inferior to the one obtained through the humid 
and terminal-blend processes, but still superior than conventional asphalt. In the humid 
process, tire powder makes 18 to 20 percent of the substance that sticks the asphalt 
mixture. The mixture is heated to 190 degrees Celsius in a closed compartment, in order 
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not to oxidize the mixture. The downside of this type of process is that the place of 
application of the asphalt needs to be near the plant where it is made, because this asphalt 
mixture looses its viscosity once it cools down. The terminal-blend process addresses the 
problem of lack of viscosity present in the humid process. It utilizes a smaller amount of 
tire powder: 12 to 15 percent of the substance that sticks the asphalt mixture, besides 
extending components. In this manner, the asphalt mixture may be heated while it is 
transported to its place of application without losing its physical properties. This process 
is utilized by Petrobras.  
 
Fourth, lamination appears as another way of transforming waste tires. 
Lamination consists of the mechanical process that results in the manufacture of sole for 
shoes, parceling for sofas and others. Finally, regeneration is another alternative 
destination of waste tires. Regeneration is the substitution of new rubber by regenerated 
rubber. This rubber is used in the manufacturing of products such as carpets and rug 
mats, industrial floors, sport courts, automotive parts and others. 
 
Table 5 shows destinations of the collected waste tires within the Brazilian 
territory. In 2002, lamination accounted for the destination of 60 percent of waste tires; 
co-processing of residues in cement kilns accounted for 25 percent; co-processing in the 
Petrobras schist plant located in the State of Paraná made 1 percent of that destination; 
and other destinations accounted for the remaining 14 percent. In 2003, the amount of 
waste tires used for lamination dropped to 44 percent, increased to 38 percent in cement 
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plants and to 5 percent in the schist business, while it dropped to 13 percent in other uses. 
In 2004, 60 percent of waste tires went to lamination, 32 percent to cement plants, 0.2 
percent to the schist industry, and 8 percent of the casings went to other uses. 
 
 
Table 5: Waste tires Destination in Brazil from 2002 to 2004 
 2002 2003 2004 
Destination Ton. % Ton. % Ton. % 
Lamination 59.766,00 60 27.099,82 44 81.617,33  60
Cement kilns 24.298,30 25 23.327,70 38 42.886,07  32
Schist       891,60 1 3.065,00 5         318,53  0,2
Others 13.870,20 14 8.143,00 13    10.177,00  8
Total 98.826,10 100 61.635,52 100  134.998,93  100
Memorandum from the Ministry of Environment’s Ad Hoc Committee Concerning Trade Practices 
Maintained by Brazil Affecting Trade in Retreaded Tires, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Mar. 20, 
2006) (on file with author). 
 
The First-Secretary of Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Brazil 
supports the WTO jurisprudence that a trade restrictive measure is only justified in face 
of the inexistence of other economically feasible measures that can accomplish the same 
level of environmental protection with less impact on trade.536 In this sense, Brazil also 
welcomes the 1999 disposal obligations; they are innovative and introduced in the 
country environmental responsibility on the part of the manufacturer and importer of 
tires. However, such obligations have their problems. For instance, they impose 
responsibility on the producer and importer of new tires to collect and dispose waste tires. 
This is what the 1999 disposal obligations do. On the other hand, they do not address the 
                                                 
536 Interview with Diplomat Haroldo de Macedo Ribeiro, First-Secretary of the Brazilian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, in Brasília, Brazil (Mar. 21, 2006). 
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policy objective pursued by Brazil, which is non-generation of unnecessary additional tire 
waste.537 Thus, the 1999 disposal obligations operate from the moment the country has 
imported the future waste, and the Brazilian measures intend to avoid the unnecessary 
generation of waste.538 The problem is accentuated by the fact that once a country 
imports a retreaded tire, it can no longer export it back after it has been used, due to a 
prohibition present on the Basel Convention.  
 
In the MERCOSUR retreaded tires dispute between Uruguay and Argentina, at 
least one alternative solution was considered. In that dispute, Argentina said it would 
accept Uruguayan retreaded tires conditioned to the fact that Uruguay would retread 
Argentinean used tires.539 As Uruguay pointed out, however, this alternative had high 
economic costs. First, Argentinean tires were more expensive than tires sold by the 
competition (mostly Europeans).540 Second, Uruguay claimed that a large amount of 
South American tires are unsuitable for retreading, given road conditions in these 
countries.541 
 
This section has demonstrated that once a retreaded tire becomes waste, there are 
several alternatives to it.  In the case of Brazil, waste tire may be used in co-processing of 
residues in cement kilns, co-processing in the Petrobras schist plant located in the State of 
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Paraná, use in the fabrication of rubber-asphalt, lamination, and regeneration. However, 
as has been demonstrated, several of these less-trade restrictive means of addressing the 
problem of waste tire cause environmental problems of their own. Most importantly, as 
noted by the First-Secretary of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, none of these 
less-trade restrictive means of resolving the problem of waste tire address the very 
problem that the import ban is intended to eliminate, which is additional generation of 
waste tires.542 All these alternative means of waste tire disposal tell one is what to do with 
the tires once you have them inside your territory. However, they do not address the 
problem of reducing the generation of waste tires. Another alternative to the import ban 
would be to permit importation of retreaded tires made from domestically-produced tires.  
As shown by the discussion of the Argentina-Uruguay dispute, however, this alternative 
has high economic costs.   
 
 
D. Political Aspects of the Retreaded Tires Dispute 
 
As discussed above, the MERCOSUR Appellate Body concluded that the 
measure could not be based on environmental concerns if it was also influenced on 
economic concerns.  Similarly, the WTO panel concluded that Brazil’s import ban was a 
“disguised” restriction on trade, because Brazil did not ban other products that posed 
similar environmental risks (domestically-produced retreaded tires and used tire imports.) 
When asked, however, a panelist that participated in the decision concerning Argentina’s 
                                                 
542 Interview with Diplomat Haroldo de Macedo Ribeiro, First-Secretary of the Brazilian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, in Brasília, Brazil (Mar. 21, 2006). 
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import ban admitted that the measure was probably motivated by purely environmental 
interests, since there was very little retreaded tire trade between Argentina and 
Uruguay.543  
 
In Brazil, the tire industry is divided into two main groups: the group that 
manufactures new tires and the group that retreads tires. The first group is dominated by 
foreign companies with branches in Brazil, such as Bridgestone/Firestone, Goodyear, 
Michelin and Pirelli.544 The interests of these companies are represented by the 
Associacao Nacional da Industria de Pneumaticos [ANIP], which fully supported 
Brazil’s defense of the import ban in the WTO.545 The second group, on the other hand, 
consists of small to medium size Brazilian companies specialized in retreading tires for 
sale domestically. The interests of these companies are represented by two different 
associations: the Associacao Brasileira do Segmento de Reforma de Pneus [ABR]; and, 
more recently, by the Associacao Brasileira da Industria de Pneus Remoldados [ABIP]. 
On the one hand, these companies benefit from a ban on imports of retreaded tires, which 
directly compete with their products.  On the other hand, Brazilian retreaders are highly 
dependent on imported used tires, which they use to make their products, and have 
vigorously fought for their importation before Brazilian courts since 1991.546 A ban on 
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retreaded tire imports could lend support to arguments for a ban on used tire imports, 
since both products pose similar environmental risks.   
 
In my interview with Vilien Jose Soares, the President of ANIP, I learned that 
ANIP approved of the policy package that resulted in the import ban on foreign retreaded 
tires.547 He strongly suspects that a lobby from the Brazilian retreaded tires industry 
(ABIP) is helping to maintain the import ban, in order to protect itself from foreign 
competition.548 
 
However, Francisco Simeao, the President of ABIP, was strongly opposed to 
Brazil’s import restrictions on retreaded tires.549  In his view, the 2001 presidential decree 
authorizing fines on importation, marketing, transportation, and storage of retreaded tire 
imports was unlawful, because it did not implement legislation as required by the 
Brazilian Constitution.550 He also suggested that the Brazilian legislative branch had been 
captured by foreign manufacturers of new tires that conduct business in Brazil,551 and that 
the Brazilian measures that ban imports of retreaded tires were entirely based on the 
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548 Id. (“ANIP’s members strongly suspect that BIPAVER is responsible for any sort of lobby. In addition, 
one of the member companies of BIPAVER is the English Colway. A few years ago, Colway has made a 
joint venture in Brazil, which originated the Brazilian BS Colway. Although this joint venture no longer 
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Colway maintain unofficial arrangements, with consequent political lobby in Brazil.”). Id. 
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commercial interests of foreign manufacturers of new tires located in Brazil.552 When 
asked whether the accessibility of foreign manufacturers of new tires to the Brazilian 
government was attributable to institutional mechanisms or personal contacts, ABIP’s 
President stated that the CEOs of Pirelli, Bridgestone/Firestone, Goodyear and Michelin 
have been paying visits to Brazilian Senators, Congressmen and public institutions 
connected to the tire industry.553  
 
However, Brazilian governmental authorities argue that the import ban on 
retreaded tires is not supported by domestic economic interests. Maria Gricia Grossi and 
Geraldo Siqueira of the Ministry of Environment stated that purely environmental and 
public health interests support the import ban on retreaded tires.554 The mere fact that the 
Brazilian measures were initiated under the competency of the Ministry of Development, 
Industry and Foreign Commerce does not necessarily indicate this is a commercial 
dispute.555 It is their opinion that the measure was issued by this Ministry because it has 
direct impacts on foreign commerce, regardless of its genuine environmental interests.556 
Haroldo de Macedo Ribeiro of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs agrees with the Ministry 
of Environment reasoning, since only the Ministry of Development, Economics and 
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Foreign Commerce has authority to issue regulations to Customs.557 Thus, it should not 
be assumed that a regulation issued by the Ministry of Development, Industry and 
Foreign Commerce is commercial in its origin.558 
 
When I asked why Brazil failed to bring the environmental exception in the 
MERCOSUR Brazil-Uruguay decision, Maria Gricia Grossi and Geraldo Siqueira of the 
Brazilian Ministry of Environment responded that they were not aware of the dispute was 
taking place. As it has been noted by them, the Ministry of Environment only became 
aware of the MERCOSUR retreaded tire dispute after the panel report of the Uruguay-
Brazil dispute had been issued.559 This shows the lack of communication and articulation 
among the several Brazilian Ministries. 
 
  This Section has demonstrated that the Brazilian ban on retreaded tires touches 
different sectors of the Brazilian domestic industry for new and retreaded tires. First of 
all, the Brazilian ban on imports of retreaded tires favors the domestic industry of new 
tire manufacturers. Once imports of retreaded tires are prohibited, there is a bigger 
market share for new tires, which generally are at a competitive disadvantage with 
respect to retreaded tires because of the significant price difference between retreaded 
and new tires, and socio-economic conditions in Brazil. On the other hand, the Brazilian 
                                                 
557 Interview with Diplomat Haroldo de Macedo Ribeiro, First-Secretary of the Brazilian Ministry of 
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559 Interview with Maria Grícia Grossi and Geraldo Siqueira, Managers of the Secretary of Environmental 
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retreaded tire industry does not support the ban on retreaded tire imports, apparently due 
to their concerns that this ban may lead to a similar ban on imports of the used tires they 
use to make their products.  On the other hand, despite strong suspicions by 
representatives of new tire manufactures and reformers of used tires in Brazil that the 
Brazilian import ban on retreaded tires resulted from strong industry lobbies in the 
Brazilian Congress and Senate, the representatives of Brazilian Ministry of Environment 
and Foreign Affairs consistently deny this.  Thus, it is not possible to determine a single 
political motive that led to the Brazilian import restrictions.   
 




As discussed in Chapters III and IV, both WTO and MERCOSUR have been 
trying to develop solutions for trade-environment conflicts. However, these solutions 
have proven ineffective. In the WTO case, a Committee on Trade and Environment 
(CTE) was established, in accordance with the Preamble to the WTO Agreement, which 
expressly recognizes the objective of sustainable development.560   The CTE was 
responsible for addressing seven issues considered to be central in trade-environment 
conflicts.561 As Professor Hansen has argued, “the CTE has been unable to develop 
                                                 
560 The Preamble provides: “Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavor 
should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living … while allowing for the optimal use of the 
world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and 
preserve the environment…” 
561 The issues included: 1) the relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system and 
trade measures for environmental purposes, including those pursuant to multilateral environmental 
agreements; 2) the relationship between environmental policies relevant to trade and environmental 
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solutions to any of the conflicts between trade and environmental rules.”562 MERCOSUR 
has actually gone much further than the WTO in trying to develop ways to solve trade-
environment disputes. Its Preamble expressly states that economic development must be 
achieved in conjunction to “the preservation of the environment.” In addition, 
MERCOSUR has established a Working Group on the Environment charged with 
functions similar to those under the CTE. MERCOSUR Member Countries have even 
signed an Environmental Frame Agreement stating that sustainable development policies 
shall not include measures that “unjustifiably and arbitrarily” restrict or distort the free 
circulation of goods and services within MERCOSUR Member States.563 However, the 
Working Group has produced little results,564 and the MERCOSUR Appellate Body did 
not even mention the Environmental Frame Agreement in its decision. 
 
There are serious concerns about the legitimacy of these institutions to deal with 
environmental interests. Trade-environment conflicts address disputes that carry BOTH 
                                                                                                                                                 
measures with significant trade effects and the provisions of the multilateral trading system; 3) the 
relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system and a) charges and taxes for 
environmental purposes, and b) requirements for environmental purposes relating to products, including 
standards and technical regulations, packaging, labeling and recycling; 4) the relationship between the 
provisions of the multilateral trading system with respect to the transparency of trade measures used for 
environmental purposes and environmental measures and requirements that have significant trade effects; 
5) the relationship between the dispute settlement mechanisms in the multilateral trading system and those 
found in multilateral environmental agreements; 6) the effect of environmental measures on market access, 
especially in relation to developing countries, in particular to the least developed among them, and 
environmental benefits of removing trade restrictions and distortions; and 7) the issue of exports of 
domestically prohibited goods. See Weiss & Jackson, supra note 5, at 25-26. 
562 See Hansen, Transparency, supra note 7, at 1036. 
563 Article 3 of the MERCOSUR Environmental Frame Agreement. 
564 See See Maristela Basso, Livre Circulação de Mercadorias e Proteção Ambiental no MERCOSUL [Free 
Trade in Goods and Environmental Protection in MERCOSUR], in MERCOSUL: SEUS EFEITOS JURÍDICOS, 
ECONÔMICOS E POLÍTICOS NOS ESTADOS-MEMBROS [MERCOSUL: ITS LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL 




trade and environmental interests. WTO and MERCOSUR have taken for granted that 
they are the most appropriate forum to address these disputes. However, critics have 
pointed out that trade institutions have little expertise in environmental regulation. This 
type of concern has even led some scholars to propose the creation of a new Global 
Environmental Organization to avoid trade-environment disputes.565  
 
 In addition, MERCOSUR has other institutional and political weaknesses that 
need to be taken into account.  As Professor Jaeger Junior pointed out, since the creation 
of MERCOSUR, legal scholars have indicated that a supranational law making body is 
needed.566 So far, this has not happened, however. Although MERCOSUR rules enable 
the CMC and the GMC to issue legally binding Decisions and Resolutions, this is not 
always the case.567 Although CMC Decisions have direct effect on Member States, 
Professor Lima Marques has shown that, in practice, the only legally binding Decisions 
of the CMC are those that are known by the judge who applies it.568 GMC Resolutions do 
not have direct effect in the Member Countries’ laws, and are not effective within 
MERCOSUR countries, unless they are internalized by all Member States.569 
                                                 
565 ESTY, GREENING THE GATT, supra note 7, at 4. 
566 Augusto Jaeger Junior. Recentes desenvolvimentos no MERCOSUL [Recent Developments in 
MERCOSUR], in ESTUDOS DE DIREITO INTERNACIONAL: ANAIS DO 5 CONGRESSO BRASILEIRO DE DIREITO 
INTERNACIONAL 254 (Wagner Menezes ed., 2007) 
567 Claudia Lima Marques, The Status of Consumer Protection Policy in MERCOSUR 11(Dec. 10, 2007) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).  
568 Id. 
569 Ouro Preto Protocol, art. 40, available at 
http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/portal%20intermediario/pt/index.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2007). 
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MERCOSUR regulations do not stipulate a time limit for a country to internalize 
MERCOSUR laws or regulations.570 
      
On the other hand, Articles 26 and 29 of the Olivos Protocol provide that 
compliance with MERCOSUR panel and Appellate Body reports is mandatory unless the 
panel or the Appellate Body decides otherwise within 30 days after the decision has been 
issued.571 According to Professor Araujo, Member Countries have been complying with 
the panel and Appellate Body reports within the established time limit.572 
  
Recently political support for MERCOSUR has been negatively affected by a 
number of crises within its Member States.573 In 1999, for example, for economic and 
political reasons, Brazil devalued its currency and MERCOSUR issued regulations 
concerning the effects of the devaluation on MERCOSUR trading partners. Argentina 
could not adjust itself to the new Brazilian system and imposed safeguard measures on 
Brazil. Several sectors were negatively affected by these measures, especially trade in 
shoes, chicken, and textiles. This incident almost ceased the existence of 
MERCOSUR.574 In 2000, Argentina considered that its participation in MERCOSUR was 
harmful to its economy, and became non-cooperative with the economic block, seriously 
                                                 
570 Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Phytosanitary Products, supra note 429, P 5.6. 
571 Article 29 of the Olivos Protocol. 
572 See Nadia de Araujo, O Tribunal Permanente de Revisao do MERCOSUL: Analise dos Laudos 
Arbitrais, Sua Ligacao com a Common Law e Algumas Ideias para o Futuro [The MERCOSUR Appellate 
Body: Analysis of the Reports, Its Connection with the Common Law and Some Ideas for the Future], in 
DIREITO INTERNACIONAL 34, 43 (Antonio Paulo Cachapuz ed., 2006). 




impairing the institution.575 Moreover, a new economic crisis hit Argentina in 2001, 
slowing down the talks into making MERCOSUR a full Common Market in the 21st 
century.  
 
Political support for MERCOSUR was further weakened by Brazil-Uruguay 
decision concerning imports of retreaded tires, which was strongly criticized by 
environmentalists and public interests groups.576 In my interview with Maria Gricia 
Grossi and Geraldo Siqueira, of the Brazilian Ministry of Environment, they both have 
expressed strong negative views concerning the MERCOSUR Brazil-Uruguay 
decision,577 as did a number of newspaper accounts. 
  
These institutional weaknesses in both WTO and MERCOSUR need to be taken 
into account by WTO and MERCOSUR trade tribunals to avoid a political backlash 
similar to that pursued by the Tuna-Dolphin decision in GATT.578 The legitimacy of both 
the WTO and MERCOSUR as the right institutions to deal with trade-environment 
disputes has been challenged. Despite its strong treaty provisions, MERCOSUR has 
                                                 
575 Id. at 258.  
576 Silvio Bressan, Brasil Pode Virar “Lixão” Mundial de Pneus: Com 100 Milhões de Carcaças, País 
Corre o Risco de Receber Sobras da Europa Via Mercosul [Brazil May Become World’s Waste Tires 
Dump: With 100 Million Casings, Country Receiving Unused Tires from Europe via Mercosul], Jornal O 
Estado de São Paulo [The State of São Paulo Newspaper], 03.17.2003. 
577 Interview with Maria Grícia Grossi and Geraldo Siqueira, Managers of the Secretary of Environmental 
Quality, Brazilian Ministry of Environment, in Brasília, Brazil (Mar. 21, 2006). 
578 Hansen, supra note 7, at 1030 (noting that “[t]he Tuna-Dolphin decision was immediately decried by 
environmentalists and other public interest groups, who criticized the panel’s incursion on the United 




failed to achieve a regional environmental policy, and is marked by several other 
institutional failures, such as the ineffectiveness of its regulations within the Member 
Countries. Although Member Countries have so far complied with the rulings of the 
panels and Appellate Body report, the Brazil-Uruguay decision has undermined political 




This Chapter has demonstrated that the impact of the Brazilian import ban on 
trade was relatively small; that the environmental risks associated with imports of 
retreaded tires were certain and significant; that less-restrictive alternatives would be less 
effective in regulating these risks; that the ban was not aimed at protecting the domestic 
retreaded tire industry; and that the WTO and MERCOSUR decisions have undermined 
political support for international institutions that badly need such support.   
 
In Section A, I have showed that the Brazilian import ban has not had a serious or 
irreversible economic impact on the European Union, since it has been successful in 
finding alternative markets.  Moreover, available information indicates the impact of 
Argentina’s measures on Uruguay’s trade is negligible.  
 
In Section B, I also demonstrated that there is a real link between tire 
accumulation and risks to the environment and public health, and a direct correlation 
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between reduction of waste tire accumulation and reduction of dengue cases. Retreaded 
tires become waste much faster than new tires. Once these retreaded tires become waste, 
they contribute to the generation of waste tires, which have toxic chemical components.  
 
Section C demonstrated that less-trade restrictive means of addressing the 
problem of waste tire cause environmental problems of their own, and are not 
economically feasible for developing countries. Most importantly, none of these less-
trade restrictive alternatives address the very problem that the import ban is intended to 
eliminate, which is additional generation of waste tires. They only address how to dispose 
of tires once they are inside your territory, not how to prevent the introduction of 
additional waste tires in that territory. Finally, although countries could address this 
problem by sending their used tires abroad to be retreaded and then re-importing the 
retreaded tires, this alternative has high economic costs. 
 
Section D showed that the political analysis of the Brazilian import ban is far 
more complex than suggested by the MERCOSUR and WTO analysis.  In fact, Brazilian 
producers of retreaded tires do NOT support the Brazilian import ban.  This is because 
they are concerned that the ban may be extended to imports of used tires, which they use 
to make their retreaded tires.  On the other hand, although the Brazilian government 
denies this, it is possible that the import ban resulted from strong lobbying by foreign 




Finally, Section E showed the weakness of WTO and MERCOSUR institutions. 
In the special case of MERCOSUR, the institutional failures go well beyond their 
treatment of trade-environment disputes and include the inability to make its regulations 
effective within its Member Countries. Moreover, I have shown the legitimacy of these 
institutions is threatened by domestic political and economic problems faced by the 
MERCOSUR countries, and may be further undermined by the Brazil-Uruguay decision. 
  
 Drawing from these lessons, the tribunals could have achieved significant welfare 
gains by ruling in favor of the Brazilian ban in the tire dispute.  In order to solidify 
political support for the WTO and MERCOSUR, these lessons should be taken into 






This dissertation has addressed the issue of whether the WTO and MERCOSUR 
decisions in the retreaded tire disputes can be justified in light of the scholarly literature 
on the trade-environment conflict and on regulatory competition.  Chapter I has explained 
the framework that has arisen for analyzing trade-environment conflicts in the WTO.  
Chapter II has examined the parallel framework that has arisen under MERCOSUR.   
These two chapters show that there are similarities and differences between the WTO and 
MERCOSUR approach to trade-environment. Both the WTO and the MERCOSUR 
frameworks recognize that the goal of economic development must be achieved together 
with competing goals such as the protection of the environment. In addition, both the 
WTO and MERCOSUR provide exceptions to the general goal of trade liberalization in 
order to protect the environment. Moreover, like the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, MERCOSUR dispute settlement also permits disputes to be settled by ad 
hoc trade panels, subject to review by a permanent Appellate Body.  
  
Chapter III dealt with the MERCOSUR decisions relating to trade in retreaded 
tires. In the first decision, the tribunal did not analyze environmental interests, because 
Brazil failed to bring them to the tribunal’s attention.  In the second case, the newly 
formed MERCOSUR Appellate Body found that Argentina’s ban on retreaded tire 
imports violated MERCOSUR law because: 1) the measure was motivated by both 
environmental and economic concerns; 2) the alleged harm to the environment was 
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neither serious nor irreversible; and 3) the import ban did not prevent the alleged harm to 
the environment. 
 
 Chapter IV discussed the WTO panel report, which concluded that the Brazilian 
import ban was applied in a manner that constituted unjustifiable and arbitrary 
discrimination, and a disguised restriction on international trade. The panel did not take 
into account the fact that the measure was issued by a developing country, or consider the 
social, political and economic difficulties such countries face in fully implementing their 
environmental policies.  
 
Chapter V then examined whether the literature on regulatory competition, which 
suggests that there are significant welfare gains to be derived from allowing a 
proliferation of different standards to be adopted by different governmental authorities.  
In the case of trade and environment conflicts, these gains will depend on a number of 
factors, including: a) the impact on trade; b) the extent and certainty of the environmental 
risks; c) availability of less-restrictive alternatives for regulating these risks; d) the 
political obstacles to effective environmental regulation; and e) the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of MERCOSUR and WTO institutions.  
 
After explaining the main lessons trade tribunals should draw from regulatory 
competition, Chapter VI applied each one of the lessons in the specific case of retreated 
tires.  I concluded that the test applied by WTO and MERCOSUR gives insufficient 
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weight to the lessons learned from regulatory competition, and that as a result the WTO 
and MERCOSUR decisions may have been wrongly decided.  
 
The general conclusion to be drawn from this dissertation is that future WTO and 
MERCOSUR tribunals deciding trade and environment disputes should give greater 
weight to the potential benefits to be gained from allowing a proliferation of different 
environmental approaches, and engage in more careful analysis of the actual economic 
impact of a challenged measure; the extent and scientific certainty of the environmental 
risk; the environmental and political obstacles to pursuing less-restrictive alternatives in 
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